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Abstract 
This dissertation examines Ronald Reagan’s changing Soviet rhetoric over the course of 
his presidency. Specifically, I argue that through the rhetorical analysis of eight of Reagan’s 
speeches, four from his first term and four from his second, we see how the President told a story 
of Soviet redemption. The first chapter of this extended rhetorical analysis is a justification of my 
claim, or a discussion of why Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric matters. The chapter also stands as a Cold 
War literature review that reveals how America understood itself as the world’s guardian against 
communist encroachment. The second chapter is concerned with Reagan’s pre-presidential 
Soviet rhetoric from his position as the Screen Actors Guild president through his failed 
presidential campaign run in 1976, and it establishes the decades-long pattern of anti-communist 
vitriol that Reagan brought to the White House. The third chapter is a rhetorical study of the 
Reagan’s concretized Soviet rhetoric that focuses on his use of historical narrative, 
characterizing the Soviet Union’s leaders as immoral and abhorrent, and the rhetoric of the 
Soviet Union’s inevitable fall. The fourth chapter examines how Reagan negotiated the shift 
from his antecedent Soviet rhetoric to a more conciliatory Soviet rhetoric, effectively recasting 
the USSR as a flawed but possibly redemptive character. The final chapter specifically looks at 
how Reagan’s Soviet redemption narrative emerged from his eight years as President of the 
United States and how that narrative might better help us understand Reagan as an orator. 
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 1 
Chapter One 
For nearly fifty years after World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged 
in a “Cold War”—a battle of words and proxy wars and sociopolitical conflict. Immediately 
following World War II, the world witnessed a historic shift in global power as the United States 
and the Soviet Union expanded their political, military, and ideological might. The United States 
did not return to its previous position as an isolationist state. The Soviet Union took steps to 
protect itself from the kind of military aggression it experienced from neighboring countries in 
World War I and World War II. The post-war actions of the United States and the Soviet Union 
led to polarized relations and enmity between the two superpowers. Where once US-Soviet 
relations were “a problem of rarely more than peripheral concern for the two countries 
involved,” it soon “became an object of rapt attention and anxiety for the entire world.”1 A 
mixture of mutual distrust, an arms race, and vitriolic rhetoric comprised the foundation for the 
Cold War during the years between 1945 and 1985. Political tension was high, and relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union seemed destined always to be poised on the 
brink of collapse. Yet 1991 saw US-Soviet relations as friendly as they had been since World 
War II, and December of that same year saw the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and with that, 
the end of the Cold War. 
 What structural factors had changed during the intervening years to bring about such a 
dramatic alteration in not only US-Soviet relations but Soviet-led communism?  The ascension 
of Mikhail Gorbachev to Soviet General Secretary in 1985, and the subsequent change in 
President Ronald Reagan’s political rhetoric and actions, were key factors in the Cold War shift. 
Together, Reagan and Gorbachev pulled US-Soviet relations out of the Cold War mire onto 
                                                          
1
 John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History, 2
nd
 ed. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1990), 175. 
 2 
firmer political soil. Gorbachev led the way in ending the Cold War, while Reagan encouraged 
and facilitated Gorbachev’s political agenda.2 Reagan accomplished this in large part through his 
political oratory, a “prolonged rhetorical campaign in which [he] attempted to alter the language, 
the ideas, and the thought process used in American discussions about the Soviet Union.”3 
 Throughout his presidency, Reagan maintained his belief that Soviet and American social 
and political ideologies were fundamentally and irrevocably antithetical, and that the Cold War 
was a war of ideas. Still, Reagan desired dialogue with the Soviet Union, but his first presidential 
term saw the deaths of three Soviet leaders.
4
 As a result, Reagan never had a single Soviet leader 
with whom he could engage in extended communication. At times, however, it seemed Reagan 
did not desire such communication, because his Soviet rhetoric was often terse, vitriolic, and 
provocative. Indeed, Reagan maintained some measure of anti-Soviet rhetoric throughout his 
presidency, although his second-term Soviet rhetoric changed relatively quickly, and he 
publically displayed greater optimism for the future of US-Soviet relations. He became more 
optimistic, in great part, because he saw Gorbachev as a different kind of Soviet leader from his 
communist predecessors.
5
 
Reagan was initially wary of Gorbachev, for though the new Soviet leader was relatively 
affable and energetic—the opposite of his three predecessors—, Gorbachev would have to have 
been a “confirmed ideologue” for the Politburo to choose him.6 The President began 
                                                          
2
 James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan (New York: Viking, 2009), 346. 
3
 Ibid., 28. 
4
 Leonid Brezhnev in 1982, Yuri Andropov in 1984 and Konstantin Chernenko in 1985. 
5
 Ronald Reagan, “Farewell Address to the Nation,” (speech, Washington, DC, January 11, 1989), The American 
Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29650&st=&st1=40. 
6
 Ronald Reagan, An American Life: The Autobiography of Ronald Reagan (New York: Threshold Editions, 1990), 
615. 
 3 
communicating with Gorbachev via a series of letters.
7
 In those letters, Reagan invited 
Gorbachev to a summit in Washington. Gorbachev declined to meet Reagan in Washington, but 
both leaders agreed to meet in Geneva, a neutral site. It is with Reagan’s November 21, 1985 
“Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Following the Soviet-United States Summit 
Meeting in Geneva” (“Geneva Address”) that we first see a shift in Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric. 
It is Reagan’s changing Soviet rhetoric that will be the focus of this dissertation. I 
examine the ways that Reagan negotiated the shift from a vehemently anti-communist discourse 
that held little hope for a meaningful or friendly relationship between the US and the Soviet 
Union to a rhetoric of guarded optimism about the future of US-Soviet relations that ultimately 
revealed a Soviet redemption narrative. Critics and pundits have long emphasized the enduring 
consistency of Reagan’s rhetoric, the ways in which Reagan would reiterate the same values and 
messages in speech after speech. Reagan’s decades-long Soviet rhetoric emphasized the moral, 
political, and social differences between the US and Soviet systems. Such disparate systems, 
Reagan seemed to say, meant that the US and the Soviet Union could hope for nothing more than 
a tense coexistence. I am interested in how Reagan altered his Soviet rhetoric, and in doing so, 
created a narrative in which the once irredeemable Soviet Union was redeemed. 
How narrative functioned as a mode of persuasion and historical restructuring in 
Reagan’s Soviet discourse is critical to this dissertation. I shall argue that eight speeches, in 
particular, exemplify Reagan’s Cold War argument, and that taken as a whole demonstrate a tale 
of Soviet redemption. That is, what emerges over the course of Reagan’s two presidential terms 
is a kind of overarching narrative of Soviet redemption played out via his rhetoric. There is a 
tonal, linguistic, and narrative shift regarding the Soviet Union from Reagan’s first term to his 
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 Reagan later said the letters “marked the cautious beginning on both sides of what was to become the 
foundation of not only a better relationship between our countries but a friendship between two men.” Ronald 
Reagan, An American Life: The Autobiography of Ronald Reagan (New York: Threshold Editions, 1990), 612. 
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second. Complicating this tale, however, is the president’s antecedent Soviet rhetoric. Reagan 
had to find a way to negotiate this change and maintain or create public support for his policy. In 
short, this dissertation asks how Reagan went from labeling the Soviet Union an “evil empire”8 
in 1983 to saying that that label was from “another time, another era”9 in 1988, and the way his 
changing rhetoric created a specific Soviet redemption narrative. 
In this chapter, I first offer a justification of this study—that is, why Reagan’s Soviet 
rhetoric matters. Next, I review Cold War literature, paying particular attention to the way 
rhetorical scholars talk about how the Cold War affected and shaped the United States’ 
understanding of itself on national and international levels. The ontological position of American 
statehood positioned itself against the ubiquitous understanding of what Soviet communism was 
socially, politically, and ethically. Following the Cold War section, I examine some of the major 
points of discussion about the power of presidential rhetoric from the mid-20
th
 century to the 
present. I then review literature concerning Reagan’s popularity as a subject of criticism and 
study, his rhetorical style, and his changing Soviet rhetoric. In the penultimate section, I preview 
the dissertation chapters. I conclude with a review of the themes presented above. 
Justification 
 Reagan came to the office of the president as a confirmed anti-communist, distrustful of 
the Soviet Union, and seemingly resigned to the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union 
could never hope to do more than coexist; his Soviet rhetoric during his first term in office only 
strengthened that perception. Yet, when he left office, the US was on friendly terms with the 
Soviet Union and the President’s tone had changed to a more hopeful one. Only a small part of 
                                                          
8
 Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, 
Florida," (speech, Orlando, FL, March 8, 1983), The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41023. 
9
 “The Moscow Summit 20 Years Later: From The Secret U.S. and Soviet Files,” The National Security Archive, May 
31, 2008, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB251/. 
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Reagan criticism is devoted to how his rhetoric changed over time, and as such, this dissertation 
will help fill a lack in Reagan studies. Studying and critiquing Reagan’s changing Soviet rhetoric 
is important because it fills gaps in Reagan literature and helps us better understand the way his 
rhetorical choices influenced world politics in the 1980s and beyond. 
In general, the change in Reagan’s once seemingly intractable Soviet rhetoric reminds us 
that rhetoric is a dynamic process, one which changes in response to new purposes, situations, 
and players. In particular, how Reagan negotiated adjusting his Soviet rhetoric in light of his 
antecedent rhetoric is a unique case of political rhetorical response and change. Reviewing a 
widely separated series of Reagan’s rhetorical choices and processes is a chance to view the 
power of rhetoric in action, to see how it can fashion the new out of the old, help to mend 
decades-old social and political rivalries, and demonstrate how a rhetor might create one unified 
message—Reagan’s aforementioned Soviet redemption narrative—out of a series of utterances 
over a span of time. 
Cold War Literature Review 
Rhetoric and the Cold War are inextricably linked. Some critics argue that the “Cold War 
is, itself, a rhetorical construction.”10 The definition of “Cold War” points to the unique 
rhetorical elements of such a conflict: “Hostilities short of armed conflict, consisting in threats, 
violent propaganda, subversive political activities, or the like.”11 The Cold War was generally a 
war of words, of competing messages about ideology, good and evil, and right and wrong, all in 
the service of achieving general and specific political goals. Rhetorical choices shaped the 
                                                          
10
 Martin J. Medhurst, introduction to Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History, ed. Martin 
J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2000), 6; See also, Thomas Kane, “Foreign Policy Suppositions and 
Commanding Ideas,” Argumentation & Advocacy 28, no. 2 (1991). Communication & Mass Media Complete, 
EBSCOhost. 
11
 English Oxford Dictionary Online, s.v. “cold war,” 
http://original.britannica.com.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/eb/article-9067596. 
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language of US-Soviet foreign relations, the way American citizens understood the place of the 
Soviet Union in the world, and America’s ideological and military oppositional position to 
communist states. This section of the chapter proceeds in three parts: First, a review of relevant 
historical Cold War sources. Second, an examination of major viewpoints in rhetorical studies on 
rhetoric and the Cold War. And third, a summary and brief discussion of historical and rhetorical 
studies sources in relation to this project. 
The Cold War “needed a coherent and inclusive vocabulary in order to promote a variety 
of security concerns, economic interests, self-images, domestic political issues, and personal 
ambitions. Accordingly, the Cold War became a frame of reference through which to view, 
understand, and explain all the historical events that occurred during its lengthy life span.”12 It 
was in the early years of the Cold War that American politicians insisted that the United States 
must respond to Soviet threats, but “that the Soviet Union could at any time choose to end the 
threat by acting like a civilized nation.”13  Thus was laid the foundation for four decades of 
American rhetoric about the Soviet Union, a rhetoric taken up in varying degrees by every 
president from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan: Internationally and domestically, the Soviet 
Union was a danger because of its adherence to the flawed ideology of communism, but 
redemption was always a possibility if they renounced their unsavory ways. In this way, “major 
American leaders supported by influential opinion-makers created the universal ideology of 
anticommunism, but applied it selectively in foreign affairs and selectively (though often 
indiscriminately) in domestic affairs.”14 
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 Thomas Kane, “Foreign Policy Suppositions and Commanding Ideas,” Argumentation & Advocacy 28, no. 2 
(1991): 80. Communication & Mass Media Complete, EBSCOhost. 
13
 Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr., The Cold War as Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945-1950 (New York: 
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In America, and to some degree throughout the West, sitting US presidents generated and 
maintained the language of the Cold War. Thomas Kane contends that the language used to 
describe and understand the Cold War “[took] shape and character during the presidency of 
Harry S. Truman.” Truman’s rhetoric was “harsh,” the tenor was “uncompromising,” and it 
“exaggerated differences and minimized common interests” as it “claimed the superiority of the 
American experience.”15 Truman’s “nondiplomatic style” of speech contributed to “the 
conformation, the interpretation, [and] the language” of nascent Cold War rhetoric.16 
Despite Kane’s argument that Truman was the sole architect of vitriolic Soviet rhetoric, 
there is a long history of American rhetoric that constituted the US as good and righteous. As 
such, any opposing system of governance donned a cloak of evil. Historian Robert J. McMahon 
notes that “American leaders have, since the foundation of the republic,” championed “the 
uniqueness of America’s civilization, history, character, and driving forces.” There is a long 
tradition of political “depiction of the United States as the world’s selfless guardian of peace, 
freedom, and democracy.” US presidents “have habitually claimed that U.S. foreign policy 
aimed to defend the peace and to carry the blessings of freedom to other peoples. Many 
American statesmen have even found divine sanction for the conceit that the United States had a 
global mission to share its superior values, institutions, and culture with others.”17  Cold War 
presidents employed rhetoric of the same kind, emphasizing the “selflessness of American 
motives and the universality of U.S. objectives.”18 For example, Eisenhower’s 1953 “State of the 
Union” admonished Americans to “be devoted with all our heart to the values we defend,” and to 
                                                          
15
 Kane, “Foreign Policy Suppositions and Commanding Ideas.” 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Robert J. McMahon, “‘By Helping Others, We Help Ourselves’: The Cold War Rhetoric of American Foreign 
Policy,” in Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History, eds. Martin J. Medhurst and H.W. 
Brands (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 233. 
18
 Ibid., 234. 
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“know that each of these values and virtues applies with equal force at the ends of the earth and 
in our relations with our neighbor next door.”19 Eisenhower’s rhetoric fell in line with 
McMahon’s contention that presidential rhetoric presented American values as universally good, 
and through such rhetoric, presidents “implied (and sometimes directly stated) that any nation or 
group that would oppose such objectives was, by definition, evil.”20 Cold War presidents argued 
that there existed a global “interdependence,” and that the “loss of peace or freedom anywhere 
will endanger peace and freedom everywhere.” As such, “the United States must act as global 
guardian for the sake of its own welfare and security. Idealism and realism, at least in this vision, 
meld.”21 
McMahon’s observations point to the interconnectedness of domestic and foreign 
policies. When one advocates for certain foreign policies, one advocates for domestic and 
international “truths.” Domestic and foreign policy rhetoric was one and the same, polarizing 
supporters and detractors of American democracy. Truman’s “Truman Doctrine” speech 
explicitly addressed the polarized state of US and Soviet ideology and interests. Democracy, said 
Truman, “is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, 
representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech 
and religion, and freedom from political oppression.” Ostensibly, those were positive attributes 
of America’s “good” governmental ideology. Conversely, Soviet communist ideology was 
“based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and 
oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal 
                                                          
19
 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” (speech, Washington, DC, 
February 2, 1953), The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9829. 
20
 McMahon, “‘By Helping Others, We Help Ourselves,’” 234. 
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 Ibid., 235. 
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freedoms.”22 Such comparisons recur throughout the Cold War, perhaps the most famous being 
John F. Kennedy’s challenge to those who would champion communism or question why 
democracy and communism were incompatible. He simply told people to “Come to Berlin” 23 if 
they wanted to see the falsity of those ideas and issues. 
Cold War presidential rhetoric was not monolithic however; presidents sometimes 
eschewed polarization for more peaceful or conciliatory words. For example, Kennedy’s 
American University commencement address “demonstrated a new understanding of reality—the 
possibility of peace with an adversary—that the audience should embrace.”24 The reason that the 
US should pursue peace with the Soviet Union was because the alternative was total war. Such a 
war, said Kennedy, “makes no sense” because the US and Soviet Union “can maintain large and 
relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces,” 
because of the awesome power of nuclear weapons, and because “deadly poisons produced by a 
nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the 
globe and to generations yet unborn.”25 Negotiation was desirable because it assured the future 
of the human race and because the facts of the historical situation led naturally to negotiation. 
Kennedy connected peace abroad with peace and freedom in the United States, and those who 
would help guide citizens toward peace and freedom at home were those with the “authority” to 
do so: the Executive and Legislative branches of the government.
26
 Thus, the government was 
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 Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine,” (speech, 
Washington, DC, March 12, 1947), The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846. 
23
 John F. Kennedy, “Remarks in the Rudolph Wilde Platz, Berlin,” (speech, Berlin, West Germany, June 26, 
1963), The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9307. 
24
 Denise M. Bostdorff and Shawna H. Ferris, "John F. Kennedy at American University: The Rhetoric of the 
Possible, Epideictic Progression, and the Commencement of Peace," The Quarterly Journal of Speech 100, no.4 
(2014): 408. 
25
 John F. Kennedy, “Commencement Address at American University in Washington,” (speech, Washington, DC, 
June 10, 1963), The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9266. 
26
 Ibid. 
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tasked with being, as Jimmy Carter would later say, “competent and compassionate.”27 Still, 
although presidents sometimes used rhetoric that relied less on opposition and more on 
cooperation, rhetoric that pitted the US against the Soviet Union was more common. 
Norman Graebner says that “the American Cold War was fundamentally a rhetorical 
exercise. It emerged and thrived on images of impending global disaster.”28 Among any number 
of disasters was communist expansion outside of Eastern Europe and Asia. Thus the US enacted 
a policy of containment, a “strategy that aimed at restraining Soviet expansionism through the 
projection of U.S. power and the building of resilient alliances with non-Communist states.”29 
Although the military strength of the communists was certainly an issue in Cold War rhetoric, 
many presidents argued that the Soviet Union did not always contrive to conquer the world 
militarily but through “the limitless promise of Soviet ideological expansion.”30 US officials 
claimed that the goal of the Soviet Union was to create a Soviet “world hegemony.”31  
The core messages of presidential Cold War rhetoric remained, to varying degrees, static 
throughout its four decades: The Soviet Union, with its flawed ideologies, was aggressive, 
morally and politically corrupt, and bent on expanding its influence throughout the world. In 
response, the US would be vigilant and respond to communist threats. The antithetical nature of 
communism to democracy meant that peace could not be achieved, but coexistence was within 
reach if both sides negotiated in good faith. Negotiating in good faith would be hard, of course, 
because presidential rhetoric stressed the malevolent nature of communism, especially in light of 
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 Jimmy Carter, “Inaugural Address,” (speech, Washington, DC, January 20, 1977), The American Presidency 
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a benevolent US democracy. Simply, the US and the Soviet Union were diametrically opposed in 
the oldest of literary conflicts: good versus evil. The ever-present stock arguments, solutions, and 
appeals to Soviet “issues” repeated by presidents from Truman to Carter found their way into all 
areas of public and political discussion. 
The concept of a “cold war,” however, holds a large measure of ambivalence. Such 
ambivalence points to the folly of attempting to study and talk about the Cold War as a static, 
decades-long event.
32
  The Cold War was at times “hotter” than at other times, and the rhetoric 
of US and Soviet leaders and culture-makers guaranteed that historical and rhetorical moments 
and situations demanded shifting ways and modes of speaking about the US-Soviet relationship. 
Rhetorical scholarship has long endeavored to make sense of such changing and contingent 
rhetoric, most prominently through discussion of Cold War rhetoric as strategic, metaphorical, 
and ideological. These discussions have been arguments about how to view and evaluate rhetoric 
but are in no way neatly compartmentalized from one another; there is overlap among them. 
Martin J. Medhurst argues that Cold War rhetoric was strategic and echoes Scott when he 
notes that rhetoric and the Cold War were in an ever-changing relationship modified by shifting 
rhetorical and historical events.
33
  Rhetoric was key to the Cold War, says Medhurst, because in 
the Cold War “weapons are words, images, symbolic actions, and, on occasion, physical actions 
undertaken by covert means.”34  Cold War rhetoric was strategic rhetoric because it was “a 
matter of symbolic action, action intended to forward the accomplishment of strategic goals—
social, political, economic, military, or diplomatic.”35 Medhurst contends that two major goals of 
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 Ibid., 4. 
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 Martin J. Medhurst, “Rhetoric and Cold War: A Strategic Approach,” in Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, 
and Ideology, Robert Ivie and Martin J. Medhurst and Robert Scott and Philip Wander et. al. (East Lansing, MI: 
Michigan State University Press, 1997), 19. 
34
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the Cold War were preventing a “hot war” and expanding the political influence of the United 
States and Soviet Union.
36
  Avoiding armed conflict while expanding a country’s sphere of 
influence is rightly a difficult proposition; the heavy lifting of such a project is shouldered by 
rhetoric. Myriad shifting factors which threatened to upset the balancing act in which US and 
Soviet politicians engaged throughout the Cold War
37
 necessitated the skilled use of rhetoric in 
keeping the Cold War cold. 
Where Medhurst argues for the primacy of rhetoric as strategic, Robert L. Ivie contends 
that metaphor played an important role in Cold War discourse. Communist adversaries of the 
United States were described as mortal threats, germs, plagues and barbarians, while freedom 
(associated with the US) was described as “weak, fragile, and feminine—as vulnerable to disease 
and rape.”38 Ivie maintains that one of the dangers of such rhetoric is that we may begin to see 
metaphors as literal, then act upon that perception.
39
  Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric took advantage of 
his audience’s belief in the literal value of metaphors, that the Soviets were indeed harbingers of 
the death of Western freedoms and values. Even now, we retain a sense of our place in the world 
in relation to other political powers through a lens shaped by Reagan’s Cold War declarations of 
the danger inherent in the savage system of communism. 
The third in this tripartite view of Cold War rhetoric is the ideological. One of the major 
rhetorical strategies of Cold War presidents was to present a polarized view of the United States 
and the Soviet Union. In all ways, went the argument, the Soviet Union was the antithesis of the 
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United States. In societal, governmental and ethical matters, the US was on the side of “good,” 
while the Soviet Union was on the side of “evil.” Philip Wander offers an insightful frame 
through which scholars might understand such polarization: prophetic dualism. Prophetic 
dualism 
 divides the world into two camps. Between them there is conflict. One side acts  
  in accord with all that is good, decent, and at one with God’s will. The other acts  
  in direct opposition. Conflict between them is resolved only through the total  
  victory of one side over the other. Since no guarantee exists that goodwill   
  triumphs, there is no middle ground. Hence neutrality may be treated as a   
  delusion, compromise appeasement, and negotiation a call for surrender.
40
 
According to Wander, prophetic dualism rose to prominence in the nascent stages of 
Vietnam War policy rhetoric, specifically that which “concerned America’s moral or spiritual 
superiority. Religious faith, moral insight, a respect for the laws of God formed a set of virtues 
attributed to the nation which...could be called upon not only to explain why those in power 
deserved to be there, but also why the United States should engage in certain kinds of action 
abroad.”41 Reagan’s rhetoric often invoked the ideological superiority of the US system of 
government over communism and was his longest-lived Cold War argument. 
Scholars of Cold War rhetoric as strategic, metaphorical, and ideological have produced 
reams of print “worked with great skill,” but recently, Ned O’Gorman has emphasized abduction 
as a way to read Cold War texts that highlights the “‘world-making’ capacity of language”42 
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through a combination of “strategic discourse” and “worldviews.”43 According to O’Gorman, 
worldviews are “a way of apprehending the world, entailing not only a way of seeing the world, 
but a way of being in it, and ultimately a distinct way of talking about it,”44 and “are discerned 
by looking at the ways in which the world is addressed, constructed, and (re)formed in 
language.”45 By engaging both the strategic elements of rhetoric and the worldviews of Cold 
War rhetors, critics might uncover the “‘motive force’” behind political statements.46 
O’Gorman’s work provides a method of examination that offers a nuanced way of understanding 
both how and why Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric was ultimately contingent and changeable after 
years of practiced, fixed, anti-communist oratory. 
The aforementioned perspectives on Cold War rhetoric are not incompatible; they are 
different viewpoints that help paint a fuller portrait of an important aspect of the Cold War. Each 
helps me understand the ways in which Reagan’s redemption narrative shaped a new view of the 
Soviet Union, one which used the power of the presidency to authorize a shift in American views 
of that nation. 
Like Medhurst, I believe that rhetoric is essentially strategic, that it is a means to an end. 
Each utterance begs the assent of the audience to a speaker’s goal. Reagan’s goal, from his days 
as the president of the Screen Actors Guild to his farewell address as President of the United 
States of America, was most often to undermine the structure and support of communism. Like 
O’Gorman, I believe that understanding the motivations of political speech via worldviews offers 
the chance for a nuanced reading and understanding of Cold War rhetoric. Reagan’s worldview 
of the moral, political, and social superiority of American democracy’s precepts over the amoral, 
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politically, and socially degenerate edicts of Soviet communism drove his Cold War rhetoric as 
he sought some way to dismantle that odious institution. 
Presidency Literature Review 
Two of the premises of this dissertation are that Ronald Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric changed 
over the course of his presidency, and that this change helped facilitate both the start of a new 
US-Soviet political relationship and a new way of perceiving the Soviet Union. Such claims raise 
questions about the power of presidential rhetoric and how that power manifests itself in public 
contexts. My interpretation of the power of presidential rhetoric is a synthesis, or amalgamation, 
of a number of theories about presidential rhetoric and its capacity to initiate social and political 
change. The power of presidential rhetoric is both instrumental and constitutive, advancing 
political agendas and creating perceptions of people and issues. It promotes social and political 
discussions and actions which can be traced back to a president’s orations. The power of 
presidential rhetoric rests in its ability to set in motion, or speed along, public and political action 
and perception. Whether the president publically raises an issue for the first time, echoes 
preexisting sentiments of an established issue or changes course on an issue, the office’s position 
and visibility inevitably creates discussion, action, and perception of people and events. 
The executive power of the President of the United States is more difficult to encapsulate 
than is found in the oft repeated idiom, “The president is the most powerful man in the world.” 
The position of President of the United States is an influential one, but it is in the words of 
presidents that we find the fount of presidential power. Presidential rhetoric motivates, 
encourages, cajoles, demands, and inspires actions and reactions. I make these claims with the 
understanding that such statements are contentious in the arena of presidential rhetorical studies. 
What follows is a brief literature review of the scholarly discussion of the power of presidential 
 16 
rhetoric and a justification for my claims on the power of presidential rhetoric. First, I review the 
literature on the power of presidential rhetoric. I discuss the ideas of the rhetorical power of the 
executive office in the pluralist and “going public” senses, as well as counter-arguments to its 
effectiveness and responses to those latter claims. Second, I define and explain my concept of the 
power of presidential rhetoric in conversation with the works in the literature review. Last, I 
reflect on the power of presidential rhetoric. 
  Arguments concerning the scope and influence of presidential rhetoric are now over 
fifty years old. In the mid-20
th
 century, Richard Neustadt claimed that the power of the executive 
office was in its negotiating and bargaining positions—in its “power to persuade” other 
governmental actors.
47
 This view of presidential power is a pluralist notion of the executive 
office—the president alone does not wield absolute authority or influence over governmental 
matters. Instead, influence is shared and facilitated by other branches of the government. The 
president is in many ways beholden to others to exercise the power of the Oval Office, often only 
flexing his political might when key negotiations loosen his restraints. Presidential power is not 
the ability to speak into being a policy or desire, nor to command other governmental actors, but 
“to convince such men that what the White House wants of them is what they ought to do for 
their sake and on their authority.”48 Neustadt contends that the president is a conduit through 
which power can flow, but he does not have the ability to control absolutely the movement of 
that power.
49
 How the president affects the flow of power is through words and actions and 
where and in what moment he chooses to speak or act.
50
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Where Neustadt argues that the power of the presidency resides in the ability to persuade 
other governmental actors, Jeffery K. Tulis argues that the power of the president manifests itself 
most strongly when he brings his messages directly to the public. In turn, the people may 
pressure Congress to follow the president’s lead regarding policies.51 This shift toward direct 
public appeal constitutes a “true transformation” of the presidency,52 what Tulis calls the 
“rhetorical presidency.” Such “popular or mass rhetoric,” says Tulis, “has become a principal 
tool of presidential government.”53 The rhetorical presidency places power in a president’s 
persuasive speech and his capacity to convince the public that his policy, initiative, or directive is 
right for the country. 
Samuel Kernell expanded on Tulis’s work, labeling the turn toward speaking directly to 
the citizenry “going public,” which “is a strategy whereby a president promotes himself and his 
policies in Washington by appealing to the American public for support.”54 While 
acknowledging the increase in presidents going public, Kernell warns that relying on direct 
public appeal in some ways undermines the bargaining component of the executive office. There 
are four ways going public undermines bargaining: First, it “rarely includes the kinds of 
exchanges necessary, in pluralist theory, for the American political system to function properly.” 
Second, it “fails to extend benefits for compliance, but freely imposes costs for 
noncomplicance.” Third, “going public entails public posturing,” which “fixes the president’s 
bargaining position.” Last, and possibly “most injurious to bargaining,” it “undermines the 
legitimacy of other politicians.”55 Going public contradicts Neustadt’s position on the power of 
the presidency, so Kernell asks, “Why should presidents come to favor a strategy of leadership 
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that appears so incompatible with the principles of pluralist theory?” The answer is because 
“[p]olitics in Washington may no longer be as tractable to bargaining as it once was. Presidents 
prefer to go public because the strategy offers a better prospect of success than it did in the 
past.”56  Presidents have learned that public opinion can be far-reaching and powerful. 
Although seemingly at odds with one another, Neustadt and Tulis’s theories share some 
ideas. The rhetoric of the Oval Office affects policies and agendas through both negotiations 
with other governmental actors and by going public. With whom the president negotiates may 
change depending on what the president would like to happen. That bargaining partner may not 
always be another government official either. In a sense, going public is a form of negotiating 
with the citizenry. When the president speaks out on an issue of domestic or international import, 
he is essentially negotiating his stance. In return, the president receives criticism and praise that 
can shape future decisions regarding that particular issue. Such a perspective elucidates how 
presidential rhetoric acts while taking into account both pluralist and going public theories of 
presidential rhetoric. 
 According to a number of critics, presidential rhetoric is a powerful tool that shapes 
political and social movement. Ontologically, presidential rhetoric constitutes the citizenry as 
uniquely American. Specifically, the sway going public holds in American politics is viewed as 
especially influential. The argument that going public is an effective and legitimate strategy for 
presidents to exercise the power of their speech has won broad acceptance among rhetoricians; 
however, the efficacy of going public has proved a contentious claim in other disciplines. 
Political scientist George C. Edwards is the most prominent skeptic of the effectiveness of going 
public. Edwards contends that there is little to no empirical evidence that presidential rhetoric 
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holds significant sway over the public.
57
  Edwards argues that presidents do not meaningfully 
change public opinion through charisma and by going public, and that they “are not directors 
who lead the public where it otherwise refuses to go, thus reshaping the contours of the political 
landscape.”58  Instead, chief executives are “facilitators” of popular public opinion who “may 
endow the views of their supporters with structure and purpose and exploit opportunities in their 
environments to accomplish their joint goals.”59  Critics who insist that charismatic presidents 
hold greater influence over public opinion are not giving the public enough credit. The public 
often “separate[s] the person from the performance,” and it is not necessary for a president to be 
likeable to advance his agenda. Plainly, Edwards states, “the ability of leaders to move the public 
is limited, and thus the role of the individual leader may be less important than we think.”60  As 
such, Edwards challenges rhetoricians to explain why presidential rhetoric matters.
61
 
 Where Edwards seeks to downplay or dismiss the power of presidential rhetoric, 
Medhurst differentiates between the two terms and offers a counterpoint to Edwards. Medhurst 
contends that there are fundamental differences between those who study the rhetorical 
presidency and those who study presidential rhetoric. Focusing on presidency directs attention to 
the presidency as an institution of established rules, norms, history, and legitimacy. Focusing on 
rhetoric directs attention to “the particular arena within which one can study the principles and 
practices of rhetoric, understood as the human capacity to see what is most likely to be 
persuasive to a given audience on a given occasion.”62  When rhetorical scholars engage 
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presidential rhetoric, they engage rhetoric in a unique context in order to further their knowledge 
and understanding of rhetoric. For Medhurst, rhetorical study is about asking questions regarding 
artistry, intent, strategy, genre, style, argument, situations and audience effectivity that are not 
quantifiable.
63
 
 The idea of “effects” in relation to presidential rhetoric, then, is Edwards’s stumbling 
block. As David Zarefsky notes, “few would argue seriously that mediated messages make no 
difference,” because there is always some reaction to presidential rhetoric. Zarefsky further 
argues that Edwards conceives of the terms “presidential rhetoric” and “effect” too narrowly. 
“Presidential rhetoric” becomes only public speech and effects are viewed as “quantitatively 
measurable changes in indices of people's attitudes or beliefs.” The problem with such narrow 
definitions of these terms is that they over-simplify “understanding of the process of 
communication and the nature of rhetorical transactions.”64  The effect of a rhetorical act is 
rarely quantifiable. As such, Edwards seems to miss the mark in terms of rhetorical criticism. 
 Discussion about the extent of presidential power and rhetoric, then, falls into a small set 
of arguments: First, a president wields the power to persuade but his power is tempered by the 
pluralist machinations of the executive office. Second, presidents find great success advancing 
their political agendas by abandoning pluralist constraints and speaking directly to the citizenry. 
Third, there is significant debate that going public significantly advances political agendas, or 
that the public is easily swayed by direct political appeals. Last, that trying to quantify the effects 
of public opinion is stymied by the unquantifiable nature of the power of rhetoric and by the 
limiting nature of definitions. 
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 I enter this conversation with an understanding of the power of presidential rhetoric that 
synthesizes aspects of pluralist and going public theories. Presidential rhetoric is a form of public 
negotiation that sets in motion, or speeds along, public and political action, as well as creates and 
sustains social and political momentum. When a president brings to light a public issue, national 
or international initiative or a political agenda, he creates discussion, action, and perception. The 
same is true when he takes up a pre-existing issue, initiative or agenda. In part, presidential 
power is housed in the ability of a president to facilitate social and political action. Lone 
instances of presidential rhetoric do not create end results or obvious effects. Instead, presidential 
speech—often a number of oratories in succession— works to speed along processes that 
eventually end in a result or effect. 
If we look only at singular instances of presidential oratory, Edwards’s view of the power 
of presidential rhetoric—that significant change does not result from presidential speech—makes 
some sense. However, Edwards’s view differs from my own because I am not concerned with 
effects criterion in a quantitative framework, but in the qualitative ways rhetoric demonstrates 
the power of presidential rhetoric. As Amos Kiewe and Davis W. Houck point out: 
The fault in Edwards’s reasoning lies in misunderstanding the rhetorical process 
altogether and treating it as a testable formula—as effects with observable causes. The 
fault also lies in the way he operationalizes his research, discounting the qualitative value 
of presidential communication and the abundance of sources, especially primary sources, 
that often shed more accurate light on an individual president and the effect of specific 
speeches.
65
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It is a dubious claim that one speech might create an immediate grand effect, but one can 
examine if, and how, people changed the way in which they approach a subject of presidential 
speech. Do journalists afford more print to a question recently broached by a president? Have 
commentators and political wonks devoted further time to discussing the particulars of 
presidential communication in the wake of a speech? Do political actors initiate a push for a 
specific political action after presidential commentary? Does the public talk about people(s) or 
events differently in the wake of presidential rhetoric? These are the kinds of questions 
presidential rhetoric scholars should be asking; in short “the critic needs to engage a text’s 
interlocutors in order to understand how a message has resonated (or failed to resonate) with 
them, especially when such evidence is available.”66 Instances of presidential rhetoric over a 
span of time may lead to an effect, and if a number of presidential addresses are viewed over a 
set period of time, we see a kind of narrative effect emerge. The story of how a president’s 
rhetoric promotes action develops in such instances. Where Edwards seeks quantifiable evidence 
of the causal power of single instances of presidential oratory, I am interested in the concomitant 
relationship between Ronald Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric and the correlated political and narrative 
events that emerge from such a relationship 
 My project takes as one of its most important elements, the idea that presidential rhetoric 
is powerful in its ability to facilitate change on national and international levels. Such a claim 
requires understanding how presidential rhetoric works to enact change and how previous 
scholars have conceived of the power of presidential rhetoric. There is over fifty years of 
scholarly discussion about the power of the modern president, and nearly all of it inevitably 
addresses presidential rhetoric, whether directly or indirectly. The number of works arguing for 
or against how and in what capacity presidential rhetoric affects social and political issues and 
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history is sizeable and often contentious. We can conclude that the power of presidential rhetoric 
is a force deserving of attention. This dissertation should add to the literature on the power of 
presidential rhetoric, not in a way that advocates presidential oratory as quantifiable tool of 
causation, but as an agent for social and political discussions, actions, and perceptions. 
Reagan Literature Review 
 Reagan was popular with the citizenry for most of his presidency, is often referred to as 
“The Great Communicator,” and even after he left office, popular press and scholars alike wrote 
prodigiously about him. As such, the literature on Reagan is legion. A general search for the term 
“Ronald Reagan” at Amazon.com returns nearly 20,500 results, over 14,000 of which are book 
results. In academic circles, he is just as popular: In the EBSCOhost database alone, a search for 
the term “Ronald Reagan” nets over 26,000 results. Reagan’s legacy in presidential rhetoric 
studies cannot be overstated, for, as Mary Stuckey notes, “Largely as a result of the Reagan 
administration, scholars now focus on the increasing importance of presidential speech.”67  
Reagan took on many roles as a speaker—hero, priest, champion of the American past, and 
moralist, to name a few.
68
  It is his overwhelming rhetorical legacy that has resulted in his broad 
popularity as an object of fascination and study for scholars and non-academics alike.
69
 What 
follows then can only be a brief account of some of the major themes in Reagan studies. 
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 Reagan’s political ideologies were formed in Dixon, Illinois, in large part because of his 
family’s political stance. His father, Jack Reagan, “one of the few Democrats in town,” worked 
to put some of the New Deal programs into place in Dixon. Reagan said that Jack’s job “gave me 
my first opportunity to watch government in action.”70  Politically, Reagan followed his parents’ 
lead; he cast his first presidential vote for Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom he “idolized.”71  Reagan 
“revere[d] Roosevelt as a communicator and a leader, even after he came to disagree with almost 
every economic component of the New Deal.”72 
 Long before Reagan emerged as a political force, he was passionate about affairs of state 
and about what he saw as a growing communist threat. Jane Wyman, Reagan’s first wife, said 
that shortly after their 1940 marriage, she realized he “was obsessed…by the insidious climate of 
evil he saw encroaching from two directions—Europe on the one hand, and communist forces in 
the United States on the other.”73  His obsession with politics strained their marriage, and 
Wyman appeared to have “resented Reagan’s growing obsession with politics, his incessant talk 
about national and international affairs, and his inattention to her views and needs.”74 
 After World War II, Reagan said, he was still a “New Dealer to the core,”75 and he 
“emerged from the war as a bleeding-heart liberal intent on making the world a better place.”76  
Part of making the world a better place was fighting the influence of, and eventually eliminating, 
communism. Reagan feared communists were infiltrating groups, societies, and guilds in 
Hollywood. Some critics argue that he had a reason to be worried about communists in positions 
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of power in Hollywood, because they attempted “to advance communist influence in the film 
industry.”77  From his days as a board member, and later president, of the Screen Actors Guild 
(SAG) in the late 1940s and early 1950s, to his witness testimony before the House Committee 
on Un-American Activities (HUAC), Reagan used his public visibility to denounce the tenets of 
communism.
78
  Reagan went so far as to “[serve] as a confidential informant for the FBI,” and 
“kept agents informed about pro-Communist influences in the Screen Actors Guild and other 
Hollywood organizations.”79  After the HUAC hearings, Reagan became a “full-fledged anti-
communist leader,” viewing himself as a “citizen-crusader” intent on protecting “traditional 
American values.”80 
 Reagan meticulously followed political maneuverings in Washington, learning the issues 
and the arguments that came out of the nation’s capital. In 1954, as his career as a movie star 
wound down, he accepted an offer from General Electric to host the weekly television program, 
General Electric Theater. Part of the job was being a “traveling ambassador,” which took him 
around the country to General Electric’s factories where he spoke to the employees.81  Reagan 
claimed that speaking so often, and to so many people, was not “a bad apprenticeship for 
someone who’d someday enter public life” and “became almost a postgraduate course in 
political science.”82  During his time at General Electric his speeches became more polarized and 
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the company believed Reagan had become a “controversial liability.”83  In 1962, the same year 
he registered as a Republican, Reagan was fired from General Electric.
84
 
Studies of Reagan’s rhetoric often address his persona, use of narrative, and/or ideology. 
Such distinctions are not so neat, however, because these three areas of Reagan’s speech 
interanimate and bolster each other. Persona, narrative, and ideology do not simply form a kind 
Venn diagram of Reagan’s rhetoric; instead, these three areas reinforce and buttress one another. 
Perceptions of Reagan were not based solely on his way of speaking or the way he presented 
himself, but on his physical being as well; he was tall, good-looking, and athletic. The public 
knew him as an actor and an outdoorsman—a romantic figure. In 1982, Walter R. Fisher argued 
“that there is a romantic strain in American history and politics,”85 postulating that one day 
Reagan’s legacy might well be one of romantic, presidential heroics. Fisher argues that Reagan’s 
physical appearance, his regard for the US military, and his belief in America’s successful future 
were all a part of him winning the 1980 presidential election;
86
 when combined with Reagan’s 
rhetoric, he becomes a kind of romantic, rhetorical powerhouse.
87
 Fisher is correct that Reagan’s 
image and his oratory were often enmeshed in one another, each supporting and strengthening 
the other. 
Physically, Reagan cut a striking figure, but a large part of his popularity was his affable, 
everyman persona
88
 combined with a conversational, simple rhetorical manner.
89
 He loved his 
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country and its people, and his rhetorical style reflected that. His style was built on stories of 
“regular” people and the ability to explain complex ideas in a way that the general public could 
easily understand.
90
  His speech was “relatable” to the American public, and he used “everyday 
citizen heroes” as exemplars in his oratory.91 Reagan’s rhetoric appealed to Americans partly 
because he had an “easy” way of speaking; his speeches were often “clear, concise, and short,” 
and he regularly turned to self-effacement to inject humor into a speech.
92
 
Even his foibles bolstered his persona. Although Reagan garnered praise from the public 
and critics alike for his oratorical skill, he was also known for his verbal gaffes, which still stand 
as part of his legacy. The president was well-spoken, but in his uttered miscues, Americans 
recognized themselves, not a slick, Washington politician. Reagan often made “impromptu and 
prepared remarks that were less than accurate,” yet, his verbal missteps did little to stymie his 
popularity. Reagan’s habit of saying what was on his mind, in conjunction with his “[a]miability, 
rhetorical flair, straight talk, and tough-mindedness” buoyed his reputation with the American 
people.
93
 One of Reagan’s strengths as an orator was that his persona and rhetorical choices were 
consistent with one another; he presented himself as the average American and spoke in a 
manner consistent as such. 
From his earliest days as a speechmaker, Reagan consistently employed narrative forms. 
Stories were the hallmark of Reagan’s rhetoric and “functioned more as truths” for political and 
social assertions than as subjective observations.
94
  Narrative was a vehicle for Reagan’s 
arguments and interpretations. Reagan told stories of good and evil in conflict. The most famous 
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of these conflicts was of noble Democracy and villainous Communism. During Reagan’s time in 
political office, narrative served as more than a way to connect with an audience, “it guided 
Reagan’s policy decisions, motivated his audience and “help[ed] to account for the variety of 
reactions to his rhetoric.”95  When one looks at Reagan’s rhetoric, it is clear that his use of 
narrative was the foundation of his reputation as an orator and to the popularity of his 
speechmaking as a whole.
96
  Reagan’s story-telling ability was a point of strength during his time 
in office,
97
 for Reagan, says Kathleen Hall Jamieson, “[b]etter than any modern 
president...[understood] the power of dramatic narrative to create an identity for an audience, to 
involve the audience, and to bond that audience to him.”98 Reagan successfully used the narrative 
of everyday “heroes” to connect with, and encourage, his audience.99 His narratives were often 
built on “common sense” anecdotes that used “practical analogies to explain and to justify his 
policy choices.”100 Wayne Booth’s assertion that the author of narrative seeks to “impose his 
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fictional world upon the reader”101 falls in line with public discourse that recounts historical 
moments and events, such as Ronald Reagan’s Soviet discourse. 
The President’s use of narrative included elements of good storytelling, particularly vivid 
description. It was common for Reagan to use topoi of savagery as markers for foreign leaders 
with whom he disagreed politically or ideologically.
102
 Reagan employed stories of the 
communist Soviet government’s misdeeds in countries around the world, juxtaposed with stories 
of the goodness of Western democracies, as a tool to differentiate between two disparate political 
and ideological entities; thus, narrative and ideology were bounded in Reagan’s rhetoric. Reagan 
portrayed the Soviet Union as an aggressive, malicious, savage government.
103
 Carol Winkler 
contends that Reagan commonly engaged in “personal attack to stress the irredeemable evil 
nature of their enemies who could only await opportunity to produce more havoc and 
destruction.”104  Reagan was “relentless” in his attacks on the Soviet Union,105 so much so, that it 
“border[ed] on caricature.”106 Winkler is critical of Reagan, but her observation points to the way 
in which aspects of Reagan’s rhetoric interanimated one another; the president was ideologically 
opposed to communism, and as such, his descriptors and language choices reflected that 
opposition. 
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 In the same way Reagan’s persona matched his narrative style, and his narratives 
reflected his disdain for communism, the president’s persona and worldview—his ideology—
were married. As the everyman, Reagan vehemently opposed communism as antithetical to 
American democracy; his Soviet rhetoric mirrored that. For Reagan, communism was a hostile 
system that produced fear and disquiet. Even in Reagan’s pre-presidential rhetoric, communism 
was always close to home, not an abstract ideology threatening Europe and Asia. The 
“distinctive thread in Reagan’s pre-presidential speeches,” says Daniel T. Rodgers, “was the way 
they turned the Cold War’s anxieties back on domestic policies—their displacement of the 
totalitarian nightmare from the world scene to the stealthy, creeping, insidious growth of 
government at home.”107 In a June, 1952 commencement address at William Woods College, 
Reagan described America as “less of a place than an idea”; the idea was “the inherent love of 
freedom.” Reagan said there was a “great ideological struggle that we find ourselves engaged in 
today,” in the same manner Americans once struggled against “Kaiserism” and “Hitlerism.” The 
foundation of these -isms was in one person or government’s desire to “rule over mankind.”108 
Just as Cold War presidents stressed the sinister nature of communism and its pervasive threats, 
Reagan talked about the way communism endangered all aspects of American life. 
 Although Reagan was concerned with communist intrusion into American life, he also 
feared its spread across the globe. In “A Time for Choosing,” or what was called “the Speech,” 
perhaps his most famous pre-presidential speech, Reagan urged America to fight against 
communist encroachment: “We’re at war with the most dangerous enemy that has ever faced 
mankind in his long climb from the swamp to the stars, and it’s been said if we lose that war, and 
in so doing lose this way of freedom of ours, history will record with the greatest astonishment 
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that those who had the most to lose did the least to prevent its happening.” There were some who 
would give into the communist threat out of fear of war, but Reagan insisted that to live in 
communism was to relinquish the freedoms of democracy; that price was too high: “You and I 
know and do not believe that life is so dear and peace so sweet as to be purchased at the price of 
chains and slavery.”109 
 Before his ascension to the presidency, Reagan had a reputation as an ardent 
anticommunist. He openly criticized the Soviet system, often in the harshest of terms. His history 
of scathing Soviet rhetoric frightened many Americans, so much so that it became a point of 
contention in his 1980 run to the White House, so he “had to reassure the American people of his 
commitment to peace.”110  Reagan insisted that he would work toward peace between the two 
superpowers, but some critics wondered if “Reagan’s commitment to peace was more rhetorical 
than actual.”111  Judging from Reagan’s early presidential Soviet rhetoric, Americans might have 
wondered if they should have heeded those critics. In the beginning of his presidency, Reagan’s 
Soviet Rhetoric was sharp and unforgiving. He made no attempt to hide his disdain for the 
communist system nor its prospects for the future: “There was a theme in the Reagan rhetoric 
especially in the first two years, that went beyond condemnation and suggested not only that the 
United States would like to be in on the execution, but that the Soviet system might be rolled 
back right to the gates of the Kremlin itself.”112  Still, Reagan, although intolerant of 
communism, did follow in the rhetorical footsteps of previous Cold War presidents, espousing a 
need for negotiation even while condemning the Soviet Union. Reagan was certain communism 
could not survive, and negotiation would buy time for the Soviet system to collapse. 
                                                          
109
 Ronald Reagan, “A Time for Choosing” (speech, Los Angeles, CA, October 17, 1964), American Rhetoric, 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreaganatimeforchoosing.htm. 
110
 Rowland and Jones, Reagan at Westminster, 32. 
111
 Ibid., 33. 
112
 Strobe Talbott, The Russians and Reagan (New York: Random, 1984): 74. 
 32 
Reagan’s presidential speech continued his established Soviet rhetoric, as well as utilized 
many of the same rhetorical strategies as his presidential predecessors: America needed to be 
aware of, and work to stop, communist expansion; democratic and communist systems and 
ideologies were inherently polarized through their antithetical structures; and through the 
matching of Soviet arms, the US could keep the Soviet Union “in check.” When he proclaimed 
that the Soviet Union was an evil empire, he recalled decades of the strategic use of polarization; 
when he argued that there should be a military balance between the two superpowers, he drew on 
the arguments of Nixon, Ford and others; and when he reminded Americans of the insidious 
nature of communist expansion, Reagan conjured the language of Eisenhower. Often, 
presidential Cold War arguments were sources of invention for Reagan that he used to advance 
his contention that communism was an untenable system. 
Reagan’s first-term rhetoric was influenced by previous presidential Cold War rhetoric. 
In his second term, Reagan’s rhetoric started changing; it became more hopeful and conciliatory. 
In large part, his rhetoric changed because Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev was 
leading the Soviet Union. Reagan saw Gorbachev as a different kind of Soviet leader from his 
communist predecessors.
113
  When asked about his characterization of the Soviet Union as an 
“evil empire” ahead of the 1985 Geneva Summit with Gorbachev, Reagan said that both sides 
had called each names: “Yes, I used the term the “‘evil empire,’” said Reagan, but the Soviets 
had called the US “‘cannibals.’” Unlike in much of his previous Soviet rhetoric, Reagan seemed 
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ready to mend fences, saying, “I think both of us have stopped that language, thinking that we’ll 
get farther at the meetings if we come together to try and eliminate the need for such talk.”114 
John M. Jones and Robert C. Rowland contend Reagan maintained a rhetorical duality 
regarding the Soviet Union through the end of his presidency. His rhetoric became more 
conciliatory even as he maintained a hardline stance against the Soviet system.
115
  The pinnacle 
of this rhetorical duality was Reagan’s May 31, 1988 address at Moscow State University in 
which he supported Gorbachev’s social and political reforms while critiquing the Soviet 
system.
116
 
 A number of critics have commented on Reagan’s rhetorical shift concerning the Soviet 
Union. Journalist David Ignatius contends that his first-term Soviet rhetoric made Reagan seem 
like “a warmonger,” while his second term Soviet rhetoric made Reagan appear “a hypocrite.”117 
Robert Wright argues that Reagan changed his Soviet rhetoric because “Mikhail Gorbachev had 
been winning global acclaim by talking peace. Reagan wanted some of the action.”118 A great 
many scholars contend that Reagan’s changing Soviet rhetoric coincided with a shift in 
American rhetoric from the Soviet side, specifically from Soviet General Secretary Mikhail 
Gorbachev.
119
  There is considerable literature, then, that suggests it was Gorbachev’s ascension 
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to Soviet leadership which facilitated Reagan’s changing Soviet rhetoric. As Reagan played his 
part in facilitating the end of the Cold War, he purposefully and necessarily changed the way he 
characterized the Soviet Union. From that rhetorical change emerged the Soviet redemption 
narrative. 
 Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric was clearly influenced by previous Cold War rhetoric. His pre-
presidential and presidential oratory was decidedly anticommunist, and his arguments against 
communism most often relied on pathetic appeals to the danger of communism. His early 
presidential Cold War rhetoric may have been the most vitriolic, exaggerated, and damning 
language of any president since Truman. Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric was squarely in line with other 
Cold War leaders:  The US could curb Soviet aggression through the arms race while continuing 
to negotiate a somewhat peaceable coexistence with an insidious enemy bent on spreading a 
flawed ideology to the rest of the world. Reagan remained convinced that communism was evil 
and antithetical to democracy, but he found in Mikhail Gorbachev a different kind of Soviet 
leader. Gorbachev’s willingness to change the way Soviet politics worked, and to engage in 
meaningful diplomatic discussions, paved the way for Reagan’s cautiously hopeful new Cold 
War rhetoric. Reagan’s long history of unwavering acerbic narratives about, and rhetoric toward, 
Western “enemies” makes how he negotiated his changing Soviet rhetoric a potentially important 
addition to the study of political rhetoric. 
Chapters 
I have organized this dissertation into five chapters. What follows is a preview of the 
remaining chapters. The second chapter is a general history of Reagan’s political rhetoric from 
his time in the Screen Actors Guild through his time as Governor of California from 1967-1975. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1992); and Lee Sigelman, “Disarming the Opposition: The President, 
the Public, and the INF Treaty,” Public Opinion Quarterly 54, no. 1 (1990). 
 35 
It demonstrates Reagan’s rhetorical and political roots, as well as his history of using narrative as 
a rhetorical tool. Salient to this dissertation are the ways in which Reagan’s pre-presidential 
Soviet rhetoric set a precedent for his first term in the Oval Office. 
 The third chapter is a rhetorical analysis of four of Reagan’s first term speeches, each an 
exemplar of his typical Soviet rhetoric and the use of narrative to advance his political agenda. 
The analysis of these four speeches demonstrate Reagan’s use of specific rhetorical strategies to 
undermine communism and the Soviet Union; to mark the flaws within Soviet/communist 
ideology, especially when compared to Western democratic ideology; and to tell the story of a 
heroic America, the shining city on a hill, engaged in a battle of ideals and principles with the 
Soviet Union, the “evil empire” casting its dark shadow across the world. 
I analyze the following first-term speeches: 
“Zero Option Address” (11/18/1981) 
“Westminster Address” (6/8/1982) 
“Address to the National Association of Evangelicals,” or the “Evil Empire Address” 
(3/8/1983) 
“Address to the Nation and Other Countries on US-Soviet Relations” (1/16/1984) 
I chose these speeches because they reiterate and reify antecedent Cold War rhetoric from former 
presidents and Reagan. Such rhetoric was both a source of invention and the language upon 
which Reagan had built his image as an anti-communist. How Reagan talked about the Soviet 
Union in these speeches demonstrates his entrenched and seemingly unerring belief that the 
Soviet system was socially, politically, and ethically degenerate. They serve as a foil to, and help 
illustrate the magnitude of, his changing second-term Soviet rhetoric. 
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 The fourth chapter is a rhetorical analysis of four of Reagan’s second term speeches. The 
analysis of these four speeches demonstrate Reagan’s changing Soviet rhetoric. I analyze the 
following second-term speeches: 
“Geneva Address” (11/21/1985) 
“Reykjavik Address” (10/13/1986) 
“London Address” (6/3/1988) 
“Farewell Address” (1/11/1989) 
Although his Soviet rhetoric was still firmly anti-communist and Reagan did not shy away from 
challenging Soviet leadership on ideological and moral grounds,
120
 his rhetoric became more 
conciliatory and optimistic about the future of US-Soviet relations. Reagan’s characterization of 
the Soviet Union changed as he shifted his focus from the evils of ubiquitous “communism” to 
Gorbachev as synecdoche for political and social change in the USSR. Further, the speeches 
exhibit a departure from the President’s narrative of the Soviet Union as an implacable foe of the 
United States to one in which the USSR was capable of change and “redemption” from its past 
“evil” ways. 
 Instead of individually analyzing each speech, I treat each set of four as a collective 
block. I demonstrate the common use of specific rhetorical strategies throughout each block but 
show the different ways Reagan used the strategies in each to create a narrative regarding the 
Soviet Union. What emerges is a concomitant change in Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric and a 
demonstrable Soviet redemption narrative which moves from a story of irredeemable Soviet 
existence to a story of redeemable Soviet existence. 
The dissertation’s fifth chapter is the conclusion, and I discuss the implications of 
Reagan’s changing Soviet rhetoric, how Reagan negotiated the change, the Soviet redemption 
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narrative’s place in Reagan studies, possible future rhetorical studies at the intersection of 
narrative, politics, and the canon of a particular orator. 
Conclusion 
The transformation of Reagan’s rhetoric is what energizes my study. No previous US 
president had changed their Soviet rhetoric in such a dramatic fashion. As with other Cold War 
presidents, Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric changed with the ebb and flow of political and social 
changes, but his decades-long, ardent, anti-communism made his changing Soviet rhetoric 
unique in presidential history. 
Ronald Reagan has been called “The Great Communicator,” and the numerous works 
devoted to his rhetoric attest to that fact. There is ample literature that references Reagan’s use of 
narrative in his rhetoric, and some of the Reagan literature notes that his Soviet rhetoric changed 
in the second term of his presidency, although none of it takes up how that change is part of a 
larger political story of possible Soviet redemption told by Reagan. A great deal of scholarly 
work focuses only on the long-standing consistency of his rhetoric and rarely takes into account 
the important aspect of his willingness to change his rhetoric, especially regarding the Soviet 
Union. Here, then, is a chance to address a lack in Reagan studies and shine a light on the way he 
employed narrative to alter, stretch, and redefine the decades-long contentious relationship 
between the United States and the Soviet Union even as his ideological dogma remained 
constant. 
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Chapter Two 
Reagan’s road to becoming “The Great Communicator” began, like his acting career, in 
Hollywood. Communism inspired the start of his public speaking career, and it was a prominent 
subject of his public address through the end of his presidency. From his time in the Screen 
Actors Guild as a board member and its president, to his testimony at the House Un-American 
Activities Committee, and through his term as Governor of California, the Red Menace found a 
home in his oratory. Reagan’s pre-presidential Soviet rhetoric generally used the same strategies 
and tropes as most Cold War rhetoric: democracy and communism were inherently antithetical; 
vigilance against an insidious, encroaching Soviet government was mandatory; and matching 
Soviet military power would deter communist aggression. 
 In this chapter, I review a number of moments in Reagan’s pre-presidential oratory, 
focusing on his Soviet rhetoric. This review establishes Reagan’s position on communism 
generally and the Soviet Union specifically. The next chapter of this dissertation concerns itself 
with Reagan’s first-term presidential Soviet rhetoric. By examining the ways in which he spoke 
of the Soviet Union, we gain an understanding of the foundation of Reagan’s presidential Soviet 
rhetoric, and why, when Reagan’s rhetoric began changing in his second presidential term, it was 
a significant event in his oratorical corpus. More generally, by examining the rhetorical strategies 
Reagan used to create and reinforce the image of the Soviet Union as a villainous actor on the 
world stage, we gain an understanding of the way large swaths of American citizens understood 
Soviet political and social actions. 
One of the claims of this dissertation is that Reagan’s changing presidential Soviet 
rhetoric tells a story of Soviet redemption. As such, understanding the communist position in 
Reagan’s early rhetoric is integral to establishing the Soviet role as a global antagonist during the 
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Cold War. A brief examination of some of the important moments and events in US-Soviet Cold 
War history lends context to the constraints and opportunities Reagan encountered as he 
navigated public discussion of the Soviet Menace. The overarching purpose of this chapter is to 
demonstrate the ways that Reagan’s pre-presidential Soviet rhetoric introduced and solidified 
rhetorical strategies he would eventually need both to retain and overcome during his presidency. 
The Cold War was marked by sweeping changes in social and political life; events and 
actions like the nuclear arms race, Civil Rights Movement, Vietnam War, détente, and the rise of 
the Moral Majority served as a backdrop for Reagan’s entrée into political life and his sustained 
prominence as a political actor. In the first twenty-five years of the Cold War, concern about the 
spread of communism was central to American foreign policy. How the US navigated 
interactions with the Soviet Union was foremost in Reagan’s political thoughts. He seemed 
always concerned with how our democratic system matched-up against the Soviet system and 
what the US should do militarily or politically to counteract Soviet actions. It is through the lens 
of Reagan’s preoccupation with encroaching communism that we see his interpretation of US-
Soviet social and political relationships. A number of strategies recurred throughout Reagan’s 
pre-presidential rhetoric. First, he often invoked the ethos of the citizen, or of the citizen-
politician. Second, he relied on descriptions and discussions of the antithetical nature of 
communism to democracy, and it is in these instances where the prophetic dualism framework 
becomes clear in Reagan’s rhetoric. Last, he a used a specific recurring analogy: the menace of 
Nazi totalitarianism reborn as Soviet communism. 
This chapter proceeds in four parts: First, I offer a brief biography of Ronald Reagan. 
Second, I enumerate and elaborate on the three rhetorical strategies used to create his Soviet 
narrative. Third, I examine the way the three rhetorical strategies coalesced to create the Soviet 
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narrative, as well as offer an analysis of a single exemplar text in which the strategies appear. 
Last, I conclude the chapter with a review of the rhetorical strategies and a brief discussion of the 
importance of understanding how Reagan used those strategies in the context of the Cold War. 
Biography 
Ronald Reagan was born on February 6, 1911, in Tampico, Illinois. His father, Jack, was 
an alcoholic and salesman. Jack’s alcoholism “made him an unreliable breadwinner”121 who 
moved his family—mother Nelle, brother Neil, and Ronald—to a number of towns in Illinois 
before finally landing in Dixon, Illinois when Reagan was nine. Nelle was a deeply religious 
woman whom Reagan admired. She explained Jack’s alcoholism as a sickness and encouraged 
“the boys’ sympathy and understanding.” Jack and Nelle were Democrats, and because of that, 
Ronald was as well and would be until he officially registered as a Republican in the early 1960s. 
 Reagan enjoyed growing up in Dixon, and he aspired to be an athlete of some kind, but 
he was generally poor at sports. Myopia contributed to his athletic failures, and when he finally 
got glasses, he was “taunted as ‘Four-Eyes.’” Reagan often talked about how the memories of his 
athletic failures still stung many decades later.
122
 While Four-Eyes may have been his initial 
nickname, Reagan came to be known by another—Dutch—which he got because of his 
childhood hairstyle. In high school, Reagan discovered that he played football well enough to 
make the school team, but it was on the stage that Reagan excelled. He had a fondness for 
writing and for acting.
123
 After high school, Reagan attended Eureka College in Eureka, Illinois. 
He was a “C” student, preferring to concentrate on football and theater rather than on his classes. 
Following graduation, Reagan went to Chicago looking for work as a radio broadcaster 
but did not find a job. He returned to Dixon briefly, then set out for Davenport, Iowa, where he 
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landed a radio job as a sportscaster for college football games.
124
 Later, he relocated to Des 
Moines, Iowa where he became a popular sportscaster. Radio was a fine job for Reagan, but he 
had higher aspirations. In 1937, when his radio station sent him to cover the Chicago Cubs spring 
training in Southern California, he took the chance to fulfill his “secret wish to break into 
movies.”125 He had a contact in Hollywood who got him an audition with Warner Brothers 
Studios. Reagan did not hear back from the studio before the Cubs broke camp, and so he headed 
back to Iowa, his dream unfulfilled. However, two days after he returned to Des Moines, he 
received a call from Warner Brothers and a seven year contract at $200 a week. In May of 1937, 
Reagan left Iowa for Hollywood.
126
 
During his time in Hollywood, “Reagan made 52 films, beginning with Love Is on The 
Air in 1937,”127 and ending with The Killers in 1964. Reagan acted in movies made in Warner 
Brothers’s “B-division” until his turn as “doomed Notre Dame football star George Gipp 
in Knute Rockne—All American.” After Knute Rockne, “Reagan was a feature film 
actor…receiving particularly good notices for a dramatic role in Kings Row.” Although he was 
never a top-list star, he “earned a reputation as a capable actor who did his best work in light 
comedies.”128 
Reagan, the one-time staunch liberal, “joined every organization whose goal was to save 
the world”129 when he first arrived in Hollywood. Two of those organizations, the Hollywood 
Independent Citizens Committee of Arts, Sciences and Professions, as well as a chapter of the 
American Veterans Committee, turned out to be fronts for Communist organizations. Reagan 
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quit the American Veterans Committee immediately
130
 and eventually resigned from the 
Hollywood Independent Citizens Committee of Arts, Sciences and Professions after an 
unsuccessful attempt to change its culture.
131
 Where Reagan once believed “the orthodox liberal 
view that Communists—if there really were any—were liberals who were temporarily off track, 
and whatever they were, they didn’t pose much of a threat to me or anyone,” his experiences 
with communists in groups he belonged to changed his mind: “Now I knew from firsthand 
experience how Communists used, lies, deceit, violence, or any other tactic that suited them to 
advance the cause of Soviet expansion. I knew from the experience of hand-to-hand combat that 
America faced no more insidious or evil threat than that of Communism.”132 It was his position 
as the President of the Screen Actors Guild, to which he was elected in 1946, that attracted the 
attention of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and facilitated his earliest, 
most prominent political appearance. 
The Citizen’s Ethos 
Ethos played an important role in Reagan’s rhetoric. In part, ethos is the persuasive 
power of the character of the speaker. Ethos “defines the space where language and truth meet or 
are made incarnate with the individual.”133 Language and the perceived character of the speaker 
are intertwined in such a way as to render them inextricable from one another. Reagan’s ethos 
manifested itself specifically in his role as a citizen who spoke, not like a politician, but like a 
“regular” American; it was the citizen’s ethos. He made uncomplicated language choices, built 
an everyman public persona largely from his many turns as an “all-American” man in the 
movies, and offered simple answers to difficult social and political questions. In Kenneth 
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Burke’s words, Reagan understood that “you persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his 
language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with 
his.”134 Through his linguistic choices, Reagan constituted himself and his audience as 
prototypical Americans, and in doing so, formed a bond of authority and trust that manifested 
itself in the form of the citizen’s ethos. 
Reagan created a contested sense of citizenship by proposing a kind of binary concept of 
the citizen. There were two categories of citizenship: the citizenry and the politicians. Reagan 
successfully defined the sense of a binary citizen through dissociation. On one hand, there were 
the politicians, who, although citizens, were characterized as beholden to their careers and 
removed from their constituents’ daily fight against communism. As such, the politician became 
an observer in the battle with communism in America. On the other hand was the citizenry. They 
were the true soldiers in America’s crusade to turn back the red tide of communism expansion. 
Reagan’s dissociation, in turn, created two kinds of ethos—one the politician’s and one the 
citizen’s. The politician’s ethos is predicated on traditional norms of political authority, whereas 
the citizen’s ethos is predicated on the citizenry engaging in political words and/or actions. 
Successfully employing dissociation required more than creating the binary; Reagan had 
to demonstrate what it meant to be a part of the citizenry. He did so through rhetorical choices 
that allowed him to construct and perform the citizen’s ethos. In a 1948 radio broadcast in which 
he stumped for Harry Truman, Reagan exemplified this approach: “This is Ronald Reagan 
speaking to you from Hollywood. You know me as a motion picture actor but tonight I’m just a 
citizen pretty concerned about the national election next month and more than a little impatient 
with those promises the Republicans made before they got control of Congress a couple of years 
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ago.”135 Reagan acknowledged his unique position as an actor, but he emphasized his role as a 
citizen, just the same as the members of his audience. Reagan spoke as a citizen engaging in the 
important work of political action, and the purpose of the address was to encourage others follow 
his lead. In enacting what he encouraged, Reagan created a sense of ethos with the citizenry. 
Reagan placed emphasis on the importance and duty of American citizens to work 
against communism at home. His pre-presidential rhetoric and his presidential rhetoric made 
great use of his image as an everyday American, creating a sense of communal heritage and 
shared values. His sincerity and fervor in defense of democratic ideals matched his identity as a 
proud American citizen. The convergence of rhetoric, persona, and character best explains 
Reagan’s authority as a speaker, for “identity, voice, self, and authenticity [are] intrinsic to 
ethos.”136 B.L. Ware and Wil Linkugel note that the rhetorical persona is not the same as the 
person of the rhetor; they “draw a sharp distinction…between the rhetor’s personal ethos and the 
ethos represented by the rhetorical persona the speaker assumes.”137 Reagan, however, not only 
blurred the line between rhetorical persona and the person of the rhetor, he eradicated it. He 
appeared authentic because there were no incongruities among Reagan’s personage, rhetoric, and 
image. 
Before his entrée into political office in the mid-1960s, Reagan regularly spoke about 
political issues, but he always presented himself as a citizen removed from the constraints of a 
politician. After he became a politician proper, he continued distancing himself from the title of 
politician, instead presenting himself as a citizen-politician. That is, he was always part of the 
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citizenry first and foremost and a politician second. Reagan claimed he spoke for “the forgotten 
American—that simple soul who goes to work, bucks for a raise, takes out insurance, pays for 
his kids’ schooling, contributes to his church and charity and knows there just ain’t no such thing 
as a free lunch.”138 Reagan’s citizen and citizen-politician personae created a sense of 
identification and connection with an audience. The same citizen-politician persona Reagan 
presented at the end of his presidency was present at the start of his speaking career. In part, 
Reagan’s ethos was linked to what he said and his public image; he gained “credibility” because 
his public image and rhetoric matched.
139
 The more his words and image aligned, the more his 
audiences perceived him as a man of high character. Belief in the worthiness of his character was 
a powerful rhetorical advantage, for as Aristotle noted, character “may almost be called the most 
effective means of persuasion [a speaker] possesses.”140 
During the late 1940s into the 1950s, Reagan’s nascent political ambition grew, but he 
rejected the mantle of the politico. Instead, Reagan performed role of a member of the citizenry, 
“consistently portray[ing] himself simply as a concerned citizen speaking his convictions.”141 His 
manner of speech reflected the same kind of uncomplicated qualities as his persona. For much of 
Reagan’s early speaking career, he eschewed metaphors and similes because they might be 
misunderstood. Instead, Reagan “used examples, stories, and anecdotes,” which turned “abstract 
concepts, such as freedom versus totalitarianism, into easily comprehensible, concrete terms,” 
and he “offered uncomplicated answers to complicated political questions.” Reagan’s facile 
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treatment of complicated issues “aroused intense animosity as well as intense loyalty” among 
listeners, and as such, Reagan’s rhetoric “was a two-edged sword” that “functioned as both an 
advantage and a disadvantage.”142 
His rhetorical and political successes over the course of four decades indicate that those 
advantages far outweighed any disadvantages such rhetoric might have wrought. In his role as a 
concerned citizen, Reagan cared about what was best for America, and such a position avoided 
the constraints and political baggage of “the politician” proper. The role of the concerned citizen, 
which would become the citizen-politician, was a simpler position for advancing his political 
interests. It also commanded an ethos unique from professional politicians. Politicians in 
Washington were charged with balancing what was good for the country with what was good for 
their careers; thus their words and actions were always somewhat suspect. They had split 
allegiances, so to speak, whereas the citizen-politician had no such restrictions. In short, the 
citizenry and the citizen’s ethos were coded in a way that concretized the differences between the 
citizenry and the politicians, clearly assigning primacy to the work of the citizenry. 
Communist encroachment across the globe was a subject that Reagan believed should 
concern American citizens because it threatened to undermine democracy generally and 
American democracy specifically. Much to America’s horror and consternation, the Soviet 
Union created satellite states of formerly independent countries at the end of World War II and in 
the years after, including Albania, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and 
East Germany. It was in this atmosphere of communist expansion and growing alarm at the ever-
increasing Soviet sphere of influence that Reagan began his speaking career. With his acting 
career waning, Reagan was increasingly involved with the Hollywood guilds and clubs. The anti-
                                                          
142
 Mary Stuckey, Getting Into the Game: The Pre-Presidential Rhetoric of Ronald Reagan (New York: Praeger, 
1989): 15. 
 47 
communist charge of the future president’s rhetoric found its purchase in his Hollywood days, 
and it was after World War II that Reagan first recognized his fear of a growing communist 
threat. 
For Reagan, fear that communism was seeping into the fabric of American life was real 
and prevalent. Citizens were asked to watch out for signs of communism in their neighbors and 
local organizations. Reagan not only kept a watchful eye for signs of communism, he spoke 
about communism and the dangers it presented to American citizens. Reagan’s experience 
recognizing and fighting communists in various Hollywood clubs and guilds afforded him the 
authority to speak on the matter of communist encroachment. Such ethos served him well as he 
spoke out against both fascists and communists, arguing that both “posed a threat to American 
values”143 and to the safety and prosperity of America. 
Reagan was a Hollywood actor, and although he held a position of relative power and 
fame in the public eye, he was nonetheless not a politician, and as such, he generated a kind 
ethos unavailable to politicians. Thinking and speaking about the dangers of communism was 
part and parcel of a politician’s daily concerns, but it was unique in the citizen’s everyday life. 
This uniqueness lent an air of earnestness and ethos to those citizens who spoke about the danger 
of communism, specifically because it was not the citizen’s “job” to speak on political matters. 
The citizen’s motives are, in this sense, purer than the politician’s. Reagan matched his role as a 
citizen-politician to an everyman persona to create the impression of a “straight-shooter.” 
The citizen’s ethos was apparent in Reagan’s 1947 testimony to the HUAC. Reagan 
declared that the members of the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) “exposed [communist] lies” and 
“opposed their propaganda.” In a one sense, the members of SAG, as ordinary citizens, 
represented the common American citizen. They were successful at detecting and uncovering 
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communist influences among their group. Further, noted Reagan, those citizens were “eminently 
successful in preventing [communists] from, with their usual tactics, trying to run a majority of 
an organization with a well-organized minority.”144 The communists attempted to replicate the 
Soviet system wherein a minority rules the majority, but the citizenry rooted out and defeated the 
communist incursion. Patriotic members of SAG were characterized as knowledgeable about 
communist methods for securing leadership in guilds and unions. Through his testimony, Reagan 
demonstrated the intelligence and wisdom of citizens as well as their ability to beat back 
communism before it can take hold. Reagan’s testimony made it clear that the citizen was an 
effective agent in the war against encroaching communism. In this and future oratory, Reagan’s 
experience as a citizen who successfully combated communism granted him ethos, in part 
because he had engaged communism and won the day, and in part because his audiences 
recognized that they had the same ability and authority to resist communist encroachment. 
Political tension between the West and the countries in the Soviet sphere of influence was 
high throughout the Cold War; it is not surprising that Reagan’s speeches, regardless of subject 
matter, often revolved around the context of communism or the Communist Menace,
145
 and his 
“goal seems to have been reaffirmation and purification of America and the American dream.” In 
large part, his pre-presidential rhetoric “relie[d] predominately upon simplistic and accessible 
rhetoric to convey his message of the Communist threat to the American way of life while 
appearing calm and reasonable.”146 Although critics questioned his authority as a political 
speaker, Reagan’s history as an actor was not a detriment to his political aspirations, because he 
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used the role of the citizen to create authority. He often accomplished this “by discussing the 
attempted Communist takeover of Hollywood,”147 thus demonstrating his authority in the matter 
of understanding the communist threat. 
Reagan called “the ideological struggle with Russia...the number one problem in the 
world.” The ideological struggle was complex and multi-faceted, but Reagan’s rhetoric distilled 
those complexities and facets into the struggle of good versus evil. “The inescapable truth,” said 
Reagan, “is that we are at war, and we are losing that war simply because we don’t, or won’t, 
realize that we are in it.” The war was a “strange” one “fought without the usual weapons.” 
Reagan admonished his audience not to “yell foul, because it is declared war,” even if it did not 
look like a traditional one. He argued that Karl Marx long ago set down the communist 
principles that created what could only ever be a combative relationship with capitalism, and that 
the Soviets would attempt to destroy our system, on the ruins of which “the world Communist 
state [would] be erected.”148 In order to avoid a world dominated by the Soviet state, Americans 
had to be aware of how and why democracy and communism were antithetical to one another, 
and recognizing that, oppose it at every turn. 
Although he has a well-deserved reputation as a staunch anti-communist, Reagan was not 
single-minded, and he did not subscribe to unquestioning red-baiting. Unlike many of the HUAC 
members, Reagan’s distrust and dislike of communism did not consume his good sense. Reagan 
admitted, often in disgust, that communists had indeed made it into the ranks of a number of 
Hollywood guilds and unions, but he was also not blind to the fact that during the Red Scare and 
the rise of Joseph McCarthy, that “many fine people were accused wrongly of being Communists 
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simply because they were liberals.”149 Reagan would spend his speaking career defaming 
communism, but he also understood the danger of labeling people communists in America. 
Reagan defended union film workers unrightfully accused of being communists
150
 because such 
a stigmatizing label ruined careers and lives. A decade later, while bemoaning the high taxes on 
low and middle class film industry workers,
151
Reagan discussed how the people of the 
“patriotic” film industry fought back against a Communist Party which sought to gain control of 
Hollywood and the messages in its films.
152
 
The future president was unwilling to call out those he could not confirm as communists 
because he did not want to stigmatize those people, and because he believed that communism 
would not thrive in democratic America. Democracy was a transcendent political force. Certainly 
the American people had to remain aware of the dangers of communism, but democracy was 
such an inherently superior system to communism that there was (theoretically) little that 
communists could do to force their ideology onto a democratic society if its people were 
watchful. In fact, during the HUAC proceedings, Reagan testified that he did not think the 
Communist Party should be outlawed because informed Americans would denounce and turn 
from communism on their own.
153
 
Prophetic Dualism 
In part, Reagan crafted his citizen persona by speaking of issues that resonated with 
middle-class Americans. Throughout his speaking career, “the most salient features of Reagan’s 
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rhetoric” were “unself-conscious references to God, emphasis on heroes, [and] appeals to values 
of freedom and progress.”154 These features fit nicely into Reagan’s long-standing use of the 
prophetic dualism frame as one of his main rhetorical strategies. As noted in the chapter one, 
prophetic dualism works on the principle of polarization. The US and Soviet Union were 
engaged in an extended conflict in which Reagan clearly delineated the good (the US) from the 
evil (the Soviet Union). He characterized the American people and its democratic system as 
“good, decent, and at one with God’s will”; in opposition stood the Soviet communist system. 
There was no real chance at friendship or reconciliation between the superpowers because the 
Soviet system was inherently flawed. The US and Soviet Union were engaged in a war of 
ideologies, and Reagan reminded America that “there can only be one end to the war we are in. It 
won’t go away….Wars end in victory or defeat.”155 Communism fostered the rule of the few 
over the many, and its leaders would not allow the Soviet people the freedom to choose what 
worked best for their lives, or whom might govern them, and as such, communism was a 
maladaptive system of governance. Where “religious faith, moral insight,…[and] respect for the 
laws of God” molded the virtues of American democracy and directed its domestic and foreign 
actions, Soviet communism was atheistic, immoral, and bent to the will of a corrupt few. The 
attributes of communism were directly antithetical to American democracy, and Reagan believed 
that Americans should oppose communism and all of its tenets. Reagan’s rhetoric reflected his 
beliefs and often used the prophetic dualism frame to emphasize the deep ideological chasm 
between the two systems of government.
156
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Starting with his early Soviet rhetoric, Reagan used a prophetic dualism frame when he 
discussed US-Soviet relations. Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric “divide[d] the world into two camps”: 
democracies and communist states broadly, and the US and USSR specifically. The great 
conflict between them resulted from a clash of ideologies. American democracy was “in accord 
with all that is good, decent, and at one with God’s will,” while Soviet communism was “in 
direct opposition.” Communists were the antagonists, while democracies were the protagonists. 
There could be no middle ground, no compromise,
157
 in the conflict between communism and 
democracy because communists represented and endorsed anti-religion and anti-freewill. As 
Reagan began his foray into politics, he established an anti-communist stance that carried 
through his presidency. Reagan’s early speeches were marked by “connection[s] between the 
Judeo-Christian religion and the United States’ past, present, and future”158 and were filled with 
praise for individualism and condemnation for its antithesis, totalitarianism. God looked 
favorably upon America’s history of individualism, while evil forces ruled the nefarious “isms” 
like communism.
159
  
 Reagan spoke about myriad issues in his pre-presidential rhetoric, but the topic of 
communism was always close-at-hand. Much of Reagan’s pre-presidential oratory incorporated 
popular Soviet rhetoric of the time: The necessity of vigilance in the face of communist 
expansion; the polarized state of communist and democratic ideologies; and the need to match 
Soviet military production. He was staunchly anti-communist, and he made no effort to hide his 
opinions. Public perception of Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric is that it was always vitriolic. However, 
Reagan was politically shrewd, and during the early years of his speechmaking career, how much 
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and often he spoke about the “Communist Menace” was determined by his audience. Audiences 
that were politically right-leaning heard far more passionate denunciations of communism than 
did moderate or left-of-center audiences.
160
 
More than antithetical to democracy, Reagan argued that communism was an “evil 
force,” and the US and the Soviet Union were in an ideological battle between “those who 
believe in the sanctity of individual freedom and those who believe in the supremacy of the 
state.”161 Using the prophetic dualism frame allowed Reagan to delineate why the US and USSR 
could never find a true middle ground: there was no compromise with evil. Thus communism 
should not, and could not, thrive in America. Through vigilance and opposition, Americans 
could turn away communism from their land. Americans would be called on to oppose 
communism anywhere in the world, and not solely because the US wanted to contain its 
expansion, but because if communism was evil, and Democracy was good, then democratic 
societies had an obligation to defend other states from the malevolence of communism. 
Polarization allowed Reagan to use communism as a foil in many speeches covering 
myriad subjects, not only in orations specifically written to bring about a comparison of 
democratic and communist systems. In many ways, polarization, or prophetic dualism, was the 
one thread that ran through the fabric of all of Reagan’s rhetorical invention. When Reagan 
engaged in narrative-making, the undergirding structure of the story was normally the stark 
differences between the US and the Soviet Union. For example, in an income tax speech to the 
House Ways and Means Committee, he told the story of a “Polish Minister of Education” who 
objected to American “propaganda” in a movie—that “‘factory workers in America’” drove the 
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cars shown in a parking lot scene.
162
  So different was the Pole’s reality from American reality, 
he did not believe the movie was truthful. The differences between a democratic society and a 
communist society played themselves out, not only on a grand, ideological scale, but in smaller 
ways, such as access to affordable personal transportation. Narrative not only showed the 
differences between the two superpowers, but acted as evidence of the superiority of democracy. 
That which Americans took for granted, like the freedom and luxury for citizens to own cars, 
was unheard of in countries dominated by communism.  
In a May, 1959 speech, Reagan argued that communism was a threat to America, but that 
socialist and communist threats were “not all external.”163  The US government was 
overreaching its position and forcing unwanted social and political programs on Americans. 
Such actions were communistic and played into Soviet desires. Reagan stated that the turn 
toward socialism was apparent enough that Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the 
Communist Party, predicted that by 1960, the US would be a socialist country.
164
  A socialist 
America meant the end of America’s “free enterprise Democracy,” which Reagan called “the 
greatest system ever evolved by man.”165  The sentiment of Reagan’s oratory was that the 
American system was superior to other systems, and that becoming a socialist or communist 
country was to accept a lesser system for the American people. Once again, communism 
threatened the American way of life. Communism was devious in its ability to undermine 
democracy; thus, Americans needed to be made aware of the threat, and they needed to remain 
vigilant in its presence. 
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In 1966, Reagan entered the California gubernatorial race, and the subject of communism 
found its way into many of his speeches. Unlike Goldwater, Reagan “spoke carefully, and his 
words conveyed the image of a reasonable man remaining calm in the face of a crisis rather than 
that of a man unreasonably excited.”166 Reagan’s constant use of communism to describe the 
woes and threats of the world might easily be dismissed as the ranting of a paranoid politician, 
but because of the apparent reasonableness of his rhetoric, he appeared to be “a serious man, 
seriously discussing an immense and misunderstood threat.”167 He “adopted a pragmatic political 
persona emphasizing problem solving at the expense of ideology.”168 He did not abandon his 
ideological roots, but instead integrated his pragmatic self into his rhetorical being, and both 
ideology and pragmatism shared space “in the same speech” during his time as California’s 
governor.
169
 Despite questions regarding his ability to govern and the seeming detriment of being 
a former actor, the charming, affable Reagan won the California governorship by nearly a 
million votes
170
 
 From the start of his governorship, Reagan attempted to unite a fractured California 
Republican Party. For Reagan, “Republican unity” was “a moral as well as pragmatic 
imperative” because republicanism combated liberalism, and liberalism led to socialism, which 
eventually led to communism. That slippery slope argument was rooted in the “the locus of the 
irreparable,” what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca defined as an “irreparable event” that “is a 
source of terror for man; to be irreparable, an action must be one that cannot be repeated; it 
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acquires a value by the very fact of being considered under this aspect.”171  In Reagan’s Soviet 
narrative, the irreparable event was a turn toward liberalism, because once America started down 
the path toward communism, it could not go back. Such was the nature of communism that once 
it took root in a country, it was difficult to uproot. Reagan brought “attention to the unique and 
precarious nature”172 of a political moment in which Americans might fall prey to the 
machinations of communism via liberalism. As such, the Republican Party, the party which had 
not been “duped” by communists, needed to be elected in order to protect Americans from the 
communist threat.
173
 The spirit of republicanism embodied in democracy held the power to 
transcend differences in political agendas. Reagan had long argued that democracy was a kind of 
transcendent force on a global level, but he also believed that it had the power to bridge 
differences on a domestic level. Reagan said as much at the close of “A Time for Choosing”: 
“You and I have a rendezvous with destiny. We’ll preserve for our children this, the last best 
hope of man on earth, or we’ll sentence them to take the last step into a thousand years of 
darkness.” Preserving a democratic America could save the world from Soviet communism. 
America’s best hope of doing so started at the national level with the election of conservative 
Republican Barry Goldwater to the presidency, for Goldwater, claimed Reagan, “has faith that 
you and I have the ability and the dignity and the right to make our own decisions and determine 
our own destiny.”174 Thus, a vote for Goldwater was a vote for choosing the destiny of the 
country and the world. 
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 During his first term as California governor, Reagan was seen as “a winner.”175 He toned 
down his anti-communist, anti-Washington rhetoric, and instead affirmed “the essential goodness 
of America,” which helped “[establish]…an aura of competent authority” and made “him appear 
less radical and extremist.”176 During this time, Reagan “relied more heavily on statistics” than 
he had in earlier years, which “helped provide the image of a man in control of both facts and 
himself.”177 Nonetheless, Reagan’s characterization of communism was always negative when 
juxtaposed against his characterization of democracy. 
 Although Reagan negotiated a small shift in his political rhetoric during his years as 
governor, his belief that communism unfairly put the power to dictate to the majority in the 
hands of the minority, remained strong. Reagan was nothing if not consistent; even in speeches 
concerning domestic matters, he espoused such a view. As governor, Reagan denounced student 
protestors at Berkeley, and later said of the situation: 
 The vast majority of the students only wanted an education. But for months they were 
 robbed of it by the rampaging of a minority; meanwhile, many moderate voices on the 
 faculty were silenced by the intimidation of left-wing professors whose vision of freedom 
 of speech was limited to speech about things they agreed with. I campaigned for the 
 governorship by saying the campus rioters should “obey the rules or get out,” and that 
 was the policy I applied when I became governor.
178
 
The Berkeley protests were domestic examples of a minority of people attempting to impose 
their will upon a majority. If the protestors were not communists, their actions held the same 
spirit as that of the Soviet system. 
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 As governor of California, Reagan spoke about national politics as well as state politics. 
At the American Legion Convention in 1972, Reagan argued against slashing defense spending, 
maintaining that American military superiority was a tool to preserve US moral superiority over 
totalitarian systems like communism. After World War II, said Reagan, “We dismantled our 
forces so fast that a Communist aggressor was encouraged to try to breach the defense perimeter 
of the free world in Korea.”179 The veracity of the containment theory was beyond reproach for 
Reagan, who saw the Korean War as a testament to the danger of Communist governments to 
their neighbors. Reagan contended that a growing number of younger Americans wanted to 
shrink the military and “believe the system [the free market and military] has failed,” an idea that 
Reagan refuted by telling the story of a “woman who fled from Poland seeking sanctuary in the 
U.S.” and enjoyed the freedom of uncensored faith, politics and communication granted by the 
American system.
180
  Further proof of the greatness of the American system in relation to Soviet 
communism came from a German who said, “‘America saved my people from starvation not so 
very long ago,’” as well as “‘the fate of our neighbors, the Czechs who are the victims of 
imperialism.”181  In the speech, the well-used message that Americans were “good” and that 
communists were “bad” appeared again. The prophetic dualism frame reinforced Reagan’s 
argument that Americans were saviors and that their democratic system was far superior to the 
Soviet system. The narratives attributed to two people from countries under Soviet threat and 
controls were evidence of the veracity of Reagan’s claims to the goodness of the American 
political system. Those narratives of experience, although anecdotal, held more authority in the 
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debate about the goodness of the US political system than did the opinion of those who simply 
“believed” it was not good. 
 Reagan’s use of the prophetic dualism frame as a rhetorical strategy was far-reaching; it 
was perhaps his most commonly used rhetorical strategy. By offering a polarized account of the 
US and USSR government systems, Reagan guaranteed that the America of his oratory was a 
virtuous America, one devoted to the ideals of goodness, individual liberty, and moral 
righteousness. In Reagan’s political narrative, America was a global hero, and the Soviet Union 
was a malevolent, totalitarian, and immoral villain. He accomplished that through employing a 
prophetic dualism frame that always presented the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union 
as an unambiguous, untenable conflict between good and evil. 
Analogy 
 One of Reagan’s rhetorical strategies in his pre-presidential rhetoric was to present a 
picture of communism as a universal evil, and the most prominent propagator of that brand of 
evil was the Soviet Union. In Reagan’s narrative, the Soviets were the Bad Guys. With World 
War II fresh in people’s minds, being the Bad Guy carried a distinct stigma. Before World War 
II, a country might be negatively judged for its actions on the world stage, but Hitler and the 
Nazis had perpetrated atrocities that called for far more than political scolding; they had 
committed actions that called for complete condemnation. Perhaps unfairly, Reagan presented 
communism as analogous to Nazism, and in turn, placed the Soviet Union in the same sphere of 
wickedness as Nazi Germany. Reagan’s insistence on a Soviet/Nazi analogy was effective 
because, as Kenneth Burke tells us, analogy allows an audience to “[bring] out the thisness of a 
that, or the thatness of a this,….And to consider A from the point of view of B, is of course, to 
 60 
use B as a perspective upon A.”182 Even if an audience was hesitant to go so far as to place the 
Soviets and the Nazis in the same sphere of evil, historical analogies still had the power to 
“trigger emotional, even subconscious associations.”183 In Reagan’s estimation, the defeat of one 
of history’s most oppressive, malignant, immoral villains created a void in the place where the 
Nazis once resided, and according to Reagan’s rhetoric, the Soviets filled that void. 
Reagan’s very early public speech was relatively sporadic in terms of frequency; 
however, that changed in the mid-1950s. From 1954 to 1962, Reagan hosted the General 
Electric Theater television program. Part of his job was to travel to various General Electric 
plants and give speeches to the workers, which gave him a platform to practice his public 
speaking skills. These speeches—by one estimate, over 9,000184—directed at conservative blue-
collar workers, helped shift his political views “from those of a New Deal Democrat to those of a 
conservative Republican.”185 Reagan’s changing political affiliation was seen in his campaigns 
for Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956, and for Nixon in 1960. However, he did not officially register 
as a Republican until 1962.
186
 In part, the change was fostered by what Reagan held was a shift 
in “classic ‘liberal’” beliefs that “individuals should be the masters of their own destiny and the 
least government is the best government” to a new kind of liberal who “claimed government had 
a greater wisdom than individuals to determine what was best for the individual.”187 That new 
liberal ideology edged too close to communism. 
 In Reagan’s estimation, the communist threat was twofold, “both external, requiring 
strong military defenses, and internal, requiring limits on the power of the government in 
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Washington.”188 For Reagan, communism represented a form of totalitarianism little different 
than Nazism, and the core of Reagan’s arguments against communism, and all totalitarian 
government systems, were his belief in individual liberty and the right to make decisions for 
oneself. That was a constitutive quality of America—one that bridged natural differences 
between Americans of all stripes and bound US citizens together in the face of communism. 
Reagan expressed this belief during a June 1952 commencement address at William Woods 
College. He declared that America was “less of a place than an idea,” and that that idea was 
“nothing but the inherent love of freedom in each one of us.” Americans recognized the fight for 
individual liberty and choice as “the same old battle” against “Hitlerism,” “Kaiserism,” and now, 
communism.
189
 The communists were analogous to Nazis, and Reagan called for his audience to 
oppose communism lest the Soviets perpetrate the same kind of outrages as did the Nazis. The 
same argument appears throughout Reagan’s career, even when seemingly out of place, in part 
because just the mention of Nazism brought to mind a slew of negative thoughts and 
impressions. In fact, this commencement address was an incongruous moment in terms of 
“situation and the speech” because it was a “highly patriotic, Fourth of July speech to a group of 
graduating seniors in the month of June.”190 Still, Reagan believed that the importance of 
establishing or reinforcing the antithetical and dangerous nature of Soviet communism to 
American democracy justified the message and tone of the address. By equating communism and 
Nazism, Reagan set the Soviet Union against the United States, communism against democracy. 
By 1964, Reagan was a popular conservative speaker who communicated the values of 
the middle and business classes. As the 1964 presidential campaign started to wind down, 
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Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater asked Reagan to campaign for him during a television 
program in October. Reagan agreed, and although he spoke at length about a number of topics, 
the subject of communism was prominent. In “A Time for Choosing,” perhaps his most famous 
pre-presidential speech, Reagan urged America to fight against communist encroachment: 
“We’re at war with the most dangerous enemy that has ever faced mankind in his long climb 
from the swamp to the stars, and it’s been said if we lose that war, and in so doing lose this way 
of freedom of ours, history will record with the greatest astonishment that those who had the 
most to lose did the least to prevent its happening.” Reagan’s alliterative comment tapped into 
metaphorical imagery to emphasize the great danger of communism. To say that throughout the 
history of humankind, that the Soviets constituted the greatest threat to humanity was a 
thoroughly unambiguous statement. For a society that recently emerged from a conflict in which 
the Nazis committed atrocities on a level never seen before, Reagan’s statement underscored the 
seriousness of the communist threat. There were some who would give in to the communist peril 
out of fear of war, but Reagan insisted that to live in communism was to relinquish the freedoms 
of democracy; that price was too high: “You and I know and do not believe that life is so dear 
and peace so sweet as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery.”191 
Taking a page from the playbooks of Cold War presidents, Reagan argued that America 
needed to keep pace with Soviet military expansion because to fall behind was to encourage 
communist aggressors. Reagan claimed that a strong military was vital to not only keeping 
communist encroachment at bay, but for driving it from countries across the globe. He argued 
that those who sought to appease the Soviet Union or any communist state were wrong-headed 
and weakened America’s military advantage. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev believed that 
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Americans would eventually bow to communist pressure, claimed Reagan: “He believes this 
because from our side he’s heard voices pleading for ‘peace at any price’ and ‘better Red than 
dead.’ Or as one commentator put it, he would rather ‘Live on his knees than die on his feet.’ 
And therein lies the road to war, because those voices don’t speak for the rest of us.” The path of 
appeasement led to defeat. Being vigilant and not backing away from the challenges of the 
Soviet Union brought “risk,” said Reagan, “but every lesson of history tells us that the greater 
risk lies in appeasement, and this is what the specter our well-meaning liberal friends refuse to 
face.”192 His audience could not deny that appeasement had been an enormous failure of 
humanity in World War II. Reagan was both warning his audience that some Americans had 
forgotten to what appeasement leads, as well the importance of making heard the voices of those 
who would not knuckle under to communism. Reagan’s rhetoric was enthymematic: If 
appeasement led to Nazi atrocities, and the Soviets were analogous to Nazis, then engaging in a 
policy of appeasement with the Soviets would lead to Soviet atrocities. 
 Reagan’s message struck a chord with his audience; the speech was an immediate and 
enormous hit, and it “raised $600,000…for the struggling senator’s campaign.”193 He “garnered 
both national attention and national conservative appeal,”194 and shortly after Goldwater lost the 
election, “the first Reagan for President Committee was formed.”195 The television speech 
catapulted Reagan into the national political spotlight. “A Time for Choosing” was one of 
Reagan’s landmark rhetorical moments, in no small part because he tapped into the fears and 
concerns of his audience, including his argument that communism was an analog system to 
Nazism. The analogy provided a clear picture of the possibilities of unchecked communist 
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expansion and prevalence in the world, and in turn, solidified the Soviet Union as the preeminent 
villain on the world stage. 
Ethos, Prophetic Dualism, and Analogy in Concert 
 Reagan was able to create and sustain the narrative of the irredeemable Soviet Union 
because he skillfully integrated the rhetorical strategies of ethos, prophetic dualism, and analogy 
into a coherent story of Soviet misdeeds, immorality, and inhumanity. His citizen’s ethos 
provided him the authority to speak about the Russian danger because he was both a citizen who 
appeared politically involved solely for the purpose of protecting the interests of the United 
States and because he had first-hand experience confronting communism as a citizen. Later, 
Reagan enjoyed the politician’s ethos, although he couched his political career in the role of the 
true citizen-politician. In his roles as citizen and citizen politician, Reagan portrayed himself as 
an ordinary American fighting against a communist system that actively worked to undermine 
and eradicate the American ideals of liberty, freedom, and the pursuit of happiness, not just at 
home but abroad. 
 A communist victory anywhere was an American defeat, so Reagan emphasized the 
differences between Soviet communism and American democracy. He called for American 
vigilance in the face of encroaching communism. His main points of reference in the battle 
between democracy and communism fit squarely in the prophetic dualism frame. Thus, Reagan, 
the vigilant American citizen, repeatedly returned to the differences between the Soviet and 
American systems. The US was a divine creation, inspired by God and charged with doing God’s 
work; the Soviets were godless bureaucrats using immoral tactics to force their system of 
government on hapless peoples across the globe. Communism, exhorted by the malevolent 
agents of the Politburo, was a force of evil, and as the benevolent sword of freedom, the US was 
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charged with combatting communism wherever it tried to take root. There could be no 
compromise on that point, for good could not silently live side-by-side with evil. 
 In World War II, Reagan had seen what happened when good countries attempted to 
coexist with evil. A policy of appeasement had opened the floodgates of Nazi expansion, and in 
its wake, millions of innocent people had died and whole countries were brought under the 
totalitarian rule of Adolf Hitler. In Soviet communism, Reagan saw the same danger and 
malevolence as German Nazism. The story of the Nazis was one of heartbreak, despotism, and 
irredeemable evil, and in Reagan’s narrative, the Soviets had taken over that role. 
 In Reagan’s pre-presidential Soviet rhetoric, ethos, prophetic dualism, and analogy were 
inextricably linked. It was only through his role as citizen-politician and experience that Reagan 
garnered the ethos to speak as an authority on the danger presented by an immoral, anti-
democratic, Soviet Union unchecked by the forces of a munificent American good. Such a force 
had to oppose the spread of Soviet communism lest the world suffer a repeat of the Nazi 
atrocities of World War II. Over the course of years, Reagan’s three rhetorical strategies 
coalesced to create the narrative of the unredeemable Soviet Union. 
It is worthwhile, then, to examine how the themes of ethos, prophetic dualism, and 
analogy came together in a single address. After he left office, Reagan remained in the political 
spotlight, and he was on the campaign trail seeking the Republican presidential nomination for 
the 1976 election when he gave his televised “To Restore America” address. The speech was a 
denunciation of then-President Gerald Ford’s domestic and foreign policies as well as a critique 
of the current climate of Washington, D.C. politics. The speech put the Ford campaign on its 
heels, and generated “$1.25 million in contributions” to Reagan’s campaign coffers.196 The first 
half of the speech was devoted to domestic affairs and the second half to foreign issues, 
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including the dangers posed by the Soviet Union and their expansionist principles. Reagan was 
clear that the Soviets were the premier threat in the world and were engaging in unsavory, 
undemocratic, and immoral activities. “To Restore America” brought together Reagan’s 
prominent pre-presidential rhetorical themes and stands as an exemplar of how he used those 
themes to create a narrative of the Cold War, villainous, Soviets.  
 Reagan established his place as a citizen engaging in politics for the good of the nation 
and the ethos that comes with that role early in the speech. He addressed the audience humbly, 
saying, “I’d like to talk to you about issues” that should be important in a “primary election 
season.”197 Although he was a candidate for the presidential nomination, Reagan did not 
approach his audience as a politician but as a fellow citizen who wanted to have a conversation 
about issues that were important to everyone, not just Republicans but “Independents and 
Democrats…because the problems facing our country are problems that just don’t bear any party 
label.” Reagan identified himself as part of his audience and disassociated himself from 
President Ford and other Washington politicians in order to create a sense of shared values and 
trust. As part of Reagan’s effort to associate himself with “common” Americans, he positioned 
himself and his fellow citizens against “the Washington Establishment.” Reagan admonished 
Congress for giving themselves “a pay increase…every time the cost of living” increased, 
shielding themselves from the effects of inflation. “Washington doesn’t feel the same pain from 
inflation that you and I do,” said Reagan. He would appreciate “some arrangement like that for 
the rest of us.” Reagan’s rhetoric built both confidence and authority by creating a sense of unity 
with his audience. 
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Clearly, Reagan understood the usefulness of the citizen’s ethos from his pre-
gubernatorial speaking career and as the Governor of California. Still, he faced a major challenge 
to his role as an everyday American because he had led a state that, if “it were a 
nation[,]…would be the 7th-ranking economic power in the world today.” He overcame that 
obstacle in the same way he had as he campaigned to be Governor: he emphasized his role as a 
citizen-politician. He downplayed his place as a politician, offhandedly noting, “My experience 
in government was the eight years I served as governor of California.” Reagan’s comment served 
two purposes. First, by understating the importance of his former position, he maintained a kind 
of closeness to his audience. Second, by invoking the governorship he laid claim to the ethos that 
came with a position of power. In this way, Reagan reaped the benefit of the citizen’s ethos and 
the politician’s. Reagan doubled down on the ethos of the citizen-politician through his narrative 
of the accidental politician: “I had never in my life thought of seeking or holding public office 
and I’m still not quite sure how it all happened. In my own mind, I was a citizen representing my 
fellow citizens against the institution of government.” Reagan established his ethos by 
simultaneously playing up his role as a regular American who did not actively grab for the reins 
of power while shoring up his political authority through the acknowledgment of his 
governorship. 
Once he had established his authority to speak on political matters, Reagan attacked Ford 
on a number of domestic issues then turned his attention to foreign affairs. The roles of the 
United States and the Soviet Union on the world stage were prominent in the speech. Reagan 
leaned heavily on aspects of prophetic dualism to emphasize the good of the US versus the evil 
of the Soviet Union. In part, he painted the picture of the Soviet Union as an expansionist danger 
through what he saw as the weaknesses of the Ford administration. Reagan seized on Secretary 
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of State Henry Kissinger’s claim that the United States was behind the Soviet Union in world 
power, that its place as the preeminent world power was finished, and on Kissinger’s declaration 
that, “‘My job as Secretary of State is to negotiate the most acceptable second-best position 
available.’”198 A world “where the Soviet Union is Number One,” said Reagan, was not a world 
in which anyone would want to live. As evidence of the many places communism had taken root 
and created an undesirable place to live, Reagan used accumulatio, amassing a list of oppressed 
countries in the Soviet sphere of influence. One needed only “ask the people of Latvia, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary...East Germany, Bulgaria, [and] Romania” and the 
truth of what a world under Soviet superiority would be like would become evident. Reagan’s 
audience would have recognized those countries as places where free elections and individual 
liberty did not exist. The people of those “captive nations,” said Reagan, were “slaves.” The 
differences between the US and the Soviet Union were not simply governmental; they were 
moral differences too awful to ignore. 
 America’s divine birth amplified those differences. God placed the US—what Reagan 
called “the last island of freedom”—“between the two great oceans to be found by those who had 
a special love of freedom and the courage to leave the countries of their birth,” while the Soviet 
government was a gang of slavers bent on dominating their neighbors, and if given the chance, 
the world. Citizens of Soviet-influenced countries fought to escape their oppressors at the same 
time “modern-day immigrants” flocked to America. The US “created government as our servant, 
beholden to us and possessing no powers except those voluntarily granted to it by us,” and the 
Soviets instituted communism by force. American democracy was good because it sought to 
“advance the dignity of man” even as communism debased its citizens. Reagan’s prophetic 
                                                          
198
 Ibid. 
 69 
dualism frame clearly delineated good from evil. The US did God’s will, and the Soviet Union 
opposed God’s will. 
 It was not surprising that Reagan characterized the Soviet Union as wicked, because in 
previous speeches, he had directly compared communism to Nazism, essentially naming the 
Soviets the successors to the Nazis as the great evil in the world. In this speech, Reagan 
established the Soviet-Nazi analogy by invoking Winston Churchill and made what amounted to 
arguments against appeasement. 
“National security,” said Reagan, was “one problem which must be solved or everything 
else is meaningless.” For Reagan, national security was anything that threatened the safety of 
America and its citizens, as well as that which posed a danger to democratic ideals anywhere in 
the world, for an attack on democracy abroad was an attack on democracy at home. There was 
only one thing which constituted such a threat. An “echo from the past,” in the person of 
Winston Churchill’s grandson, named the “danger” that menaced the world: “the spread of 
totalitarianism threatens the world once again.” Reagan’s invocation of Winston Churchill and 
the past spread of totalitarianism was a reference to the Nazi occupations, and attempted 
occupations, of numerous countries during World War II. The present spread of totalitarianism 
came in the form of communism. Thus, as was the case in his earlier rhetoric, Reagan found 
communism directly analogous to Nazism. 
What led to the Nazi Germany’s rise to power and their subsequent invasion of their 
neighbors was a policy of appeasement. Reagan saw the same signs of appeasement in US 
foreign policy under Ford. Reagan cited America’s half-hearted support of Angola’s fight against 
Cuban-backed, and by proxy, Soviet-backed, leftist militants as a kind of appeasement because 
America “gave just enough support to one side to encourage it to fight and die, but too little to 
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give them a chance of winning.” When the US failed to give the Angolans the tools to win 
outright against the communists, they had effectively followed a policy of appeasement that 
allowed a communist government to take hold. 
The pattern of appeasement took different forms according to Reagan, including a policy 
of détente with communist countries that often compromised what he believed were American 
morals and values. Reagan’s litany of instances of appeasement with Communist governments 
included an agreement to “reduce our military presence on Taiwan where we have a longtime 
friend and ally” in order to benefit from a relationship with China; establishing “friendly 
relations with Hanoi” so that the US might “learn the fate of the men still listed as Missing in 
Action,” something that “should have been one of our first demands of Hanoi’s patron saint, the 
Soviet Union, if détente had any meaning at all”; a “campaign to befriend [Fidel] Castro while he 
“continues to export revolution to Puerto Rico, to Angola, and who knows where else”; and 
negotiations with the “pro-Communist” dictator, Omar Torrijos, to “[give] up our ownership of 
the Panama Canal Zone” even as he “threatens sabotage and guerrilla attacks on our installations 
if we don’t yield to his demands.” Yet, for all of the unsavory instances of appeasement to 
communist countries, Reagan protested most vociferously against Soviet foreign policy. Reagan 
bemoaned the relative strength of the Soviet military to our own, citing statistics to prove the 
dangerous position America was in militarily. The strength of the Soviet military was important 
because Reagan believed that when America is “Number Two in a world where it’s dangerous, if 
not fatal, to be second best”199 then it necessarily negotiated from a position of weakness. That 
weakness led to agreements that encouraged Soviet expansionism, and ultimately, the spread of a 
totalitarian system that was analogous to Nazism. Reagan’s implicit argument was that by 
appeasing the Soviets and their proxies, the US was inviting the Soviet Union to follow the lead 
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of the Nazi party and attempt to expand their totalitarian system of government with the ultimate 
goal of world domination. 
 Reagan’s “To Restore America” drew on his two and half decades of rhetorical strategies 
to create a message that was familiar and effective with his audience. In it, Reagan played the 
role of the citizen-politician on a mission to save the United States from an unworthy 
government that endangered American democratic values, morals, and safety. He claimed both 
the citizen’s and politician’s ethos so that he might command the authority to continue his long-
standing Soviet narrative depicting the Soviets and their system as antithetical to Americans and 
democracy. The Soviets were, as they had long been, an immoral, insidious blight on the world, 
something more akin to the Nazis of World War II than good global citizens of the modern 
world. 
Conclusion 
Although the US and the Soviet Union did not engage in direct military conflict, the Cold 
War nonetheless bred anxiety, not only between the superpowers, but across the globe. Reagan 
keenly felt this anxiety, and in large part, he counseled Americans to recognize it as a warning to 
be vigilant against the agents of communism who were attempting to infiltrate not only America, 
but countries around the world, in order to bring ruination to our way of life. That message was 
clear throughout his pre-presidential rhetoric. Reagan’s pre-presidential rhetoric evolved over 
time, but his commitment to what he saw as essential American values remained the same. 
Reagan, in both his roles as citizen and politician, made use of some of the same arguments that 
circulated through and from contemporary politicians. He argued that communism was a flawed 
ideology; that the Soviet Union was an insidious, aggressive state that demanded that the US 
continue an arms race with the communists; that the US was a force of good, while the Soviet 
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Union was a force of evil; and that Americans needed to be alert to the dangers of encroaching 
communist influence. 
 Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric was clearly influenced by previous Cold War rhetoric. His early 
presidential Cold War rhetoric may have been the most vitriolic, exaggerated and damning 
language of any president since Truman. The US might coexist with the Soviet Union, if for 
nothing else than to avoid a nuclear war, but there was little hope for reaching a lasting peace 
between the two disparate systems of government. He believed that the US and USSR’s 
relationship would be forever on a limited, static level, and that greatly influenced his rhetoric. 
He used rhetorical strategies and tropes that constantly put the US in a place of greater moral and 
systemic certitude of goodness than that of the Soviet Union. Thus he set the foundation of his 
presidential Soviet rhetoric, and in turn the rhetorical history he would have to negotiate as he 
changed his rhetoric in the second term of his presidency. 
 The events of the Cold War prior to Reagan’s election as president offer a view into why 
the anxieties of the Cold War were high. A long series of political conflicts kept the US and the 
Soviet Union in a constant state of mutual suspicion and distrust. It was in this climate of 
suspicion that Reagan found a willing audience for his declarations about the looming 
Communist Menace and the Soviet desire to destroy the American way of life. Americans 
needed to be aware that communist agents were attempting to undermine the US democratic 
system, and that armed with that knowledge, they could bravely defend the American political 
and social systems. To help illustrate the dangers of communist encroachment, Reagan relied on 
rhetorical strategies characteristic of his political oratory such as the citizen’s ethos, prophetic 
dualism, and the idea that that communists were analogous to Nazis. 
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Reagan’s beliefs and use of these rhetorical strategies were not cut of whole cloth, but 
stitched together by the historical context of the moment and his interpretation of those moments. 
His interpretations of the historical moments and events of the Cold War in relation to the US-
Soviet relationship were unwavering and he repeatedly delivered the same messages regarding 
the Soviet Union over the course of many years before he became the President of the United 
States. These messages concretized the public’s view of Reagan’s understanding of US-Soviet 
relations, as well as offered insight into the way many Americans understood and reacted to the 
actions, ideas, and politics of the Soviet Union. As such, Reagan created a rhetorical legacy that 
defined the way in which others expected him to address and engage the Soviets, and this legacy 
was prominent in the public and political reaction to Reagan’s negotiation of his changing 
second-term Soviet rhetoric. 
 Understanding Reagan’s use of ethos, prophetic dualism, and analogy to tell the story of 
an inveterate evil in the form of the Soviet Union is a kind of key to reading and recognizing 
where Reagan’s presidential rhetoric is rooted. What becomes obvious is that by the time Reagan 
reached the White House, he had nearly 35 years of telling a US-Soviet narrative. In that 
narrative, the Soviet Union is an irredeemable force of evil engaged in an ideological, social, and 
political battle with the United States. With over three decades invested in that specific narrative, 
Reagan abruptly changed the direction of the story; the Soviet Union started to redeem itself. 
That change in the narrative was unexpected, and by understanding Reagan’s seemingly 
unchangeable Soviet narrative, we gain a greater awareness of the magnitude of Reagan starting 
to craft, not a story of the unredeemable Soviet Union, but a story of Soviet redemption. 
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Chapter Three 
In 1981, Reagan reached the White House. In his first term, the President continued the 
Soviet narrative he had told for nearly 35 years: the Soviet Union was an irredeemable force of 
evil engaged in an ideological, social, and political battle with the United States. Thus, for 
Reagan, it was imperative that the US possessed a strong military, economy, and will in the face 
of the Soviet threat. At the start of his presidency, the US had just emerged from a decade in 
which the Vietnam War caused its citizens to question American ideological and military 
superiority, the expansion of détente, and President Jimmy Carter’s insistence that America was 
experiencing a malaise and a crisis of confidence. Reagan’s first goal as president was to rebuild 
the perception of a powerful military and a confident American people. In part, he did this 
through advancing a strong foreign policy. He stressed the Soviet Union’s military build-up and 
the need for the United States to level the playing field by increasing military spending. He also 
needed to address American perceptions: “Reagan put the need for a renewed vision of and faith 
in the nation and its role in the world above all other considerations, even the need to rearm. The 
nation’s pride and confidence had to be restored.”200 In his view, the United States needed to 
return to a confident and moral sense of self: “An America that is militarily and economically 
strong is not enough. The world must see an America that is morally strong with a creed and a 
vision.”201 Reagan long held that a strong military, healthy economy, and clear morality were 
vital pieces of the national character. 
In Reagan’s estimation, a decade of détente had exacerbated the degradation of national 
military and moral structures. Leading up to Reagan’s presidency, détente had failed, in large 
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part because the Soviets rejected “‘deep cuts’ in strategic arsenals,” the US Senate refused to 
“ratify the SALT II arms control treaty,” the Soviets waged “‘proxy wars’ in Angola and Central 
America,” the US engaged in “global arms sales,” Poland and the Soviet Union carried out major 
human rights violations, the US “attempt[ed] to orchestrate an Olympic boycott in retaliation for 
the [Soviet led] Afghanistan invasion,” and the US continued the development of the neutron 
bomb.
202
 Détente was supposed to ease political tensions between the superpowers but 
ideological conflict and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 effectively ended the 
policy. Reagan believed that détente had placed America in grave danger: 
In the last 15 years or more, the Soviet Union has engaged in a relentless military 
buildup, overtaking and surpassing the United States in major categories of military 
power, acquiring what can only be considered an offensive military capability. All the 
moral values which this country cherishes—freedom, democracy, the right of peoples and 
nations to determine their own destiny, to speak and write, to live and worship as they 
choose—all these basic rights are fundamentally challenged by a powerful adversary 
which does not wish these values to survive.
203
 
In the face of such Soviet danger, Reagan argued that US foreign policy needed to operate under 
two conditions: “The need to revitalize the United States and world economy as a basis for the 
social and economic progress of our own and other nations, and the need to provide adequate 
defenses to remain strong, safe, in a precarious period of world history.”204 
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 Reagan set in motion his plans for an economic revival and military build-up, in part 
because he believed both were necessary to combat communism. While the economy and the 
military strengthened, Reagan set his rhetorical powers to discrediting, denouncing, and 
demonizing the Soviet Union. In his first term, the President continued his anti-communist 
rhetoric of the previous two decades. Through speeches and statements, Reagan told the story of 
a global enemy in the form of the Soviet Union. The Soviets were villains on the world stage; 
they were untrustworthy, devious, dangerous, and a threat to the safety of all people. Soviet 
leaders were irredeemable despots clinging to a dying system. 
Reagan’s pre-presidential Soviet rhetoric set the tone for his first-term presidential 
rhetoric. As a citizen, a governor, and a potential presidential nominee, Reagan established his 
authority on Soviet-American relations. As he entered the White House, Reagan’s 
characterization of Soviet and American ideologies as antithetical, and of the Russians as the 
premier evil in the world, positioned Reagan to continue his narrative of the irredeemable Soviet 
Union. In his first term, Reagan told the story of a Soviet Union that had acted aggressively since 
the end of World War II while the US and its allies modeled decency and peaceful vigilance. He 
characterized Soviets as savages who trampled the freedoms of people wherever they or their 
proxies gained influence or control. Despite the magnitude of the Russian menace, Reagan told 
his audiences that the Soviet Union could and would be defeated, for it fought on the wrong side 
of history. Reagan carried his pre-presidential Soviet narrative through his first term. 
 In this chapter, I examine three recurring elements in Reagan’s first-term Soviet rhetoric: 
1) a post-World War II historical narrative of the Soviet Union and the United States; 2) the 
social, political, and moral character of the US, the Soviets, and their allies that flowed out of 
that story; and, 3) the actions needed to assure the West’s eventual triumph over Soviet 
 77 
communism. These rhetorical elements concretized Reagan’s decades-long Soviet narrative. 
Four speeches
205
 continued the narrative and established a clear pattern of misdeeds perpetrated 
by the Soviet Union. Understanding the scope and breadth of that foundational rhetoric is 
important to the success of my claim that Reagan’s changing second-term Soviet rhetoric created 
a Soviet redemption story that spanned the eight years of his presidency. 
Historical Narrative 
Throughout his first-term, Reagan constructed a historical narrative that emphasized the 
aggressive and duplicitous actions of the Soviet Union since the end of World War II. At the 
same time, he contrasted the actions of the Soviets with those of the United States and its allies. 
The emergent historical narrative told the story of a Soviet Union actively extending its political 
and military might through bad faith and bad acts while the West opposed them in ideology and 
action. Using historical narrative was an effective strategy because “narratives function to 
construct the social reality that constitutes the lived world of social actors.”206 The constitutive 
power of narrative is well established. As James Jasinski notes, Aristotle recognized that 
“narrative is an effective mode for depicting character.”207 Reagan’s narrative consistently 
impugned the Soviet Union’s character; simultaneously, Reagan’s chronicle praised the United 
States’ character. Thus, Reagan constituted the Soviets’ role as immoral antagonists and the 
Americans’ role as moral protagonists in the Cold War story. 
Reagan’s place in the Soviet redemption narrative was ambiguous. He was the narrator, 
an agent, and a facilitator, but he was never the protagonist of the story. He performed his part in 
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the tale, and at the same time, he was part of the general populace; he was no more than any 
American. It seems like an odd role for the President, but given the pains he took to cultivate his 
everyman persona, it was fitting. He both told and did in the narrative: he reported to the 
American people on the state of US-Soviet relations, and he readily described his interactions 
with Soviet leaders. Yet, his speeches always focused on the ontological aspects of American 
citizenship. Reagan consistently placed himself among his fellow Americans, not outside of 
them. Thus, despite his place in the historical Soviet narrative, Reagan’s role was far more like 
the Grandfather’s in The Princess Bride than the Dread Pirate Roberts’s. 
From the outset of his presidency, Reagan made it clear that the Soviets were 
untrustworthy. His Soviet rhetoric was sharp and divisive, and it remained so throughout his first 
term. In his first press conference, Reagan set the tone for his presidential Soviet rhetoric. 
Reagan claimed that Soviet leaders “reserve[ed] unto themselves the right to commit any crime, 
to lie, to cheat” in order to further a political agenda that included the “promotion of world 
revolution and a one-world Socialist or Communist state.”208 Reagan’s characterization 
constituted the Soviets as global criminals bent on dominating the world through an ideology 
that, although untenable and destined to fail, stood in stark opposition to democracy even as the 
passage of time hurled communism toward its expiration. 
In much the same way Dwight Eisenhower’s Cold War rhetoric was a “historical 
development of romanticism” constituted by the unyielding purpose, “necessity,” or “force” of 
nature and “spirit,” or freedom,209 Reagan’s rhetoric created of the Soviet historical narrative a 
decidedly dyadic concept. On one hand, history was a force seeking its teleological end in terms 
of the Soviet Union. History moved the USSR ever closer to its inevitable downfall; the world 
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could simply wait for the Soviet Union’s collapse. On the other hand, Reagan keenly felt the 
West’s responsibility to usher along the Soviet downfall. It was a moral imperative too strong to 
resist, and Reagan believed America should have a part in bringing the Soviet Union to an 
expeditious collision with history, and ultimately, its destruction. Likely, Reagan encouraged the 
West to participate in quickening the Soviet Union’s demise because history tied together the 
American-Soviet past, present, and future. The history of US-Soviet relations was not a series of 
discrete moments, but a continuous narrative that brought those moments together “thematically 
and providentially.”210 In other words, America was invested in the present and future of the 
Soviet Union, because it had always been invested in the Soviet Union. 
Personal and political turmoil filled Reagan’s first year in office. In February 1981, 
General Wojciech Jaruzelski, “in full alliance with, and with full support from, the highest state 
organs of the Soviet Union and the military command of the Warsaw Pact,”211 became the 
President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) of Poland. In December of the same year, 
the “communist government of General Jaruzelski introduced martial law…in order to suppress 
Solidarity, an independent, non-communist trade union that had emerged in 1980” and “was 
becoming a significant political movement in Poland.”212 Jaruzelski’s ascension was evidence of 
Reagan’s long-held belief that the Soviet Union would expand and solidify its power and 
influence whenever and wherever it could. 
A month after Jaruzelski rose to power, and only two months after Reagan became 
president, John Hinckley Jr. shot and wounded the President. The assassination attempt bolstered 
Reagan’s political power: “No other president in American history had recovered from a gunshot 
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wound sustained while in office, and Reagan’s survival generated a wave of public sympathy 
that boosted his popularity and gave crucial momentum to his conservative political agenda early 
in his first term.”213 Reagan’s near-death experience was a boon for a foreign policy plan that 
included strengthening the United States’ military power in the face of long-unchecked Soviet 
military and global expansion. 
Reagan insisted that the Soviet Union, Soviet proxy states, and Soviet-friendly nations 
were a great threat to global stability, the United States, and America’s democratic allies. The 
Soviets offered political and military backing not only to communist states but also to enemies of 
the United States. The consequence of such relationships came to the fore on August 19
th
, when 
Soviet-built, Libyan jet fighters engaged American jets during a US Navy training exercise in the 
Gulf of Sidra. Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi claimed dominion over international waters 
where the US was running its exercise and ordered the jets into the air. US fighters shot down 
two of the Libyan jets.
214
 One month later, Gaddafi, who in the past had eschewed public 
alignment with the Soviets, championed a “treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union.”215 
The Soviet threat to democratic allies of the US was on display in October when a Soviet 
submarine ran aground near a Swedish naval base at Karlskrona.
216
 Despite Soviet protestations 
that faulty instrumentation led to the submarine’s grounding, Swedish officials concluded that 
the vessel most likely carried “nuclear-tipped torpedoes” and that “‘the Soviet submarine 
intentionally violated Swedish territory for the purpose of carrying on illegal activities,’” 
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probably “spying or testing coastal defenses.”217 Thus were the events leading up to the “Zero 
Option Address.” Reagan had survived an assassination attempt, watched as Poland crushed a 
democratic movement, saw a Middle-East foe attack the US, then ally with the Soviets, and 
observed a Soviet submarine infiltrate the coastal waters of a US ally. 
The recent actions of the Soviet Union, their proxies, and their allies lent credibility to 
Reagan’s Soviet narrative, and it illuminated the Russians’ immoral character. A narrative of any 
kind has a beginning, but the Soviet actions of the previous year did not constitute the opening of 
their narrative. In his “Zero Option Address,” Reagan identified World Wars I and II as the 
nebulous start of the historical narrative of the Soviet Union and the United States. The “Zero 
Option Address” was a policy speech that made great use of the history of Western and Soviet 
social and political actions. The policy at hand was a “program for preserving peace in Europe 
and our wider program for arms control”218 that included removing all medium-range US and 
Soviet nuclear weapons from Europe. That Reagan should wish peace for the European continent 
was no surprise, because according to him, America had a long history of helping secure that 
peace. Peace was not easily won; the US paid for it with the blood of its citizens: 
Twice in my lifetime, I have seen the peoples of Europe plunged into the tragedy of war. 
Twice in my lifetime, Europe has suffered destruction and military occupation in wars 
that statesmen proved powerless to prevent, soldiers unable to contain, and ordinary 
citizens unable to escape. And twice in my lifetime, young Americans have bled their 
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lives into the soil of those battlefields not to enrich or enlarge our domain, but to restore 
the peace and independence of our friends and Allies.
219
 
The “twice in my lifetime” parallel structure reinforced the message that America had paid a 
heavy price in the name of peace, and it brought to light Europe’s history of terrible wars. Note, 
as well, Reagan’s claim that America was selfless; the US sought only to help its allies, not gain 
some material advantage. The United States’ selfless character emerged through the historical 
narrative. It was common for Reagan to praise the early actions of the United States and lionize 
its people. The Soviets, however, were not afforded the same accolades, despite their important 
role in defeating Nazi Germany. Throughout Reagan’s rhetoric, he depicted the US as a selfless, 
free nation. By comparison, the Soviets were selfish, seeking to gain material and political 
advantage on the world stage, and had been so since the end of World War II. 
 At the heart of Reagan’s proposal to eliminate medium-range weapons from Europe was 
a critique of Soviet behavior since the end of World War II. Reagan showed some restraint in the 
“Zero Option Address”; he did not directly attack the Soviet Union. Rather, he enumerated many 
actions and inactions that revealed the Soviet Union’s character. The speech is divided into three 
sections: an introduction in the form of a letter from Reagan to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, 
ostensibly detailing obstacles to world peace; a long section, in which Reagan offered a political, 
social and military history, as well as introduced his “Zero Option Address” arms control plan; 
and, finally, a brief meditation on “‘peace’ and ‘security.’”220 Reagan’s tone throughout was 
serious and sincere. 
Reagan began the address with an allusion to his recovery from the March 1981 
assassination attempt: 
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Back in April while in the hospital I had, as you can readily understand, a lot of time for 
reflection. And one day I decided to send a personal, handwritten letter to Soviet 
President Leonid Brezhnev reminding him that we had met about 10 years ago in San 
Clemente, California, as he and President Nixon were concluding a series of meetings 
that had brought hope to all the world. Never had peace and good will seemed closer at 
hand.
221
 
Reagan’s choice to understate his brush with death enhanced the measured nature of his decision 
to write Brezhnev about important world affairs. A sense of history was in play, albeit recent, as 
Reagan recalled a meeting of a decade earlier during Brezhnev’s visit to the US. Brezhnev and 
Nixon met to discuss “the process of reshaping relations between the USA and the USSR on the 
basis of peaceful coexistence and equal security as set forth in the Basic Principles of Relations 
Between the USA and the USSR signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972.”222 Reagan’s anecdotal 
letter writing, then, became the frame of reference for the remainder of the address. 
Reagan’s choice to send a handwritten letter demonstrated the sincerity and importance 
of the correspondence. The subject matter—Richard Nixon’s meeting with Brezhnev in a “series 
of meetings that had brought hope to the world”—was gravely important to Reagan.223 Reagan’s 
language was intense and vibrant. In 1972, Reagan asked Brezhnev if he was “aware that the 
hopes and aspirations of millions of people throughout the world were dependent on the 
decisions that would be reached in those meetings.” Reagan recalled Brezhnev’s response: “You 
took my hand in both of yours and assured me…that you were dedicated with all your heart and 
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soul and mind to fulfilling those hopes and dreams.”224 G. Thomas Goodnight notes that “the 
vivid, detailed image radiates mutual sincerity, even as the episode reveals that the President’s 
concern for world peace (and initiatives) extend far back into the past.”225 Both the question and 
the response revealed measures of character. The dramatic question served three purposes: First, 
it emphasized the meeting’s scope of importance. Second, it countered perceptions of Reagan as 
a hawk. Instead, Reagan became a concerned global citizen who wished the best for the world. 
Third, it placed a large measure of responsibility on the Soviet Union for the failure to produce a 
durable peace. In short, the question modified Reagan’s personal character and the Soviets’ 
general character. The question immediately constituted Reagan’s character in a manner different 
from the recorded historical narrative. 
It took a couple of lines more to see how the question reinforced the narrative of the 
Soviets’ bad character. Nearly a decade after the meeting, Reagan’s audience knew that for all of 
the apparent sincerity in the interaction, the Soviets had failed to live up to their leader’s 
statement, revealing the truth of their character. Reagan was clear that “the wishes of the world’s 
people—to be left alone and at peace” remained the same, but Soviet actions during the 
intervening years showed a pointed disregard for advancing peace. The “Soviet Union [had] 
demonstrated its insincerity” to the success of the peace process by repressing its citizens and 
through their “aggressive policies in Cuba and Afghanistan.”226 Brezhnev and the Soviets had 
failed; the “peace and good will” that “had…never seemed closer” when Nixon met Brezhnev 
never materialized.
227
 Reagan placed the blame for the failure of demonstrable peace squarely on 
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the Russians. Brezhnev’s unfulfilled promise that he was dedicated to satisfying people’s hopes 
and dreams was proof of the Soviets’ bad character. 
When Reagan said, “The people of the world still [emphasis added] share that hope,”228 
he implied that Brezhnev had not, in fact, worked at “fulfilling those hopes and dreams.” 
According to Reagan, all people dreamed of living in what amounted to a democratic society: 
They longed for “the dignity of having some control over their individual lives, their destiny,” 
the ability to “work at the craft or trade of their own choosing and to be fairly rewarded,” and the 
freedom to “raise their families in peace without harming anyone or suffering harm themselves.” 
Freedom of choice and the ability to raise one’s family in peace were tenets of American 
democracy, and Reagan’s comments were thinly veiled shots at Soviet communism’s purposeful 
exclusion of those tenets. The President again presented the United States in a positive light. If 
people desired freedom of choice and safety, and the United States offered those, then it stood to 
reason that the US was of high moral character. Conversely, the Soviet Union denied their 
people freedom and safety, and as such, the USSR maintained their low moral character. 
Reagan created a timeline that established the United States’ tradition of benevolence and 
the Soviet Union’s long history of antagonism. He was clear that history showed that Soviet 
leaders sought to advance communism across the globe and oppress those who rejected Soviet-
style governments. To Reagan’s chagrin, he explained that those same repressive communist 
regimes “often implied” that the US had “territorial ambitions,” “imperialistic designs,” and 
threatened the “security” of existing and nascent totalitarian governments. But Reagan refuted 
those charges, and in an instance of prolepsis, possible future claims that impugned the integrity 
of the US: “Not only is there no evidence to support such a charge, there is solid evidence that 
the United States, when it could have dominated the world with no risk to itself, made no effort 
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whatsoever to do so.” Moreover, after World War II, America was “the only undamaged 
industrial power in the world,” and it alone possessed atomic weaponry. America could have 
“sought world domination,” but instead, it “followed a different course, one unique in all the 
history of mankind.” The US choose to “rebuild the war-ravished economies of the world, 
including those of the nations who had been our enemies.”229 Reagan characterized the US as 
good, chivalrous even; it was historic in its benevolence. The US was presented as a (re)builder 
on the world stage. It engaged in restrained and balanced world interactions, and it was not 
aggressive. Reagan attributed these same qualities to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
(NATO) “policy of peace.” 
In fact, the formation of NATO was evidence of the Soviet threat. Reagan noted that 
since its founding in 1949, “the Atlantic Alliance has preserved the peace through unity, 
deterrence, and dialog.” The NATO alliance preserved peace in three ways: First, they “stood 
united by the firm commitment that an attack upon any one of us would be considered an attack 
upon us all.” Second, they “deterred aggression by maintaining forces strong enough to ensure 
that any aggressor would lose more from an attack than he could possibly gain.” Third, they 
“engaged the Soviets in a dialog about mutual restraint and arms limitations.” The alliance, then, 
was concerned with the possibility of foreign attacks, maintaining military strength enough to 
repel foreign attacks, and the Soviets’ military power. Reagan’s enumeration enthymatically 
demonstrated the Soviets’ long history of menace. NATO’s first two steps to preserving peace 
dealt specifically with safeguarding against foreign military aggression, and the third step 
explicitly referenced concern for the Soviet Union’s military force and its restraint. Therefore, 
the Soviet Union had to be one of those aggressive, foreign military powers that concerned 
NATO members. The Soviet Union was not a member of NATO, so Reagan’s audience knew 
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that for at least thirty-two years, the USSR had been an obstacle to preserving peace. Essentially, 
the President used the historical record to condemn and prove the Soviet Union’s low character. 
Reagan used comparison and logos (in the form of facts and figures) to support his 
enthymematic argument that the Soviet Union was a danger to the West’s safety. Reagan insisted 
that the members of NATO did not initiate conflict, but they would respond to threats and 
aggression. Reagan argued that in the past ten years, the Soviet Union displayed their aggression 
through its military build-up. Since Reagan’s 1972 meeting with Brezhnev, the Russians had 
steadily worked toward outgunning the West by expanding its military forces while the US and 
NATO had contracted their armed forces. Where the US “reduced the size of its Armed Forces 
and decreased its military spending,” the USSR increased its number of soldiers. The Russians 
“expanded their real military spending by about one-third,” built “some 50,000” tanks—where 
the US had 11,000—, and “ they transformed their navy from a coastal defense force to an open 
ocean fleet, while the United States, a sea power with transoceanic alliances, cut its fleet in half.” 
During the same period, “NATO deployed no new intermediate-range nuclear missiles and 
actually withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads,” while “the Soviet Union deployed more than 750 
nuclear warheads on the new SS20 missiles alone.” 
Reagan’s language created a sense of expansion and contraction. The Soviet Union 
occupied a position of strength, while the US was sapped of its power. America’s weakened 
position was untenable, said Reagan, so he had “strengthen[ed] all three legs of the strategic 
triad: sea-, land-, and air-based.” Building up the military was important to “remedy the neglect 
of the past decade and restore the eroding balance on which our security depends.”230 The 
Soviets’ commanding military position was a “growing threat” to the safety of the West. The US 
and its allies would have to “counter” the Soviets’ aggression through strengthening their own 
                                                          
230
 Ibid. 
 88 
military might. The recent historical narrative recorded the Soviet Union’s antagonist role at the 
same time the US and its allies embodied their proclaimed role as defenders of peace. 
In Reagan’s narrative, the Soviet Union’s menace extended beyond possible military 
aggression. Reagan argued that Soviet communism was a flawed system of government for a 
number of reasons, but its foundational weakness was in its relationship with the people who 
lived under its control. Reagan pointed out the hypocrisy of the Soviet system, paraphrasing 
Thomas Jefferson’s “First Inaugural” speech: “If [people] are incapable, as some would have us 
believe, of self-government, then where among them do we find any who are capable of 
governing others?”231 Reagan used the same allusion in his “Inaugural Address” to argue against 
expanding US government reach and oversight.
232
 Linking his inaugural speech and the “Zero 
Option” address demonstrated the continuity of his political beliefs and that Reagan, unlike the 
Soviets, was not a hypocrite. The Soviet system was unsuccessful in part because the 
government did not trust its people to make decisions for themselves specifically because the 
leaders knew the people would choose another form of government. The Russians had had 
decades to enact positive change in the relationship between the government and its people, yet 
Soviet leaders perpetuated decades of oppression to maintain power. 
Through a series of rhetorical questions, Reagan argued that the ideological failings of 
communism were to blame for many problems faced by people across the world. Reagan asked, 
“‘Is it possible that we have permitted ideology, political and economic philosophies, and 
governmental policies to keep us from considering the very real, everyday problems of our 
peoples?’”233 By “we,” Reagan meant the Soviet Union, of course, for American ideals 
                                                          
231
 Ibid. 
232
 Ronald Reagan, "Inaugural Address," (speech, Washington, DC, January 20, 1981), The American Presidency 
Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43130. 
233
 Reagan, “Zero Option Address.” 
 89 
encouraged ideologies, philosophies, and policies that considered the everyday issues of its 
people. Two more rhetorical questions followed—an implicit chastisement of Brezhnev, and by 
extension, the Soviet Union: “Will the average Soviet family be better off or even aware that the 
Soviet Union has imposed a government of its own choice on the people of Afghanistan? Is life 
better for the people of Cuba because the Cuban military dictate who shall govern the people of 
Angola?”234 The inevitable answer to both was “No.” Communism benefitted those in charge at 
the expense of individuals. Communist governments could make the lives of their citizens better 
by allowing more freedoms, but they had not. Thus, Brezhnev’s false statement that he would try 
to fulfill the hopes and dreams of communist citizens became another example of the Soviet’s 
history of untrustworthiness. 
Responses to the “Zero Option Address” were mixed. The week after Reagan delivered 
the “Zero Option Address,” his job approval poll numbers jumped from 48% to 54%.235 West 
European leaders were “generally favorable” to Reagan’s proposals, with West German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt calling them “‘reasonable.’”236 Tass, the official Soviet news 
agency, derided the speech as “‘propaganda’” and “challenged Reagan’s assertion that the Soviet 
military build-up threatened the European nuclear balance,” suggesting that the President “was 
trying to influence public opinion in Europe” ahead of Brezhnev’s trip to West Germany. The 
European and Soviet responses were unsurprising. The NATO allies believed the Soviets were 
an immediate danger. On the date of the “Zero Option Address,” reports out of Bonn, Germany 
revealed that simulated war games showed that “the Soviets would break through NATO’s 
forward general defense positions in West Germany,” and by the 19th day “Western Europe’s 
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rear defenses [would] fall.” The only way to shift the tide of the Soviet’s march on Europe would 
be “a nuclear counterattack.”237 As for the Soviet response, Reagan knew the outcome 
beforehand. Ahead of the address, “U.S. arms control specialists” voiced their opinion that the 
Soviets would reject Reagan’s plan, in no small part because the Russians had recently 
developed the new “triple-warhead SS-20, capable of carrying three nuclear warheads.”238 The 
Soviets would loath giving up a weapon of such power and were unlikely to do so. 
The magnitude of Reagan’s proposals presented an obstacle to the address’s reception, as 
did Reagan’s past Soviet rhetoric and his image. Reagan’s “harsh, tough talk to the 
Kremlin…frightened U.S. supporters abroad and [had] given force to neutralists’ arguments that 
the President [was] a shoot-from-the-hip zealot, hell-bent on provoking nuclear war.” Reagan 
was characterized as “alternately stern and folksy” in his speech. Despite his “anti-Soviet 
posture,” Reagan nonetheless endeavored to keep lines of communication with the Soviets open 
through a series of letters. This praise was tempered by critical admonishments about his “Zero 
Option Address” being “a trifle disingenuous” at the point when he called his plan “simple and 
straightforward.”239 Reagan’s “popular image” was of “a gunslinging cowboy,” and though that 
image would not “change overnight to that of a man of peace,” European leaders praised 
Reagan’s speech.240 Some commentators said that with the policy speech “the West finally has a 
position on European arms control that is defensible morally and simply, before the broad public 
and peace protestors alike.”241 Reagan’s image as a “foe of arms control” was transformed in a 
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small way as some saw the speech as “necessary and effective” propaganda.242 The speech was 
categorized as “clear, unequivocal, and bold,” just what the world “wants and needs to hear” 
from America. It was a speech that some critics said “[put] America on the moral high ground of 
the nuclear weapons issue.”243 
Reagan’s arms proposal did not gain traction between the superpowers, but it served to 
open arms control dialogue between them. However, the “atmosphere was immediately 
embittered by developments in Poland” when Soviet-supported General Jaruzelski declared 
martial law in order to quash Solidarity’s rise.244 The Reagan administration objected to the 
martial law order and considered it an attack on the freedom of the Polish people. In this 
acrimonious atmosphere, the Soviets offered their own arms control agreement in February. 
Brezhnev “proposed a two-thirds cut in United States and Soviet arsenals of medium-range 
nuclear weapons in Europe by 1990”; Washington immediately rejected it “on the ground that 
the Soviet Union was now superior in medium-range weapons and that equal cuts would 
preserve an imbalance.”245 
In June, Reagan embarked on European tour that took him to a number of countries, 
including England, where he was invited to speak before members of the British Parliament. 
Reagan’s public image continued to be a rhetorical obstacle before his “Address to Members of 
the British Parliament” (“Westminster Address”). Despite Reagan “seeking international support 
for his proposals to negotiate arms-reduction agreements,” many in the public saw him as a 
warmonger and believed that the “central thrust of US strategic doctrine” was to “[prevail] in a 
protracted nuclear war.” The Reagan administration denied the charge and insisted that their 
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focus was on conventional weapons. A focus on conventional weapons served two purposes: 
First, it deterred Soviet aggression, and second, “if the deterrence fail[ed],” the US could win a 
war by “outfighting and outlasting the enemy.”246 
It was apparent that the Reagan administration disliked the Soviets, and he made it clear 
that the Russians were untrustworthy. The Reagan administration often engaged in activities that 
demonstrated its mistrust of the Soviet Union, such as Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s 
revelation that the US planned to have an anti-satellite weapons system in operation within five 
years. The system would destroy satellites that would help guide Soviet nuclear missiles in the 
case of attack.
247
 Thus, for all of Reagan’s insistence that conventional weapons were his focus, 
the discussion seemed always to come back to nuclear weapons. It was a trend that distressed 
nuclear freeze proponents. When Reagan arrived in England, there were nuclear arms protests 
across Europe and America, and on the eve of his address, over “100,000 anti-nuclear 
demonstrators jammed Hyde Park” and “condemned both the President and British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher.”248 Just as Reagan effectively used historical narrative to denigrate 
the Soviet Union’s character, the President’s well-worn anti-Soviet rhetoric and connection to 
nuclear weapons besmirched his own character. 
 Despite the damage his anti-Soviet rhetoric did to his reputation, the President continued 
his Soviet censures in the “Westminster Address.” Reagan’s “Westminster Address” was a 
celebration of Western democracy and a condemnation of Soviet communism. In Reagan’s 
estimation, the US and Britain were the standard-bearers for democracy. The two countries 
shared a unique history, and at points, Reagan used the American-British friendship as a kind 
proof that his historical narrative was not bilateral, limited only to the US and the Soviet Union, 
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but multilateral, including the US, its allies, and the Soviets. The speech “stated a rhetorical 
theory of the cold war” in which Reagan “systematically subverted the narrative, ideology, and 
values of Marxism” as he “presented a coherent narrative, a value definition, and an ideological 
worldview that were completely consonant and antithetical to the narrative, value definition, and 
ideology of the Soviets.”249 Two historical frameworks—one of Britain and America’s shared 
sense of democracy, and the other of aggressive, violent totalitarian regimes—evoked a spirit of 
cooperation. “It is this sense of history, this understanding of the past that I want to talk with you 
about today,” said Reagan, “for it is in remembering what we share of the past that our two 
nations can make common cause for the future.”250 The history that the US and Britain shared 
led naturally to the two countries standing against communism in the present and future because 
the existence of communism was a direct threat to the future of democracy. 
The future should have been bright, but it was not. The shadow of a Soviet nuclear threat 
darkened the future. The “gifts of science and technology…made life easier,” but they “also 
made it more dangerous.” Reagan declared that there were unprecedented “threats…to our 
freedom, indeed to our very existence, that other generations could never even have 
imagined.”251 The “threat of global war” and “the existence of nuclear weapons could mean, if 
not the extinction of mankind, then surely the end of civilization as we know it.” Just as he had 
in the “Zero Option Address,” Reagan linked military danger and the Soviet Union. In response 
to the threat of global nuclear war, Reagan would begin “Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
[(START)]” with the Soviets to “reduc[e] the risk of war by reducing the means of waging war.” 
Since the early 1950s, when the Soviet Union successfully tested their first atomic weapon, 
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Soviet aggression and expansion passed through the realm of the sinister into the malevolent. 
The historical narrative told Reagan that leaving the Soviet Union unchecked in the nuclear age 
could lead to global disaster. 
The Soviet Union had a history of violently grabbing power if allowed. The Soviets had 
proved that through the policies of their totalitarian form of government. The President was clear 
that totalitarianism was an abomination on the landscape of the world, especially where the 
sanctity of personal freedom was at stake. Individual freedom was threatened by “the enormous 
power of the modern state.” The Soviets oppressed their citizens and denied them freedom of 
choice in various areas of their lives. Reagan noted that history taught “the dangers of 
government that overreaches-political control taking precedence over free economic growth, 
secret police, mindless bureaucracy, all combining to stifle individual excellence and personal 
freedom.” Reagan recognized that there was a “legitimate disagreement over the extent to which 
the public sector should play a role in a nation’s economy and life” found among the US and 
several European countries. However, he was sure that “on one point all of us are united—our 
abhorrence of dictatorship in all its forms, but most particularly totalitarianism and the terrible 
inhumanities it has caused in our time—the great purge, Auschwitz and Dachau, the Gulag, and 
Cambodia.”252 The allusions were to the USSR, Nazi Germany, and Khmer Rouge. By grouping 
known totalitarian governments together, the atrocities that occurred under the rule of each 
became the atrocities of all totalitarian governments. The major totalitarian force in the world 
was the Soviet Union, and Reagan linked crimes and atrocities visited on different peoples in the 
20
th
 century to the Soviet Union, solidifying its position as a malevolent force in the world. 
The use of historical narrative carried through from the “Zero Option Address” to the 
“Westminster Address.” However, in the “Westminster Address,” Reagan amplified the menace 
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and danger the Soviets posed to the present. The Soviets had a history of bad actions, but in the 
climate of the day, the outcomes of Soviet misdeeds far outstripped anything from the past. 
Reagan magnified the danger, and in a sense, the Soviet willingness to engage in threatening 
actions, by grouping the Soviets with other insidious totalitarian governments. Reagan created an 
association, and in turn, constituted the Soviet Union as one among a number of wicked 
governments willing to unleash atrocities on their own people and the world. 
Reactions to the speech were again mixed. Reagan’s job approval rating did not change 
after the “Westminster Address.”253 The address was occasioned with “pomp” but also “the 
feeling that often infuses the special relationship between Britain and the United States.”254 
Reagan’s audience was impressed with his delivery, which he gave “apparently without glancing 
at a note” and “without faltering once.”255 British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher praised the 
address in the highest, calling it “magnificent” and “a triumph.” Thatcher’s accolades seemed 
hyperbolic in the moment as she thanked Reagan for “putting freedom on the offensive, which is 
where it should be. You wrote a new chapter in our history—no longer on the defensive but on 
the offensive.”256 The speech drew a sharp rebuke from the Soviets. The Soviet news agency, 
Tass, accused Reagan of leading an anti-Soviet movement and unfairly blaming the Soviet Union 
for all of the world’s ills.257 Others saw the speech as Reagan’s declaration that he was “a man of 
peace and of substance, and [not] a trigger-happy intellectual lightweight, as he is sometimes 
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portrayed.”258 The overall American reaction to the speech was lukewarm. Many critics 
dismissed it as a rehash of the President’s previous Soviet rhetoric, or condemned Reagan’s lack 
of a specific plan to achieve his goals, or claimed his rhetoric was overly strident.
259
 
Reagan’s narrative made great use of comparisons between the US and the Soviet Union, 
and his “Address to the Nation and Other Countries on US-Soviet Relations” followed the same 
pattern. Speaking the night before a “European disarmament conference in Stockholm,” Reagan 
said that the present was “a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities to peace.” As 
was common, he depicted America’s desire for a durable peace, one “that enhances dignity for 
men and women everywhere.” As per usual, the Soviet Union took its place as the United States’ 
foil in the peace process. Reagan wanted to “establish a constructive and realistic working 
relationship with the Soviet Union.” The President believed the US was “in the strongest position 
in years” to do so because it had left détente behind and strengthened its military. As in earlier 
speeches, Reagan enumerated how the Soviets ramped up their military production to 
unprecedented levels while the US and their allies “neglected our defenses” and “the risks of 
serious confrontation grew.”260 The US and the Soviet Union had clearly entrenched themselves 
in their respective roles as Cold War: The US was a benevolent guardian, and the USSR was an 
insidious blight on the world. 
Reagan noted that since he took office, the US reversed its weakened position, and with a 
“mandate from the American people…change[d] course” in such a way that America could be 
sure of its “commitment to defend our values.” America’s recovery must have vexed the Soviet 
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Union, claimed Reagan, because Soviet leaders often said “that our demise was inevitable.”261 
The President claimed that America’s military position led to an increase in “strident rhetoric 
from the Kremlin.” Nonetheless, said Reagan, with a newly built military, “America’s deterrence 
is more credible, and it is making the world a safer place—safer because now there is less danger 
that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or question our resolve.” The Soviet 
Union was a real danger in the world, and to counteract their presence, the US greatly 
strengthened its military capabilities. Thus, the world was a safer place because of its military 
might and ability to safeguard against Soviet aggression.
262
 
The President called for peaceful competition and a world in which armed conflict was 
eliminated, but he presented the Soviet Union’s actions as serious obstacles to those goals. 
Reagan lamented that the “armed conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, 
Central America, and Africa” and areas where “independent nations are confronted by heavily 
armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion….have been exploited 
by the Soviet Union and its surrogates.” The Soviet Union fueled conflict and “export[ed] 
violence,” worsening “tensions,” “suffering,” and “social and economic problems.”263 The 
Soviets were instigators and exploiters, and their involvement in conflict across the globe served 
no purpose but to further their political agenda. In short, according to Reagan, the Soviet Union 
was a major perpetrator of violence in the world and had been throughout the mid and late 20th 
century. 
Reagan’s first-term speeches laid out the historical narrative of Soviet aggression in the 
20th century through the comparison of US and Soviet actions. In turn, the narrative revealed the 
character of the superpowers. Reagan implicitly invited to his audience to compare the virtues of 
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the US to the iniquities of communist states. Through comparison, the story of the US and Soviet 
Union in the 20th century was one of parallel and antithetical rivals. The US encouraged 
freedom, defense, and benevolence where the Soviets actively sought to spread communism, 
oppress its citizenry, and build up its military. Reagan’s historical narrative presented a specific 
picture of the Soviet Union that gave some insight into the character of the Soviets and the 
Americans. In fact, the superpowers’ character was integral to Reagan’s rhetoric, and the 
character of the two nations and their allies emerged out of and were defined in these speeches. 
Reagan’s emphasis on national character defined the antagonists and protagonists of his 
narrative. 
Character 
We have seen how Reagan used historical narrative to reveal the Soviets’ character: He 
characterized the Soviet Union as savages and aggressors in order to make his political words 
and deeds seem reasonable. Robert Ivie argues that part of Reagan’s rhetorical success in dealing 
with US-USSR relationships is the appeal of Reagan’s common sense arguments in relation to 
the “metaphor of Soviet savagery which establishes an interpretive set, or context of 
assumptions, upon which the remainder of his logic largely depends for its coherence and 
rhetorical force.” If the Soviets were the aggressors in world politics, Reagan could chastise their 
political decisions even when it might seem unpopular to do so. “Rather than backing away from 
anti-Soviet rhetoric when it threatens his command over public opinion,” notes Ivie, “Reagan as 
President advances with the intent of making his case against America’s number one enemy 
sound reasonable so that his policies may ultimately prevail.”264 
Skepticism met Reagan’s zero option proposal. Various critics went so far as to say it was 
a disingenuous proposal designed to be rejected. Still, Reagan presented his plan as a reasonable 
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reaction to fear and war perpetrated by the Soviets. He called for the “preservation of peace in 
Europe” and to “help to bring peace and security to regions now torn by conflict, external 
intervention, and war.”265 Reagan insisted that there was “no reason why people in any part of 
the world should have to live in permanent fear of war or its spectre,” and that it was time “for 
all nations to act in a responsible spirit that doesn’t threaten other states.” America did not 
perpetrate acts of war or aggression, so the Soviet Union was the entity characterized as war-like 
and fear-mongering. Through their “external interventions,” the Soviets sowed the seeds of 
discontent and conflict. Furthermore, the Soviets and their allies kept their citizens “oppressed” 
and “destitute”; they “stripped [their citizens] of human freedom and dignity.” In Reagan’s eyes, 
the Soviets were a savage, oppressive group introducing and maintaining conflicts across the 
globe. In contrast, the US was characterized by benevolent qualities that could be seen in 
Reagan’s zero option proposal. The President called for an “agenda that can help to achieve 
peace, security, and freedom across the globe.” In fact, said Reagan, nothing had “a higher 
priority for me and for the American people over the coming months and years.” 
 The Soviets were presented as divisive, and their relationship with their allies rooted in a 
common belief in denying their citizens freedom. Conversely, Reagan offered a picture of the 
United States as an agent of unity, bonded to its allies through love of freedom and liberty. The 
“Westminster Address” demonstrated that bond most clearly. Reagan played up the relationship 
between the US and its allies, and he took care to ruminate on the nature of US-British 
friendship. The start of the address was framed as a long journey that took “[Reagan] to two 
great cities of the West, Rome and Paris,” then to Versailles for an economic summit which 
revealed “that even in a time of severe economic strain, free peoples can work together freely 
and voluntarily to address problems as serious as inflation, unemployment, trade, and economic 
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development in a spirit of cooperation and solidarity.” The President emphasized that if free 
peoples worked together during hard times, they could work together in good times as well. We 
know that the speech accentuated a shared sense of unity between Western powers. Kinship 
among Western powers was important because Reagan’s journey was not finished; he would 
soon travel to Germany where “NATO allies [would] discuss…joint defense[s] and America’s 
latest initiatives for a more peaceful, secure world through arms reductions.” The President’s 
rhetoric highlighted the United States’ good character through the story of a journey in which 
Reagan visited friends in order to help keep them safe. 
Western countries were friends and partners, but in the “hallowed halls” of Westminster, 
America had family; there was a sense of “kinship and homecoming.”266 Reagan sought to create 
common ground between America and Britain through their shared lineage and history of 
democracy: 
Speaking for all Americans, I want to say how very much at home we feel in your house. 
Every American would, because this is, as we have been so eloquently told, one of 
democracy’s shrines. Here the rights of free people and the processes of representation 
have been debated and refined.
267
 
Reagan told a story of kinship for a few reasons—chiefly to create a sense of identification 
between the two countries. Identification was critical to the core message of the speech: The 
Soviet Union was an enemy that was dangerous to world peace but was destined to fail if the 
West stood united against it: 
We’re approaching the end of a bloody century plagued by a terrible political invention-
totalitarianism. Optimism comes less easily today, not because democracy is less 
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vigorous, but because democracy’s enemies have refined their instruments of repression. 
Yet optimism is in order, because day by day democracy is proving itself to be a not-at-
all-fragile flower. From Stettin on the Baltic to Varna on the Black Sea, the regimes 
planted by totalitarianism have had more than 30 years to establish their legitimacy. But 
none—not one regime—has yet been able to risk free elections. Regimes planted by 
bayonets do not take root.
268
 
Reagan described their common enemy in terms that invoked violence and instability. The Soviet 
Union subscribed to a manner of governmental rule inculcated in a “bloody” history. The US and 
its allies were characterized by a bond of love for freedom and liberty for all the peoples of the 
world, while the Soviets were tied to 20
th
 century atrocities and denial of liberty.  
 As we have seen, the “Westminster Address” connected the Soviet Union to totalitarian 
regimes known for atrocities, but perhaps no Reagan speech was more direct in its 
characterization of the Soviets than his “Evil Empire Address.” Early Reagan speeches stressed 
the wrongheadedness, the violence, and the abhorrent nature of communism and its champion, 
the Soviet Union, but on March 3, 1983, in an address to the National Association of 
Evangelicals, Reagan shocked many people when he declared the Soviet Union an “Evil 
Empire.” G. Thomas Goodnight notes that in the “Evil Empire Address,” Reagan presented 
“himself as a man of peace working in dialogue with the Soviet leadership….demanding 
righteousness in the modern world.”269 Through rhetorical devices like “stories, jokes, biblical 
quotations, and personal revelations,” the President “created an ahistorical, dream-like vision of 
America and world destiny.” In turn, he “transformed administration policy from the secular to 
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the spiritual realm.”270 Essentially, Reagan tied his good character as a Christian to his policy 
decisions. The argument, then, was that Reagan’s policies were good by virtue of his 
Christianity. 
Reagan began the speech by placing America firmly in the context of being a Christian 
nation and the better for it. One of Reagan’s favorite rhetorical sources was the Founding 
Fathers, and in this speech, he linked both Christianity and the Founding Fathers. “Freedom 
prospers only where the blessings of God are avidly sought and humbly accepted,” said Reagan: 
The American experiment in democracy rests on this insight. Its discovery was the great 
triumph of our Founding Fathers, voiced by William Penn when he said: “If we will not 
be governed by God, we must be governed by tyrants.” Explaining the inalienable rights 
of men, Jefferson said, “The God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time.” And 
it was George Washington who said that “of all the dispositions and habits which lead to 
political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports.”271 
The President declared his unity with the evangelicals present: “Well, I’m pleased to be here 
today with you who are keeping America great by keeping her good. Only through your work 
and prayers and those of millions of others can we hope to survive this perilous century and keep 
alive this experiment in liberty, this last, best hope of man.” By placing himself firmly in 
lockstep with his audience, he positioned himself in opposition to those would deny the 
supremacy of American ideologies. On the international front, Reagan positioned himself against 
the Soviet Union; Reagan and America were good, while the Soviet Union was evil. 
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Soviet leaders eschewed morality, and embraced the destruction and exploitation of 
people for their own gain. They did this in part through “repudiate[ing] all morality that proceeds 
from supernatural ideas—that’s their name for religion—or ideas that are outside class 
conceptions. Morality was subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything is moral that 
is necessary for the annihilation of the old, exploiting social order and for uniting the 
proletariat.” The Soviets were not evil solely because of their human rights crimes, or even 
purely on political grounds, but because in addition to those wrongs, they attempted to deny their 
people access to God. Reagan told a story to emphasize this aspect of communism: 
A number of years ago, I heard a young father, a very prominent young man in the 
entertainment world, addressing a tremendous gathering in California. It was during the 
time of the cold war, and communism and our own way of life were very much on 
people’s minds. And he was speaking to that subject. And suddenly, though, I heard him 
saying, “I love my little girls more than anything “And I said to myself, “Oh, no, don’t. 
You can’t—don’t say that.” But I had underestimated him. He went on: “I would rather 
see my little girls die now, still believing in God, than have them grow up under 
communism and one day die no longer believing in God.”272 
Reagan’s story played out as a moment of identification for his audience. In it, the Evangelicals 
present might have recognized aspects of “the sacrifice of Abraham,”273 wherein God 
commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son Issac. Although it grieved Abraham to do as God 
instructed, he was willing to kill his son, so great was his love of the Lord. In a similar manner, 
the father in Reagan’s anecdote was willing to see his children die for God’s love. Reagan’s 
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story served to emphasize the magnitude of evil held in the Soviet system that a father would 
rather his children die than live under the yoke of communism and separated from God. 
Reagan doubled down on the connection between communism’s denial of God and the 
evil of such a system: “Yes, let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that 
totalitarian darkness-pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be 
aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual 
man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in 
the modern world.”274 In Reagan’s estimation, communism kept people from God, the vilest of 
acts, and in God’s stead was the communist government. The comparisons between the Soviets 
and the Americans were straightforward: The United States were a collective of moral, just, and 
good people. The Soviet Union housed an atheistic, oppressive, evil lot of politicians. 
The “Evil Empire Address” was perhaps his harshest condemnation and characterization 
of communism and the Soviet Union, and as such, responses to Reagan’s address words were as 
blunt and unequivocal as the President’s words. One editorial expressed “shock” that the 
President was “a leader willing to divide his people along religious lines so that his ‘political 
philosophy’ might prevail.”275 The Soviets responded to Reagan’s speech, calling it “‘another of 
his provocative speeches’ that proved again that his Administration ‘can think only in terms of 
confrontation and bellicose, lunatic anti-Communism.’”276 Still, for all of the criticism leveled 
against the speech, after the “Evil Empire Address,” Reagan’s poll numbers climbed 5% and 
generally rose for the rest of 1983.
277
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 Reagan could justify rhetoric that leaned heavily on Christian values and the 
condemnation of the Soviet Union because he saw Christianity and communism as diametrically 
opposed just as were the US and the Soviet Union. Reagan disagreed that his rhetoric or 
characterization of the Soviet Union was wrong. The year between Reagan’s “Evil Empire” 
speech and his “Address to the Nation and Other Countries on US-Soviet Relations” did little to 
change his position on the malicious nature of communism. Reagan introduced his Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI), better known as “Star Wars”; the Soviets shot down Korean Air Lines 
007, touching off “a storm of anti-Soviet fury” across the United States and the “mood of 
Congress swung massively in favor of escalation of the arms race”278; and in “November 1983 a 
routine North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear readiness exercise codenamed Able 
Archer could have led to a Soviet nuclear strike against the West.”279 The incident was one of the 
Cold War “situations where the world came closest to nuclear war.”280 
Ahead of Reagan’s speech, some critics questioned the make-up of the President’s 
administration, noting that it was filled with current or former military personal, whether “on 
loan” or in permanent positions. There was a fear that with so many military types around 
Reagan that it might restrict the kinds of voices that lent counsel on policy decisions.
281
 He had 
always been clear on how he felt about communism, and his first-term Soviet rhetoric reflected 
those feelings. Still, Reagan sometimes drew declarations of surprise from the Soviets over his 
criticism of the character of the USSR. In his “Address to the Nation and Other Countries on US-
Soviet Relations,” Reagan reacted to one of these moments; he chided Soviet leaders for feigning 
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surprise at his words because they had “never shied from expressing their view of our system.”282 
Reagan described the Soviets as pouting, saying, “We don’t refuse to talk when the Soviets” 
disparage the US, “or because they cling to the fantasy of a Communist triumph over 
democracy.” 
The US and Soviet Union must talk, but Reagan insisted that “negotiations deal with real 
problems, not atmospherics.” By atmospherics, Reagan meant following through with promised 
actions. Reagan had a history of accusing the Soviets of paying lip-service to negotiations and 
little else, and he noted that “over 2 years ago” he put on the table “the zero option for 
intermediate-range missiles.” Despite the good that such an agreement would bring into the 
world, the Soviets had ignored it: “Last month the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his 
country would do everything to avert the threat of war. Well, these are encouraging words, but 
now is the time to move from words to deed. The opportunity for progress in arms control exists. 
The Soviet leaders should take advantage of it.” The character of the Soviet Union was 
impugned. Although the Soviets had the chance to put the world in a safer place, it did not. 
Reagan chastised the Soviets for what he saw as a lack of good character. The “rest of the 
world waited for a safer existence,” yet the Soviets “broke off negotiations on intermediate-range 
nuclear forces” without setting “a date for the resumption of the talks on strategic arms and on 
conventional forces in Europe.” Reagan’s narrative exposed the self-centered nature of the 
Soviets. They walked away from negotiations that would make the entire world safer because 
they did not care about the rest of the world. In comparison, the United States displayed excellent 
character. The Americans were eager to “negotiate in good faith” and to “return to the 
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negotiating table to work toward” arms agreements.” Furthermore, the Americans were willing 
to compromise and “meet them halfway283 during arms negotiations. 
Reagan argued that a chance at reducing tension and danger in the world was there for the 
taking, yet the Soviet Union balked, extending years of conflict in regions of the world and a 
general sense of unease worldwide. The Russians exacerbated a number of global problems: 
They “introduce[ed] sophisticated weapons” into hotspots of violence in the Middle East and 
“created mistrust and ill will” through human rights violations. Reagan sought healthy 
competition between the two superpowers because competition would “bring out the best in us” 
and “in the Soviet Union.” The challenge was not a threat to the Soviet Union, declared Reagan: 
“Freedom poses no threat. It is the language of progress.”284 Reagan’s statement was an explicit 
reassurance to the Soviets and an implicit jab at communism; if freedom was the language of 
progress, then communism was, at best, the language of stagnation, and at worst, the language of 
regression. 
As always, Reagan was clear that the oppressive Soviet government deserved the West’s 
disdain, not the people trapped in communist countries. Reagan used dissociation to separate 
Soviet citizens from their government, because it allowed him to negotiate the 
“incompatibilities”285 of damning a people oppressed by their government even if the citizens 
were, at least in name, Soviets. The Soviet people wanted basic human rights: 
People want to raise their children in a world without fear and without war. They want to 
have some of the good things over and above bare subsistence that make life worth 
living. They want to work at some craft, trade, or profession that gives them satisfaction 
and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all borders. 
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In Reagan’s estimation, communism worked against fulfilling any of these desires, but 
democracy provided a blueprint for satisfying such needs. The Soviet Union could easily follow 
the blueprint: “If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can 
strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms, and know in doing so that we have helped fulfill the 
hopes and dreams of those we represent and, indeed, of people everywhere. Let us begin 
now.”286 Reagan connected arms policy to peace, and peace to better lives for everyone. It stood 
to reason, then, that acquiescing to Reagan’s arms policies would bring about a better world. It 
was a message typically Reagan: there was a simple answer to a complex situation, but it was not 
an easy one, at least not for the Soviets. 
Ahead of the address, Reagan’s aides said it would be “a major conciliatory speech on 
US-Soviet relations.”287 Some in the media conjectured that it might be “designed to calm 
domestic fears about a new Cold War during an election year as much as to wave an olive branch 
at the Soviet Union.” Indeed, after the address, critics said the tone of Reagan’s speech was 
“softer” but that his stance on US-Soviet disagreements did not change in a substantive way.288 
Immediately following his “Address to the Nation and Other Countries on US-Soviet Relations,” 
Reagan enjoyed a bump from 52% job approval to 55%.
289
 Polls aside, there was a sense that 
Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric had changed, but only in terms of aesthetics, not substance. In fact, 
some “senior officials [were] not convinced” that Reagan’s mildly conciliatory tone indicated 
that he had changed his stance toward the Soviets; the “anti-Soviet instincts of Reagan and some 
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of his closest advisors” were so strong that might “easily and quickly re-emerge.”290 Reagan’s 
rhetoric was less harsh than in the past, yet the “speech gave no indication that he had gone 
‘soft’” as he “still strongly criticized Moscow’s record of human rights, its military involvement 
in Syria and military intervention in Afghanistan and its taking advantage of arms control 
agreements.” The Soviets thought little of Reagan’s rhetoric and pointed out that though the 
President’s tone may have softened, he still insisted that the Soviets were not trustworthy and 
that the US would continue negotiating from a place of military strength.
291
 
Eventual Triumph Over the Soviet Union 
In Reagan’s rhetoric, the Soviet Union was a nation intent, not upon improving relations 
and safety in the world, but on clinging to power even as it made disingenuous declarations 
about desiring peace. The Soviets were careful not to allow its people freedom and choice 
because it could lead to communism’s downfall. Reagan was sure the Soviet Union would not 
survive for long in its present state, and he argued that there were some political actions needed 
to assure eventual triumph over Soviet communism. The eventual fall of the Soviet Union would 
come, but for all of his confidence, Reagan also believed the West needed to usher along the end 
of the Soviets lest they take advantage of Western inaction. 
 Reagan was particularly adamant about both the inevitable fall of the Soviet Union and 
the need for the West to help along communism’s demise in his “Westminster Address.” The 
Soviets’ tenuous hold on their power needed only for the democratic West to pry loose a few 
fingers and the Soviet communist system would plunge into the abyss of history, leaving 
democracy to carry on. Reagan called for cultivating the growth of democracy and culling 
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communism through a “campaign for democracy”292: “No, democracy is not a fragile flower. 
Still it needs cultivating. If the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom 
and democratic ideals, we must take actions to assist the campaign for democracy.” The US and 
Britain, and indeed, the West, would be active agents in vanquishing communism:  
While we must be cautious about forcing the pace of change, we must not hesitate to 
declare our ultimate objectives and to take concrete actions to move toward them. We 
must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, 
but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings….The objective I propose is 
quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, 
unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to 
develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.
293
 
The West would foster democratic ideals throughout the world, and in turn, the communist 
system, already weak and failing, would succumb to the inevitable destruction of its own 
malevolent ways, so strong was the righteousness of democracy. The President’s belief in the 
viability of his plan was not without merit: “What I am describing now is a plan and a hope for 
the long term—the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the 
ash heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-
expression of the people.” The historical record was full of totalitarian regimes who oppressed 
their people, only to eventually fall to the rectitude of democratic ideals. 
The Soviets were a threat to peace and freedom, and the “mission” of the day for 
democratic society was “to preserve freedom as well as peace.” The world had come to “a 
turning point” in history: 
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In an ironic sense Karl Marx was right. We are witnessing today a great revolutionary 
crisis, a crisis where the demands of the economic order are conflicting directly with 
those of the political order. But the crisis is happening not in the free, non-Marxist West, 
but in the home of Marxist-Leninism, the Soviet Union. It is the Soviet Union that runs 
against the tide of history by denying human freedom and human dignity to its citizens. It 
also is in deep economic difficulty. The rate of growth in the national product has been 
steadily declining since the Fifties and is less than half of what it was then. 
The Soviets were mired in a fight against history fueled by a fierce desire to cling to a system of 
government doomed to fail. There were tangible consequences to their position—their economy 
was failing and had been for decades. The Soviet system was an experiment in failure, and its 
eventual demise was not a surprise to democratic society: 
Wherever the comparisons have been made between free and closed societies-West 
Germany and East Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, Malaysia and Vietnam—it is 
the democratic countries that are prosperous and responsive to the needs of their people. 
And one of the simple but overwhelming facts of our time is this: Of all the millions of 
refugees we’ve seen in the modern world, their flight is always away from, not toward 
the Communist world. Today on the NATO line, our military forces face east to prevent a 
possible invasion. On the other side of the line, the Soviet forces also face east to prevent 
their people from leaving.
294
 
Democratic societies were the on the right side of history because of the freedoms their people 
enjoyed. Conversely, the Soviets were on the wrong side of history, as evidenced by the constant 
attempts by their people to flee to democratic countries. The communists, despite the 
protestations of their citizens, would not change. In fact, the Soviets had to use military might to 
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coerce their people into remaining in their countries. Use of force to detain people and take away 
their right to self-determination was antithetical to democratic ideals. Thus, in Reagan’s 
narrative, the Soviets betrayed a sense of a desperation linked to a doomed system of government 
and a desire to illegitimately hold on to their station as the rulers of their country and those under 
their sphere of influence. 
 Reagan was clear why the Soviet Union would one day vanish, and he admonished his 
audience to recognize and remember that the conflict between the US and Soviet Union was 
always one of good versus evil. Reagan urged people not to “place the United States in a position 
of military and moral inferiority,” to “beware…the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves 
above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive 
impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby 
remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.
295
 Americans 
would have to choose sides in the conflict between the US and Soviet Union; they could not sit 
on the fence, so to speak. Reagan defined such inaction as “simple-minded appeasement,” and as 
Reagan’s audience knew from Hitler’s actions in World War II, appeasement was a dangerous 
and unethical choice. It was clear who was right and who was wrong in Reagan’s narrative. 
Fence sitting was the realm of pure politics, and this conflict was greater than a disagreement 
between governments; it was both political and spiritual. 
Reagan was sure he knew who would win the conflict between democratic and 
communist systems if the West would “rise to the challenge” of standing against the Soviet 
Union. To Reagan, communism was “another sad, bizarre chapter in human history.” The 
President thought it would be a short entry in the history books, for according to Reagan, 
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communism’s “last pages even now are being written.”296 The Soviet Union was a force of evil 
in its last throes, clinging to an unsustainable system of repression, but like a wounded animal, it 
was dangerous and could not be dismissed out-of-hand.
297
 
 If the West allowed communism to thrive with little intervention, the world might be 
made “safer” through uneasy, tenuous agreements between the West and communist countries. 
As Reagan made clear in his “Address to the Nation and Other Countries on US-Soviet 
Relations,” that “safer” was not “safe enough.”298 To be safe enough required reducing the 
number of nuclear weapons and finding a way to improve America’s “working relationship with 
the Soviet Union.” Reagan proposed that the only “rational alternative” to armed conflict with 
the Soviet Union was “credible deterrence and peaceful competition.” The President was clear 
that the US and the USSR would not be friends, that there was a great disparity “between our 
two societies and our philosophies,” and in fact, he advocated for continued rivalry, albeit a 
peaceful one. Reagan did not believe that peace was close at hand as he noted that there were 
only “opportunities for peace” in the year ahead. He advocated that the superpowers “do more to 
find areas of mutual interest and then build on them” and “find ways to reduce, and eventually to 
eliminate, the threat and use of force in solving international disputes.”299 
If the Soviet Union was such a force of discord and discontentment in the world, and the 
US and USSR had different philosophies, it stood to reason that America was a force for 
harmony and contentment. Reagan claimed that there must be some cooperation between the US 
and Soviet Union, but that the immense “gap in American and Soviet perceptions and policy is 
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so great that our immediate objective must be more modest.” The first step was setting up a 
mutual examination of “actions that we both can take to reduce the risk of U.S.-Soviet 
confrontation.” The superpowers could reach a peaceable compromise, but its success would 
depend on the Soviet’s willingness to set aside their aggressive, exploitive ways for actions more 
in line with what Reagan claimed America did—respond to conflict, not create it. In part, the 
Soviet Union could fall in line with American sentiments to “reduce the vast stockpiles of 
armaments in the world,” which Reagan said could “reverse the vicious cycle of threat and 
response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.” The US had already done so on its own, 
and if the Soviet Union would follow suit, it would “provide greater stability, and build 
confidence” in the future of a peaceful world.300 
In conjunction with reducing arms, Reagan proposed “a better working relationship” with 
the Soviet Union. The key to the new relationship was “greater cooperation and understanding.” 
The Soviet Union would have to change its ways though, as Reagan pointed out through a series 
of antithetical statements: 
Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of 
individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding 
contacts across borders and permitting a free exchange or interchange of information and 
ideas increase confidence; sealing off one’s people from the rest of the world reduces it. 
Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts. 
Reagan used parallel structure to condemn Soviet acts and emphasize the differences between 
US and USSR ideologies. Reagan marked the Soviets with negative descriptors; the communists 
violated, harmed, held hostages, and thieved. Reagan plainly called the Soviets untrustworthy, 
saying of “Soviet compliance with agreements and treaties” that “there’s been mounting 
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evidence that provisions of agreements have been violated and that advantage has been taken of 
ambiguities in our agreements.” He stated that it was “clear that [America] cannot simply assume 
that agreements negotiated will be fulfilled.” It was the Soviet actions of the past that kept “our 
relationship with the Soviet Union” from being “what it should be.”301 Clearly, the Soviet Union 
would have to make significant changes to reach a point where Reagan thought a Russian-
American relationship would be fruitful.  
Nonetheless, Reagan was willing to try to build a relationship with the Soviets, although 
America would “have to start in small ways.” To achieve a relationship, said Reagan, he would 
follow “three guiding principles—realism, strength, and dialogue.” First, “We must recognize 
that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of 
individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our 
differences and unafraid to promote our values.” Second, strength encompassed military, 
economic, and spiritual power, and that “strength is necessary to deter war and to facilitate 
negotiated solutions. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get 
something in return. Well, America can now offer something in return.” Third, “Strength and 
dialog go hand in hand, and we’re determined to deal with our differences peacefully through 
negotiations. We’re prepared to discuss the problems that divide us and to work for practical, fair 
solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.” Reagan’s 
guiding principles were unflinching declarations of an American strength that allowed for 
negotiation and action from a position of superiority. 
Throughout the address, Reagan stressed that if the Soviets followed America’s lead, they 
could improve their citizens’ lives, and that the most important thing in a US-Soviet relationship 
would be an improvement in peoples’ quality of life. Reagan insisted that although the US and 
                                                          
301
 Ibid. 
 116 
Soviet Union had different political philosophies, its peoples were the same. The speech 
contained an extended hypothetical example of the commonality of American and Russian 
people in which the fictional couples, “Ivan and Anya” and “Jim and Sally,” discovered how 
much they had in common. The example created identification between Reagan’s audience and 
the Soviet people. Just as he had in the “Zero Option Address,” Reagan employed rhetorical 
questions to make an argument. Reagan asked if the couples would “debate the differences 
between their respective governments? Or would they find themselves comparing notes about 
their children and what each other did for a living?” The answer was that they would talk about 
their children because American and Soviet citizens were far more alike than the American and 
Soviet systems of government. The rhetorical questions were an implicit indictment of Soviet 
communism. Reagan’s narrative of Ivan, Anya, Jim, and Sally reinforced the stark contrasts 
between communism and democracy. The Soviet and American couples got along easily and 
naturally; they shared the common bond of humanity. Communist and democratic systems did 
not get along; they had vastly different views of how a government might intersect with 
humanity. Communist ideology generated the conflict between itself and democracy because it 
was corrupt and bent on keeping a small number of people in control of a large group of people. 
The nature of communism would lead to the downfall of the Soviet Union. The US simply had to 
advance the cause of democracy in the world at the same time it halted the march of communism 
while the West waited for the USSR to fail. 
Conclusion 
Reagan’s first-term speeches were clear indictments of the Soviet Union. His historical 
narrative presented the Soviets as villains on the world stage, emphasizing their historically 
oppressive nature, untrustworthiness, lying ways, exploitative practices, and the danger they 
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presented to the rest of the world. As a Soviet foil, America’s history of eschewing power and 
oppression for a position as a defender of liberty and a friend to the world emphasized the 
antagonistic narrative of the Soviets. Reagan’s historical narrative was effective because he 
could compare the superpowers, clearly demonstrating evil and good. In like manner, Reagan’s 
characterization of the Soviets and the US as antithetical to one another enhanced the bad 
characteristics of the Soviet Union and the good characteristics of America. The President both 
explicitly and implicitly denounced the Soviet Union, plainly calling them evil at times. He 
contrasted the evil of communist Russia with the good of democratic America, and in doing so, 
Reagan created a protagonist defending against the Russian antagonist. Both narrative and 
character pointed toward Reagan’s ultimate declaration that the Soviet Union could not survive 
in its present incarnation if the democratic West worked to ensure the USSR’s downfall. 
Ideological attack and careful defense against Soviet expansion would guarantee that the Soviet 
Union’s existence would be short-lived, for the communist system was on the wrong side of 
history. 
Reagan’s use of historical narrative, discussion of the social, political, and moral 
character of the US, the Soviets, and their allies, illumination of the actions needed to assure the 
West’s eventual triumph over Soviet communism were effective. Reagan reinforced the Soviet 
Union’s place as a global antagonist, and the Soviets’ did little to change that perception. It 
certainly seemed that the Soviet’s would maintain their place as the bad guys in Reagan’s 
narrative. The President’s Soviet rhetoric squarely placed the USSR on the road to ruin and 
declared that they meant to bring the rest of the world down with them. Thus, when Reagan’s 
rhetoric changed in his second term, creating a Soviet redemption story, it illuminated how 
rhetoric might make new relationships out of old oppositions.  
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Chapter Four 
Ronald Reagan’s first-term Soviet rhetoric had its roots in his pre-presidential rhetoric, 
and its invention was influenced by previous Cold War political rhetoric. The Soviets were still 
villains who sought to expand communism, disrupt peace in the world, and unduly influence 
weaker countries. The communists had a history of human rights abuses, despicable and 
disreputable social and political actions, and global antagonism. According to Reagan’s rhetoric, 
the Soviets were irredeemable; their decades of antagonistic words and reprehensible deeds 
revealed a morally bankrupt government. Given the history of Soviet actions and the place of the 
USSR on the world stage, one would expect that Reagan’s second-term Soviet rhetoric would 
approximate his first-term rhetoric, yet that was not the case. In his second term, Reagan 
presented his audience with the story of a Soviet Union that, although deeply flawed, was 
redeemable. 
In this chapter, I chart Reagan’s redemptive narrative through recurring strategies in four 
of his second-term speeches.
302
 First, Reagan used historical narratives by comparing past and 
present Soviet words and actions in a way that illustrated Soviet change. Second, Reagan made 
appeals to reciprocity as a way to establish a US-Soviet partnership that would bridge political 
differences, build trust, and demonstrate a place for the Soviets as global companions. Third, he 
presented Mikhail Gorbachev as a synecdoche for the Soviet Union because Gorbachev 
represented a new way of Soviet thinking and the best chance for Soviet change and redemption. 
 This chapter proceeds in three parts: First, I briefly review and define Reagan’s three 
rhetorical strategies. Second, I do a chronological analysis of the speeches and the 
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aforementioned strategies, demonstrating how Reagan developed and sustained an overall 
narrative that justified a reversal of his position. Last, I review the Soviet redemption narrative in 
the context of Reagan’s second-term. 
Rhetorical Strategies 
Reagan’s second-term Soviet redemption narrative relied on the interdependent, tripartite 
rhetorical strategies of historical narrative, reciprocity, and synecdoche. The Soviets’ past actions 
affected how the US perceived and reacted to current Soviet words and deeds. In turn, US-Soviet 
reciprocity, with its call for transparency, proceeded from both past and present Soviet actions. 
The conduit of that reciprocity was the blossoming relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev. 
Gorbachev represented a new way of Soviet thinking, and as the Soviet leader, he became a 
synecdoche for what Reagan hoped would be a different Soviet state. 
The underpinnings of Reagan’s second-term narrative were the historical actions of the 
Soviet Union. Reagan had told the story of the antagonistic Soviet Union for decades; thus, the 
historical narrative necessarily affected Reagan’s Soviet interactions. We might think of 
narratives as linear, but they are temporally complex. Historical narratives have an 
“anachronistically dual perspective,” for a “defining feature of narrativity” is that as “one event 
[is] being described, a later one [is] being referred to proleptically.” Thus, the “essence” of a 
historical narrative is that the “significance of one moment is deferred to another point in 
time.
303” In historical narratives, the storyteller fashions “intertextual relationships” between 
past, present, and future narratives, and in doing so, “lend[s] legitimacy” to the present story.304 
The past becomes a strategic resource “providing a setting and an expressive pattern for 
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discussions that transform both past and present.”305 So it was with Reagan’s second-term Soviet 
narrative. The President’s previous Soviet narrative, and the Soviets’ past words and actions, lent 
credibility and gravity to his new rhetoric. Perhaps most significantly, Reagan’s rhetoric 
somewhat countered his previous proleptic declarations of an irredeemable Soviet antagonist. 
Reagan’s second-term rhetoric was decidedly more optimistic, although guarded; the old Soviet 
narrative remained true, and it complicated the present Soviet narrative. 
Reagan needed to mediate the complicated Soviet narrative. One way to do that was to 
build mutual trust between the US and the USSR, so he turned to appeals of reciprocity. Reagan 
called for open and frank deliberation on social and political differences, cultural and educational 
exchange programs, and non-combative military and political interactions. Each side would treat 
the other as they wished to be treated. Reciprocity arguments are effective because they “rely 
upon a perceived symmetry that has a certain inherent appeal”306; they “claim the same treatment 
for the antecedent as for the consequent of a relation – buyers-sellers, spectators-actors, etc.,” 
based on the presupposition that the “relation is symmetrical.”307 Reagan’s turn toward 
reciprocity arguments was unique because his antecedent Soviet rhetoric clearly placed either the 
US or the USSR in a position of advantage; their relationship was not symmetrical. As such, 
there was never a sense of equality or trust between the superpowers. 
The fresh US-Soviet interplay had not occurred in the past because of two reasons: One, 
Gorbachev’s predecessors did not possess his desire for reform. Two, even had they that desire, 
they died in such rapid succession that Reagan had no chance to establish meaningful 
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relationships with them. Gorbachev sought to enact reforms in ways that no previous Soviet 
leader had. In Gorbachev, Reagan found a politician who embodied a new Soviet way of 
thinking, and as such, Reagan took the chance to create of Gorbachev, a synecdoche for the 
Soviet Union. Burke defines synecdoche as the “part for the whole, whole for the part, container 
for the contained, sign for the thing signified.”308 Synecdoche is a form of reduction and 
representation.
309
 Thus, in Reagan’s second-term rhetoric, Gorbachev became a symbol for the 
whole of the Soviet Union. His willingness to enter into sincere deliberation, reform Soviet 
polices, and interact with the United States in ways his predecessors did not signaled a 
significant change in the Soviet Union writ large and constituted in Gorbachev. The Soviet 
leader became the lynchpin in Reagan’s tripartite rhetorical strategy and a central character in the 
Soviet redemption narrative. 
Analysis 
In the time between Reagan’s “Address to the Nation and Other Countries on US-Soviet 
Relations” in January 1984 and his “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Following 
the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Geneva” (“Geneva Address”) in November 1985, 
there were a number of significant Cold War events: The Soviet Union and various allies 
boycotted the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles, with the Soviets citing “chauvinistic 
sentiments and an anti-Soviet hysteria being whipped up in the United States”310 as reasons for 
the boycott. On August 11, 1984, Reagan made a joke at a sound check before his weekly radio 
address: “My fellow Americans, I'm pleased to tell you today that I've signed legislation that will 
outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes.” The joke did not go out over the air 
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but was later leaked. The Soviets decried the joke as “monstrous” and said “it showed the 
insincerity of U.S. calls for improved relations with Moscow.”311 Most germane to this study, 
there was rapid upheaval in Soviet leadership as Yuri Andropov died in February 1984, followed 
by Konstantin Chernenko in March 1985, and Mikhail Gorbachev took the mantle of General 
Secretary with Chernenko’s death. Talks on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaties, and space weapons, dubbed the Nuclear and 
Space Talks (NST), were set to begin again, and Reagan firmly believed that his policies and the 
growing US military strength made it a perfect moment to start negotiations with the new Soviet 
leader. Nancy Reagan bolstered his beliefs, and per her desire to see her husband remembered as 
a peace-maker, supported Reagan’s commitment to US-Soviet negotiations.312 
Gorbachev’s rise to power offered a new opportunity for US-Soviet relations. Gorbachev 
was far younger than his predecessors, well-educated, familiar with Western Europe, and sought 
social and political reform in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev wanted reforms because he 
recognized that the Soviet Union’s economic position in the world was rapidly falling behind 
that of the West.
313
 Strengthening the Soviet economy was a priority for Gorbachev, and he had 
the education, experience, and negotiating skills to succeed in his goals. He was, according to 
Soviet statesman Andrei Gromyko, driven to leave failed Soviet policies in the past and had been 
picked as the General Secretary because of his experience, critical mind, and rhetorical 
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acumen.
314
 Reagan invited Gorbachev for a summit between the two superpowers—the first in 
six years—and Gorbachev agreed. 
Almost immediately after ascending to the Soviet premiership, Gorbachev “expound[ed] 
on the dangers and irrationality of nuclear weapons and the need for improved East-West 
relations.”315 He was particularly critical of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a 
missile defense system that used both ground and orbital platforms to protect against a strategic 
nuclear weapon attack. Gorbachev claimed SDI “threatened to undermine the nuclear balance 
and unleash a new race in offensive missiles,” and he sought Western support for his resistance 
to a renewed arms race. Ahead of the US-Soviet summit in Geneva, Switzerland scheduled for 
November, many of America’s European allies echoed Gorbachev’s reticence about SDI. Fears 
that at best “SDI would never produce results commensurate with its promise and its cost,” and 
that at worst, it would “damage the strategic unity” and “undermine the arrangements that had 
served Europe so well,” plagued Reagan.316 Thus as the Geneva summit neared, it became clear 
that arms control would rule the day at the November meeting.
317
 
Further complicating the forthcoming summit was Gorbachev’s growing global 
popularity, for Reagan wanted to argue the Soviets were still a threat to global well-being, yet 
even “U.S. officials” admitted “Gorbachev’s success in establishing Soviet positions [on arms 
control] as moderate and reasonable.”318 Reagan had reason to believe the Geneva summit would 
produce favorable results for US-Soviet relations. Secretary of State George Shultz had been 
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involved in preliminary negotiations with the Soviets—back-channel, “quiet diplomacy”—and 
he reported to Reagan that the Russians were willing to advance a friendlier relationship with the 
US; the summit would be the chance for a fresh start between the superpowers.
319
 In advance of 
the Geneva summit, Gorbachev proved to be a different kind of Soviet leader. Vice President 
George Bush and Shultz described Gorbachev as “healthy and ebullient”320; in March 1985, the 
Soviet leader sent a letter to Reagan requesting “an end to the practice of saying one thing to 
each other in confidence and something different in public”321; in April, he announced that the 
USSR would abandon plans to deploy additional SS-20 missiles in Europe; and in August, 
Gorbachev proposed a five-month unilateral moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons 
starting on the 40
th
 anniversary of the Hiroshima atomic bombing.
322
 
Gorbachev’s actions were both refreshing and frustrating for Reagan. The President 
“recognized that something extraordinary was happening in the Kremlin,” but the Soviet 
Premier’s actions and popularity, especially with the Western nations, were obstacles to his 
traditionally hardline, anti-Soviet rhetoric. Unlike previous Russian leaders, Gorbachev was 
affable and charming, and he “understood the uses of personality at least as well as Reagan 
did.”323 In an effort to counter the Soviet leader’s popularity, Reagan demanded “evidence” that 
Gorbachev’s policy reformations were “more than an ephemeral ploy.”324 Not willing to accept 
Gorbachev’s gestures on faith, the Reagan administration insisted that the only way for the 
Soviets to prove their good intentions was “practice” not “promises.” Reagan pointed to the 
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Soviet presence in Afghanistan as one example of Gorbachev’s suspect rhetoric.325  In another 
instance, the Reagan administration dismissed Gorbachev’s call for a moratorium on nuclear 
weapons testing as “‘propaganda’ and ‘unverifiable.’”326 In truth, Reagan, who feared the 
destructive power of nuclear weapons, rejected Gorbachev’s proposal “mainly because it would 
have halted work on SDI.”327 
Reagan resisted publically praising Gorbachev, and privately, his stance on the schedule 
for the Geneva negotiations concerned the Soviet leader. The Americans wanted to “concentrate 
on strategic nuclear weapons,” while the Soviets “insisted on including intermediate-range 
missiles…in the discussion”; further, the Soviets raised objections to “American foreign bases 
for its nuclear forces as well as to the Strategic Defense Initiative.” Reagan’s negotiating team 
“refused to give way and insisted that all categories of bombs, missiles and vehicles should be 
taken separately and in sequence.”328 Gorbachev was frustrated by the Americans’ unwillingness 
to negotiate beyond nuclear weapons, and he “came to Geneva bristling with distrust,” claiming 
the US was leveraging the arms race to weaken the Soviet state.
329
 Gorbachev was correct; 
Reagan believed that SDI was a strong bargaining chip for gaining concessions from the Soviets, 
and he would not trade it away.
330
 Reagan’s resistance to giving in to the Soviets on the focus of 
the arms talks was in part purely political, and in part his “insistence on personal control [of] 
Soviet-American diplomacy.”331 The President understood that Gorbachev’s rule offered an 
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opportunity to advance US-Soviet relations to new ground, and he was going to take advantage 
of the situation for political gain.
332
 
After the summit, some of Reagan’s speechwriters wanted to include deprecating 
language about the Soviets and Gorbachev in the “Geneva Address,” but Reagan refused.333 He 
liked Gorbachev and felt the meeting was productive. Furthermore, Reagan thought Gorbachev 
was a leader with whom he could work. In Gorbachev, Reagan saw “a remarkable leader 
determined to change the economic and political landscape of the U.S.S.R. for the better.”334 
Geneva Address 
The “Geneva Address” was the moment Reagan pivoted from his previous tale. The 
Soviets became a group with whom the US could negotiate, although Reagan cautiously 
acquiesced to that line of thinking. The address stands as the touchstone speech against which I 
analyze the other speeches in this chapter. Reagan began the third act, or the resolution, of his 
Soviet narrative in the “Geneva Address.” It introduced the important character of Mikhail 
Gorbachev and depicted points of conflict and resolution with the Soviet Union. The “Geneva 
Address” set the foundation for Reagan’s narrative change by introducing the rhetorical 
strategies of arguments from reciprocity and synecdoche, as well as continuing arguments from 
historical narrative. 
Reagan’s established anti-communist persona, and his previous Soviet rhetoric, called 
into question the veracity of his narration. To overcome this rhetorical obstacle, Reagan 
positioned himself as a reliable narrator early in the speech by adopting a news reporter’s 
neutrality and trustworthiness, declaring, “Maybe it's the old broadcaster in me, but I decided to 
file my own report directly to you.” Tapping into the reporter’s ethos served two purposes: First, 
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Reagan’s comments and declarations became both points of fact and narrative elements. Second, 
it became the ascendant story of what happened at Geneva; Reagan combated “3,000 opinions” 
proffered by the “over 3,000 reporters in Geneva”335 with his truth. 
Although Reagan’s second-term narrative was not a linear tale of progression, the 
“Geneva Address” demarcated that which came before and that which Reagan hoped would 
come after. From the start of the speech, Reagan chose phrases that signaled that demarcation. 
He “called for a fresh start”; declared that he and Gorbachev “[understood] each other better”; 
and claimed the meeting was “constructive.” A fresh start implies that something has grown 
stale, rotten, or old; if something is better, it has come from something worse; and constructive is 
a term that denotes the building of something from nothing. Reagan looked to history to inform 
his rhetorical decisions in the present and his hope for the future of US-Soviet relations. Past 
Soviet deeds were the locus of invention for Reagan’s current rhetoric. The complicated 
temporal aspects of Reagan’s historical narrative were unavoidable because narrative is a 
“strategy for coming to terms with time, process, and change.”336 In the “Geneva Address,” 
historical narrative ceased being solely about the Soviets’ past misdeeds; it could also be a tool 
for demonstrating change through comparing past Soviet bad acts with current better, or good, 
acts. 
Reagan did not incorporate a wholesale change in his use of historical narrative. Rather, 
he continued to employ arguments from historical narrative to link past and present Soviet 
misdeeds while challenging the Soviets to take steps to change further the narrative. Reagan 
demonstrated the contrast between a historical narrative that continued as it always had and one 
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that postulated what that narrative might look like with positive change from the Soviets. Early 
on, Reagan established that the Soviets’ previous bad actions and refusal to change made 
negotiating a difficult proposition: “You can’t imagine how much it means in dealing with the 
Soviets to have the Congress, the allies, and the American people firmly behind you.”337 The 
comment reinforced the magnitude and scope of the past on present US-Soviet cooperation. The 
office of the President commanded respect, and Americans expected their leader to be a capable 
diplomat. So, when Reagan acknowledged that American support was helpful, he revealed the 
magnitude of difficulty in navigating negotiations that were hindered by history. Further, by 
constituting Americans as his confederates, the President implied that US citizens shared the 
results of the summit. The audience already knew the summit was more successful than many 
thought it might be. Thus, the American audience shared in the victories of the summit. 
One of those victories was a subtle change in the course of the historical narrative, or, the 
aforementioned “fresh start” in US-Soviet relations. Reagan called for a fresh start because US-
Soviet relations were long-stagnant. Reagan and Gorbachev did not have “a meeting of the 
minds on such fundamentals as ideology or national purpose,” so different were the US and 
Soviet positions. Both history and ideology assured the superpowers would not would not reach 
a consensus, but significantly, they had come to better understand one another, and that was “a 
key to peace.” Each leader had “gained a better perspective” of the other, which seemed to open 
up previously closed channels of negotiation. Reagan and Gorbachev exchanged, and accepted, 
mutual invitations to visit each other’s country. Agreeing to meet multiple times for the sake of 
peace was significant, because in Reagan’s antecedent previous rhetoric, the Russians rarely, if 
ever, involved themselves in substantive peace talks. It was a moment when the Soviets broke 
from the established historical narrative of being myopic and self-serving. 
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Still, the fresh start did not ameliorate the past and current Soviet bad deeds that served to 
stymie change in the Russian narrative. The “subject matter” of the meeting was influenced by 
the Soviet Union’s past transgressions: “These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the 
West or for the world. You know the facts; there is no need to recite the historical record. Suffice 
it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R.” Given his 
past willingness to attack the Soviet Union on any number of bad acts, Reagan use of paralipsis 
may have seemed surprising. However, the fact that he did not give a litany of Soviet misdeeds 
confirmed that whatever historical narrative Reagan had been telling, he was open to changing it. 
At no point did Reagan say the Soviets altered the historical narrative. In fact, he challenged 
Gorbachev to prove the Soviet Union wanted reform by engaging in “deeds,” not only “words.” 
Although Reagan did not explicitly note a change in Soviet action, his positive characterization 
of Gorbachev, as well as the many principle agreements they reached, implied that the Soviet 
leader had laid the foundation for changing the historical narrative. 
In Reagan’s narrative, US and Soviet pasts carried through to the present. In particular, 
Reagan returned to the historical narrative that depicted the US as a shield against world dangers. 
This depiction was particularly salient to his discussion of SDI. Gorbachev was concerned that 
the US “might use a strategic defense system to put offensive weapons into space and establish 
nuclear superiority.” Protesting, Reagan noted that successful research arising from SDI would 
create a “safer, more stable world that we seek.” He, and other Cold War presidents, argued that 
the United States was “a nation that defends, rather than attacks” and whose “alliances [were] 
defensive, not offensive.” The Americans were peacemakers and freedom fighters. In 
comparison, the Soviets and other communist regimes were warmongers and despots. Reagan 
offered the “wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, and Cambodia” as proof of the 
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savage nature of communism. Reagan had said the same thing to the United Nations a month 
earlier, where he “linked progress in East-West relations to the resolution of fighting in 
Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia and Nicaragua.”338 Communist forces in those areas 
undergirded totalitarian “regimes which obviously do not represent the will or the approval of the 
people.”339 
Reagan’s rhetoric was designed to create comparisons in the minds of his audience. 
Reagan’s Americans believed in the goodness of American democracy and its attendant boons: 
Democracies “are less violent toward their citizens and more protective of human rights,” avoid 
war with each other, create and maintain “stable and prosperous” market economies, have 
“higher life expectancies” among their citizens, and “make good allies.”340 In contrast, 
totalitarian regimes like the Soviet Union must rule without allowing the freedoms and privileges 
of democracies because “if an autocracy is successful—if it produces a wealthy and educated 
population—that population will construct a civil society that will sooner or later demand 
political change.”341 The leaders of totalitarian governments were discouraged from adopting 
democratic ideals because they would ultimately lead to loss of power. For decades, Reagan 
proclaimed the political and moral superiority of the US to the USSR; he believed that the 
freedom to choose leaders and lifestyles, to live without fear of government, and to enjoy basic 
human rights were the building blocks not only of a good government but of a good life. It was a 
ubiquitous Cold War argument that lionized the US and villainized the Soviet Union, who had 
long denied their citizens the basic constructs of human rights and freedom. 
                                                          
338
 Bernard Weinraub, “President Urges Soviets to Resolve Wars in 5 Nations,” New York Times, October 25, 1985. 
339
 Reagan, “Geneva Address.” 
340
 Larry Diamond. "Democracy in Decline," Foreign Affairs 95, no. 4 (2016): 153-154. Business Source Complete, 
EBSCOhost. 
341
 Diamond, 154. 
 131 
In Reagan’s narrative, both the US and the Soviet Union had established roles. The US 
was the protagonist of the historical narrative, and the Soviet Union was the antagonist. One 
need only follow the trajectory of Reagan’s narrative from his pre-presidential days through his 
presidency to see how neither country deviated from their roles. Before the “Geneva Address,” 
Reagan’s Soviet narrative was definitive; however, Reagan cautioned his audience not to 
“assume” the Soviets would change, and in that word was the possibility of change. To assume is 
“to suppose,”342 but it is not “to know.” 
 Reagan’s address held evidence of Soviet change in the form of agreements. He praised 
the good work of both the US and Soviet negotiators for agreements in principle on a number of 
issues, including the mutual establishment of new consulates in America and the Soviet Union, 
the formation of a “Pacific air safety agreement” to help avert situations like the Korean Airlines 
incident
343, and an agreement to research the “feasibility of developing fusion energy.” Reagan 
was ready to move beyond the past, and his rhetorical choices bore that out. The “Geneva 
Address” was full of phrases and metaphors that invoked forward movement: Reagan and 
Gorbachev “made a measure of progress” on nuclear arms reductions, and though they had a 
“long way to go,” they were “heading in the right direction.” They “moved arms control forward 
from where [they] were last January,” and their negotiators were told to “hasten their vital 
work.” Some form of a word that invoked movement appeared often, especially when Reagan 
was discussing US-Soviet policy, exchange, or relations. 
 The summit was the first step in a “long-term effort to build a more stable relationship 
with the Soviet Union”—one that would not immediately materialize. The Soviets were getting 
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in the way of themselves through continued communist expansion “in a number of regions of the 
world.” The President did not have an illusory view of US-Soviet relations. He declared that both 
“limits” and “promise” populated the summit. One summit out of eleven post-World War II 
summits could not erase the historical differences between the superpowers. What emerged from 
the summit that was different from previous summits was a sense of hope and guarded optimism 
for the future of US-Soviet relations. Optimism might become something more concrete if 
Reagan and Gorbachev continued to “bridge…differences.” Given the Soviets’ historical record, 
Americans might have expected that some differences were too vast to bridge. Still, despite his 
previous Soviet narrative, Reagan offered his audience new insight into his belief in the future of 
US-Soviet relations: “Hope,” said Reagan, “is a realistic attitude and despair an uninteresting 
little vice.” This sentiment was new to the President’s Soviet rhetoric. In the past, there was no 
hope in the Soviet narrative, but in the “Geneva Address,” the possibility of change entered 
Reagan’s story. It was a subtle but important narrative distinction that marked the turning point 
in what would become a tale of redemption. 
Hope as a “realistic attitude” was little more than ether without corresponding actions. 
Reagan called for reciprocity as a kind of proof that justified hope. A reciprocal relationship 
would build trust and ameliorate mistrust. Reagan was clear that the superpowers had to “reduce 
the mistrust and suspicions” in order to forge a different relationship and for successful 
negotiations to take place. The President conceived of reciprocity as both “words” and “deeds”; 
Gorbachev, Reagan said, agreed. In part, when Reagan called for more than “words alone,” he 
meant something other than his established criticism of Soviet lip-service to global issues and 
their history of breaking promises. The President meant that, of course, but he also meant that the 
superpowers needed deliberation. A prominent aspect of Reagan’s sense of US-Soviet 
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reciprocity was meaningful conversation. He called for open and frank discussions of social and 
political differences and non-combative political interaction. Reagan declared dialogue the key to 
keeping the peace and said the superpowers “must be clear with each other and direct.”344 
Reagan sought what Matthew Festenstein calls deliberative trust.
345
 This form of 
deliberation “appears as a potentially valuable resource,” for it “may facilitate engagement 
across differences in complex and diverse societies, where people need to justify to each other 
their publicly articulated values, interests, identities, and goals.”346 The US and USSR 
represented two “complex and diverse societies,”347 and reciprocity allowed for the expression of 
differences between the superpowers without the fear of thoughtless condemnation. Reagan was 
adamant that transparency and candor should mark American-Russian interactions, that the 
“great issues of our time”—nuclear and conventional weapons, chemical warfare, SDI and other 
defense programs, wars and proxy wars, keeping the world safe from global dangers, and Soviet 
influence in the world—must be discussed openly and frankly, even if “either side found it 
uncomfortable or inconvenient.” According to Reagan, movement in the right direction for the 
Soviets had already occurred. Gorbachev and Reagan made “a measure of progress” toward 
creating a safer world by advancing nuclear arms control through “equitable, verifiable, and deep 
reductions” of “50 percent in appropriate categories” of nuclear armaments, opening dialogue 
about controlling and eventually eliminating chemical weapons, and “lessening the chances for 
surprise attack in Europe.” Reagan’s call for reciprocity suggested that America and Russia 
could forge a new relationship different from a past in which deception—created and maintained 
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by the Soviets
348—ruled the day. In fact, the “Geneva Address” was a moment of praise for the 
Soviets because their words matched their actions, unlike in the past. Since his ascension to 
Soviet General Secretary, Gorbachev had claimed he wanted to help make the world safer from 
nuclear warfare and that he believed arms reductions were vital to ensuring peace; Reagan 
agreed with Gorbachev on these points.
349
 Thus, when both leaders said they wanted to make the 
world safer and then ostensibly acted on those words via an arms agreement, they achieved 
reciprocity. 
In the “Geneva Address,” Reagan offered an argument of reciprocity that the Soviets had 
gained a measure of trust. Gorbachev and Reagan reached an agreement that was mutually 
beneficial, and in doing so, the Soviet leader deserved a degree of confidence. Neither side 
sacrificed more than the other, and as such, there was a reciprocal symmetry
350
 that held a 
“certain inherent appeal”351 for the audience. Reciprocity helped accomplish summit goals. 
Those goals included societal exchange aspects of the US-Soviet relationship, as well as political 
aspects. One way to accomplish societal exchange was more “people-to-people”352 interactions 
between US and Soviet citizens. Although Reagan and Gorbachev “remain[ed] far apart on a 
number of issues,” there were some things the two sides agreed upon, such as exchanging works 
of art, culture, and heritage, and social and educational exchange programs. Reagan believed the 
exchanges would “help break down stereotypes, build friendships, and, frankly, provide an 
alternative to propaganda.” Ostensibly, the cultural exchanges would, as Reagan said, “provide 
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an alternative to propaganda.” Yet Reagan’s comments suggested otherwise, or rather, that the 
propaganda would solely benefit the US. In a telling statement, Reagan said he wanted 
“Americans [to] know the people of the Soviet Union—their hopes and fears and the facts of 
their lives” while Soviet citizens learned about “America’s deep desire for peace and our 
unwavering attachment to freedom.” Exchanges would expose Soviet citizens to American 
democracy and a “better” way of life, while Americans would learn about the Soviet citizenry 
but not the communist system. Ultimately, exchanges forwarded the expansion of the democratic 
ideology Reagan had championed for decades. In the “Geneva Address,” exchanges became the 
vehicle for Reagan’s argument from reciprocity; America and the Soviet Union would learn to 
better understand each other, just as Reagan and Gorbachev had at the summit, and in the end, 
exchanges would enhance and enlarge the reach of American democratic ideals in the Soviet 
Union. 
One of my arguments is that Reagan’s tripartite strategies relied on one another to work. 
Arguments from historical narrative and reciprocity would have fallen short of the mark without 
synecdoche in the person of Gorbachev. Reagan could not have facilitated change without 
Gorbachev’s work toward Soviet reform in social and political policies. Soviet change and 
redemption came through the efforts of both men,
353
 and from their first meeting in Geneva, 
Reagan emphasized the importance of their personal interactions. Reagan characterized 
Gorbachev as far different from his Soviet predecessors; the General Secretary was “energetic,” 
“eloquent,” and a “good listener.”354 In past rhetoric, the Soviet Union was a monolithic entity 
controlled by self-serving politicians who forced Soviet citizens to live under the communist 
system. Gorbachev, with his distinctly different demeanor and ideas, was unique. In Gorbachev’s 
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uniqueness, Reagan found a symbol for Soviet change from the past, and a possible new future in 
US-Soviet relations. Gorbachev came to stand for the whole of the Soviet Union, an entity 
willing to reform in the dying light of the old ways. The “Geneva Address” laid the groundwork 
for Reagan’s second-term use of Gorbachev as synecdoche for the Soviet Union. 
Reagan characterized his interactions with Gorbachev in a way he had never done with 
previous Soviet leaders. There was a sense of friendliness and ease in Reagan’s description of the 
summit discussions: 
I guess you know that I have just come from Geneva and talks with General Secretary 
Gorbachev. In the past few days, the past 2 days, we spent over 15 hours in various 
meetings with the General Secretary and the members of his official party. And 
approximately 5 of those hours were talks between Mr. Gorbachev and myself, just one 
on one. That was the best part—our fireside summit. 
One-on-one talks beside a fireside are something intimates do, and to his American audience, the 
expression, “fireside summit,” was a clear allusion to Franklin Roosevelt’s fireside chats. 
Roosevelt’s “fireside chats” were, and are, iconic for their perceived intimacy and ability to put 
the American people at ease.
355
 Reagan tapped into the nostalgia and ethos of Roosevelt’s 
fireside chats, and in doing so, he transformed Gorbachev from the leader of the totalitarian 
Soviet state into, if not quite a friend, a friendly acquaintance. The image of families and friends 
gathered together to listen to Roosevelt suddenly included Gorbachev. It was a striking moment 
in the Soviet narrative for two reasons: One, the perception of a Soviet leader was no longer 
solely of an evil dictator, and two, Reagan had always preached defense against communist 
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encroachment, but Reagan seemed to be inviting the very symbol of the Soviet Union into 
America’s midst. 
Indeed, Reagan did invite Gorbachev to America, suggesting a meeting in Washington 
the next year, and Gorbachev reciprocated by inviting Reagan to Moscow the year after that. The 
invitations were not planned; rather, they arranged them “out in the parking lot.” Just as the 
fireside discussion evoked a picture of friendliness, so too did two people in a parking lot 
agreeing to visit one another. Reagan established that Gorbachev was different enough from 
previous Soviet leaders that he had a chance to forge a Soviet relationship unique in the history 
of the Cold War. Reagan’s choice to present Gorbachev as friendly was politically savvy because 
the Soviet leader had established a measure of global popularity. Gorbachev’s popularity 
presented an obstacle to Reagan’s traditional anti-communist rhetoric because he could not use 
some of his antecedent rhetoric with the same force of ethos. The change in Reagan’s rhetoric 
served two purposes: First, it allowed the President to align himself with some of the popular 
aspects of Gorbachev’s rule while continuing to advocate caution in the new relationship. 
Second, it allowed Reagan to promote the position that it was easier to connect with and change 
an individual, and in turn, for an individual in Gorbachev’s position to help change a system.356 
In short, Gorbachev was a person with whom Reagan could work, respected, and thought well 
of. Thus, Gorbachev, as a synecdoche for the Soviet Union, encouraged Reagan’s audience to 
see the USSR as something different than was their habit. 
When we take into account the number of ways that Reagan signaled changes in the US-
Soviet relationship, the “Geneva Address” was unmistakably a pivotal moment in his Soviet 
narrative. The historical narrative that Reagan carried through from his days as an actor to the 
Presidency gestured toward a modification of Soviet expectations. Reagan’s appeals to 
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reciprocity offered an avenue for Gorbachev to fulfill new explicit and implicit expectations. The 
President clearly perceived Gorbachev as the synecdoche for a new Soviet Union, and it was the 
General Secretary’s differences from his predecessors that gave Reagan hope Gorbachev would 
fulfill those expectations. The recurring elements of Reagan’s first-term rhetoric—historical 
narrative; the social, political, and moral character of the US and the USSR; and the actions 
needed to assure the West’s eventual triumph over Soviet communism—were present in the 
“Geneva Address,” but the President altered how he incorporated them. Reagan seized the 
chance to reframe his Soviet rhetoric, and in doing so, the speech became the moment the 
President’s narrative turned toward one of Soviet redemption. 
Immediately after the summit, Reagan and Gorbachev released a joint statement.
357
 The 
statement noted modest progress on a number of issues, and a “vague, generalized assertion that 
a nuclear war could not be won and should never be fought.”358 Some of the statement’s content 
was familiar to the American public because it “echoed some of Reagan’s speeches of the 
previous two years.”359 The statement, then, was in large part perfunctory, but it also gestured 
toward a future that included a working US-Soviet relationship, something the Cold War saw 
little of previously. 
Some critics have called the summit a “failure” because it achieved only modest progress 
on a few issues, and that although Reagan and Gorbachev “liked each other and a bond of trust 
began to emerge between them” at the meeting, the intervening year between the Geneva and 
Reykjavik summits was “punctuated by disagreements on issues like Afghanistan, Nicaragua and 
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human rights” as the leaders exchanged ideas about disarmament.360 Others have noted that the 
“rapport that developed between” at the summit between the two leaders was “significant.”361 
Reagan and Gorbachev were in accordance with this latter assessment of the summit; Reagan 
believed the summit “had gone well,” and the “absence of a definite agreement with Reagan 
failed to dampen [Gorbachev’s] optimism” for a new era in US-Soviet relations.362 
Although the summit drew mixed reviews, critics had generally positive things to say 
about Reagan’s “Geneva Address.” Reagan’s championing of nuclear de-escalation was warmly 
received, as “senators and congressmen of both parties applauded his efforts.”363 The President 
noted in his diary that he had not received such an enthusiastic reception from Congress since he 
“was shot,” and that “the members wouldn’t stop clapping & cheering.”364 The press and 
television congratulated Reagan for changing the tone of US-Soviet relations and moving the 
superpowers in a new, positive direction.
365
 The Washington Post called the address Reagan’s 
“the finest of his presidency,” effusively praising the President’s “tone” as “dignified and 
statesmanlike,” “realistic,” and “most important for the future, conciliatory and generous toward 
the Soviets.”366 The address signaled a “breakthrough in foreign policy by easing [Reagan’s] 
previous rigidity toward the Soviets and seeking to set a more positive climate.”367 Job approval 
ratings for immediately after Reagan’s “Geneva Address” are unavailable; however, just two 
days before the speech, the President was at 66%, and nearly two months later, he maintained a 
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good approval rating of 63%.
368
 In Western Europe and “around the world,” public reaction to 
the summit and the address was “supportive” and “immensely to the American advantage.”369 
Even the Soviets were receptive to Reagan’s address, and it was reprinted by Pravda, the official 
newspaper of the Soviet Communist Party.
370
 
Reykjavik Address 
Despite the encouraging tenor of the Geneva Summit, and Reagan and Gorbachev’s 
mutual words of praise, the US and the Soviet Union soon found themselves at odds with one 
another. Post-Geneva, Gorbachev fell back on well-worn “Leninist jargon and fierce 
denunciations,” and by early 1986, Reagan was somewhat disillusioned with the Soviet leader’s 
public persona. After years of antagonism, it was not unexpected that the Americans and the 
Soviets might return to their old roles. Still, Reagan and Gorbachev had made progress in 
reforming US-Soviet relations, and neither was willing to erase that progress. Gorbachev told his 
Congress that the superpowers were interdependent on one another—a bold proclamation on his 
part.
371
 By the summer of 1986, Reagan still spoke highly of Gorbachev, remarking to French 
president François Mitterand that he behaved like a contemporary man, unlike previous Soviet 
leaders.
372
 Nonetheless, the year between the Geneva summit and the October 1986 Reykjavik, 
Iceland summit was fraught with political turmoil. Although Reagan “hoped to build on what he 
took as the positive spirit of Geneva,” arms disagreements continued to be a contentious issue.373 
Gorbachev insisted that SDI “stood in the way of any meaningful agreement,” but he was open 
to further dialogue. Gorbachev’s inflexibility on SDI angered Reagan. Caspar Weinberger, the 
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President’s hawkish Secretary of Defense, took advantage of Reagan’s frustration and pushed for 
him to “break the limits of an unratified Strategic Arms Limitations Talks II (SALT II) treaty” 
based on reports of Soviet “breaches of SALT limits”; Reagan agreed that the US should not 
observe the SALT II restraints because of the Soviets’ dishonesty in the matter.374 In the world 
arena, Gorbachev continued to press his moral advantage on nuclear weapons, calling again for a 
moratorium on nuclear testing. Despite his fear of escalating a nuclear arms race, Reagan once 
again took Weinberger’s advice, rejecting Gorbachev’s proposal and agreeing to nuclear 
weapons system testing in the name of “American security.”375 Reagan’s choices to break the 
SALT II limitations and approve further nuclear testing hurt his image and made him seem like 
“a warmonger when Gorbachev was preaching peace and fewer weapons.” In fact, Gorbachev 
proposed a plan to eliminate all “nuclear weapons by the end of the century.”376 Critics of the 
proposal saw it “as an effort to test Reagan’s sincerity.”377 Reagan admired the plan, but he was 
unwilling to “overrule” the “hawks in his administration and Congress” who pressed him reject 
it. Still, Reagan wanted to reduce the danger of nuclear arms, and Gorbachev was “willing to 
meet again” at another summit.378 
Gorbachev’s goodwill had its limits, however, and it seemed to evaporate in the wake of 
the April 1986 Chernobyl disaster. A nuclear reactor at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the 
Soviet Ukraine city of Pripyat suffered a catastrophic malfunction, “leading to an explosion that 
spewed large amounts of radioactive debris into the atmosphere.”379 There were thirty-one 
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immediate deaths, and thirty-one more “through March 1987.”380 The Soviet response to the 
tragedy “was a debacle.”381 Gorbachev wanted to tell the Soviet people as much as he could, but 
the “ingrained secrecy of the Soviet bureaucracy prevented even him from finding out what was 
going on.” As such, the Soviet people found out details of the disaster from Western sources, and 
even though Reagan “refrained from trying to gain political ground at Gorbachev’s expense,” 
some Americans did. Gorbachev was furious at what he saw as the West exploiting the tragedy 
for political gain. In light of the perceived exploitation, and the Reagan administration’s recent 
stance on SDI, SALT II, and the nuclear moratorium, Gorbachev concluded there was ample 
“evidence of American bad faith” in the ongoing arms talks. 
By July, progress between the US and the Soviet Union had not only stalled but seemed 
to be moving backward; the Geneva spirit that so enthralled Reagan and Gorbachev immediately 
after the summit had dissipated into the ether. A new summit, and the furthering of US-Soviet 
relations seemed unlikely, but “two visitors that summer—Francois Mitterrand and Richard 
Nixon—helped rekindle Gorbachev’s ardor for summitry.”382 Mitterrand and Nixon praised 
Reagan at the same time they acknowledged his faults, and that “struck Gorbachev forcibly.”383 
Gorbachev took the summer to mull over Mitterrand and Nixon’s words, and in September, he 
proposed a summit in Reykjavik, Iceland during which the two sides would discuss SDI, 
“intermediate nuclear forces in Europe, and nuclear testing.”384 Reagan agreed to the summit. 
Tensions were still high between the US and the Soviet Union as the summit drew near, 
and an international incident threatened to escalate those tensions. Ahead of the Iceland meeting, 
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the FBI arrested Soviet physicist Gennadi Zakharov for attempting to buy classified US Air 
Force documents. In retaliation, the KGB arrested American journalist Nicholas Daniloff for 
espionage. US-Soviet relations were strained as the Iceland meeting date approached, but the 
superpowers agreed to exchange Zakharov for Daniloff, and the Russians also released Soviet 
dissident Yuri Orlov. Although the exchange did not create a convivial tone for the approaching 
summit, it nevertheless helped rebuild some lost trust between the Soviets and Americans.
385
 
Frustrated by an inability to progress his agenda at the US-Soviet summit in Reykjavik, 
Iceland, Reagan’s “Address to the Nation on the Meetings With Soviet General Secretary 
Gorbachev in Iceland” (“Reykjavik Address”) focused more on the failures and unacceptable 
political and social positions of the Soviet Union than did the “Geneva Address.” If the “Geneva 
Address” demonstrated the Soviet’s first steps toward redemption, the “Reykjavik Address” 
showed Soviet backsliding. The speech was replete with charges of Soviet weapons treaties and 
human rights violations. Reagan characterized the Soviets as obstinate in the area of weapons 
reduction agreements. The tenor and subject matter of the “Reykjavik Address” reflected the 
tensions and conflicts of the previous year. Nonetheless, its part in the Soviet redemption 
narrative cannot be overstated. Where the “Geneva Address” was a turning point in Reagan’s 
overall narrative, the “Reykjavik Address” challenged the Russians to create a new Soviet 
narrative. Specifically, Reagan’s characterization of Soviet wrongdoings and obstinacy in 
conjunction with claims that “the Soviets must make”386 the decision to advance US-Soviet 
relations offered the Russians the chance to begin redeeming themselves. What we find in the 
“Reykjavik Address” are the rhetorical strategies of historical narrative, reciprocity, and 
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synecdoche used in the service of forcing Gorbachev to choose how the Soviet narrative would 
proceed. 
Reagan started the speech by admitting that the summit was, in part, a failure. The 
Americans had “proposed the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in 
history…[and] the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles—Soviet and American—from 
the face of the Earth by 1996,” but when the summit ended, the “American offer [was] still on 
the table.” The reasons that Reagan opened the address with the failure to reach an agreement 
were twofold. First, he placed the US in the familiar historical narrative role of benevolent world 
leader. In this case, America sought a safer world. Second, he implied that the Soviets were the 
reason negotiations failed. Reagan put the Soviet Union in their traditional role as an impediment 
to global peace. 
In the “Reykjavik Address,” Reagan used historical narrative differently than he did in 
the “Geneva Address.” In the “Geneva Address,” Reagan highlighted the Soviet Union’s nasty 
history as a means to emphasize a fresh start. In the “Reykjavik Address,” historical narrative 
served two main purposes: To chastise the Soviets for their continued misdeeds, and germane to 
this study, it demonstrated the scope of change needed to alter the Soviet narrative. Three 
subjects demonstrated the scope of continued Soviet transgressions: The first was the Soviet 
violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM). According to the treaty, each country 
“agreed to limit any defense against nuclear missile attacks to the emplacement in one location in 
each country of a small number of missiles capable of intercepting and shooting down incoming 
nuclear missiles.” The USSR “deployed the few antiballistic missiles around Moscow as the 
treaty permitted,” but they later expanded that defense system into the city of Krasnoyarsk. 
Reagan linked the violation to Gorbachev’s unwillingness to allow SDI to proceed unfettered. In 
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Reagan’s rhetoric, the Soviets enacted their typical underhanded ways by creating an obstacle for 
SDI. They opposed SDI because they wanted to maintain the upper hand in nuclear defense in 
the form of the missile defense system of Moscow and Krasnoyarsk. It was, as Reagan said, 
“their own SDI.” Such duplicitous actions fell in line with the characteristic self-serving 
communists of Reagan’s Soviet narrative. 
The second subject of Soviet transgression was human rights violations. Reagan 
established a pattern of the USSR violating treaties in his discussion of human rights. Just as the 
Soviets flouted the rules of the ABM treaty, so too did they disregard the 1975 Helsinki Accords. 
The agreement, signed by the Soviets, was “a far-ranging set of agreements among 35 countries 
in Europe, North America, and the Soviet bloc” that included a “set of principles guaranteeing 
individual rights of expression, assembly, and so on.”387 Specifically, Reagan cited the Soviets 
“refusal to let people emigrate from Russia” to escape religious persecution, and to “rejoin their 
families, husbands, and wives…separated by national borders.”388 
Like previous Cold War presidents, Reagan chastised the Soviets for what he saw as 
inexcusable human rights abuses—rights he called “fundamental” to human lives. Not 
surprisingly, the first fundamental right Reagan noted was the right to live free from religious 
persecution. In doing so, the President created a sense of empathy between his American 
audience and the persecuted Soviet citizen, for history taught Reagan’s audience that America, as 
they knew it, was founded by men and women fleeing religious persecution in Europe. The 
President insisted that human rights had a direct effect on negotiations: “Improvement of the 
human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral 
relations with the United States.” If the Soviets wanted to continue deliberation, they had to act 
                                                          
387
 John Feffer, "The Forgotten Lessons of Helsinki," World Policy Journal 21, no. 3 (2004): 32. Business Source 
Complete, EBSCOhost. 
388
 Reagan, “Reykjavik Address.” 
 146 
on their words: “So, I told Mr. Gorbachev—again in Reykjavik, as I had in Geneva—we 
Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these than 
upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we’re 
all from Missouri—you got to show us.”389 Reagan had never trusted the Soviets, because if the 
Soviets would betray their own people, they would do the same to the rest of the world.
390
 
The third subject of Soviet transgression was their continued interference in the political 
affairs of other countries. “Regional conflict” was another subject that Reagan used to argue 
from the historical narrative. Just as he had in the “Geneva Address,” Reagan enumerated the 
countries in which the Soviets directly or indirectly promoted communism, encouraged 
“totalitarian rule,” or engaged in war. The Soviets had a history of interference in other 
countries’ affairs, and those “Soviet actions” were detrimental to citizens of places like 
“Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia.” The Soviet Union proved willing to invade, 
coerce, and threaten other countries for political gain, and they continued to do so. Reagan 
admitted that the US also involved themselves in the affairs of other countries, although solely 
for the “expansion of freedom,” and to aid “freedom fighters who [were] resisting the imposition 
of totalitarian rule.” As was his wont, Reagan’s comparison reified the established record: the US 
was on the side of good, and the Soviet Union was on the side of evil. Reagan’s use of the well-
known historical narratives of the US and the Soviet Union served to remind his audience that 
despite the positive outcome of the summit a year ago, the Soviets had yet to prove they were 
truly willing to change. The President said as much when he declared that he could not “promise 
that the talks in Iceland or any future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to 
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great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.” The eventual outcome of the Soviet 
narrative remained uncertain. 
Uncertainty and frustration were present in Reagan’s use of reciprocity arguments. That 
ambiguity was perhaps most prevalent in Reagan’s characterization of the Soviets and their 
response to SDI. Reagan was heavily invested in the realization of SDI, and he argued that SDI 
would benefit the world as a whole. Reagan described the negotiations in terms of reciprocity: If 
the Soviets agreed to the start of the SDI program, the US would “share the benefits” of SDI’s 
non-nuclear defensive capabilities. The Soviets rejected the immediate start of the SDI program; 
instead, they “asked for a 10-year delay in the deployment of SDI” in what Reagan saw as 
“effectively killing SDI.” The Soviet rejection was emblematic of the sense of uncertainty and 
frustration in Reagan’s arguments from reciprocity. Protection from nuclear attack should have 
been a strong bargaining chip. Instead, Reagan found himself wondering why Gorbachev would 
discard a chance to leave behind the defensive strategy known as mutually assured destruction 
(MAD). The essence of MAD was that “if one side launched a nuclear attack, the other side 
could retaliate.” Reagan found MAD deeply flawed because the “threat of nationwide 
annihilation made such a limited defense seem useless.” A series of questions seemed to answer 
the question of why the Soviets rejected SDI: “How does a defense of the United States threaten 
the Soviet Union or anyone else? Why are the Soviets so adamant that America remain forever 
vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack? As of today, all free nations are utterly defenseless against 
Soviet missiles fired either by accident or design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we 
remain so—forever?” These questions pointed to a zero-sum game mentality on the Soviets’ 
part. Reagan’s questions appeared to illuminate a US-Soviet relationship in which the Russians 
saw a victory by the Americans as a loss for themselves. 
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For all of the frustration Reagan experienced when he failed to secure a deal on SDI, the 
Iceland summit ultimately bolstered the credibility of his later redemption narrative. His 
insistence on deeds over words played to his dedication to reciprocity. When the Soviets would 
not agree to a mutually beneficial SDI agreement, Reagan walked away from the negotiations 
rather than settle for a bad deal. Thus, when the Soviets later changed their stance on a number of 
issues, including arms controls, it boosted Reagan’s ethos. His words and deeds at Reykjavik 
eventually proved his prescience in the area of the intersection of policy and reciprocity. As one 
critic argues, the “Reykjavik Address” was politically significant in part because “Reagan used 
SDI as a diplomatic tool to pressure Gorbachev publicly to implement reforms within the Soviet 
Union, especially human rights reforms.”391 Reagan “argued that there was a historical continuity 
between past and present Soviet practices of violating human rights.”392 The “Reykjavik 
address” was part of Reagan’s strategy of linking past and present Soviet human rights violations 
in order to force Gorbachev to decry, or “move away” from, such bad actions. In turn, the 
Soviets would be less likely to “revert to form” in the future and more likely to continue social 
and political reforms.
393
 Essentially, the Soviets were pressured to act on the promises of 
Brezhnev from a decade and a half earlier.  
It was clear Gorbachev was not disposed to help Reagan advance his agenda, and, in turn, 
Reagan saw little use in Gorbachev’s place as a synecdoche. If Gorbachev would not change, 
neither would the Soviet Union. As such, Reagan’s discussion of Soviet good deeds, change, or 
Gorbachev’s positive qualities, was lacking. The Iceland meeting was far less productive or 
positive than the Geneva summit, and Reagan avoided ascribing much in the way of praise to the 
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Soviets. One exception was near the end of the speech; Reagan declared that “there’s good 
reason for hope. I saw evidence of this is in the progress we made in the talks with Mr. 
Gorbachev.”394 The statement was vague and perfunctory; Reagan was disappointed and angry 
with the Soviets for hammering SDI at the expense of moving other negotiations forward. 
The “Reykjavik Address” did not advance the Soviet narrative in a positive direction. In 
fact, it seemed as if the Soviets had backslid to a time before Geneva. However, Reagan was 
“still optimistic” that the “opportunity to begin eliminating the nuclear threat” was closer than 
ever. Despite the lack of successful negotiation, the “Reykjavik Address” was an important 
speech in the course of Reagan’s Soviet narrative specifically because it emphasized the failings 
of the Soviet Union in terms of changing the historic narrative, embracing reciprocity, and 
maintaining friendly relations with the US. A successful meeting might have pushed Reagan to 
maintain the status quo, but because Gorbachev and the Soviets proved frustrating, obstinate, and 
unwilling to compromise, whether there would be future meetings and negotiations was “a 
decision the Soviets” would make; the Americans would be “prepared to go forward whenever 
and wherever the Soviets are ready.” The major takeaway from this speech was that it offered the 
Soviets a chance to create a new Soviet narrative forwarded by themselves. Most good 
redemption stories do not involve the protagonist coercing the antagonist to change. Instead, 
worthy redemption stories involve an individual or group who take responsibility for their past 
actions and make a conscious effort to become better than they were.
395
 
The failure at Iceland, in large part because Reagan would not compromise on SDI, drew 
sharp criticism from “liberals in the West for sacrificing world peace on the altar of Star Wars.” 
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Western conservatives were also critical of Reagan because he had come close to compromising 
on SDI. Still, the meeting set up a historic outline for eliminating nuclear weapons by 1996.
396
 
Reagan’s insistence on keeping SDI just as he would like took the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons off of the table though, and after Reykjavik, “Reagan’s aides undertook a propaganda 
blitz to emphasize that the Soviet’s concern over SDI proved that the system was essential,” 
while Gorbachev “dismissed the White House statements as propaganda, stressing” that it was 
Reagan’s idea to eliminate all nuclear weapons, yet he backed down from the proposal.397 
Reactions to the address universally commented on the failure of the Reykjavik 
summit—specifically that the negotiations broke down because of a “dispute” over SDI and 
Reagan’s unwillingness to compromise his stance on the program398—and many noted that the 
address seemed to be geared toward salvaging some semblance of positivity from the meeting. 
Indeed, Reagan “refrained from blaming Gorbachev personally for the dramatic breakdown”; 
instead he “emphasized his optimism that the U.S. and the Soviets [could] overcome their deep 
differences over SDI.”399 The New York Times remarked on the “conciliatory” tone of the 
address and Reagan’s insistence that despite the botched nature of the summit, the superpowers 
were closer than ever to meaningful an arms accord.
400
 As Lou Cannon observed, Reagan sought 
to reframe the summit, not as a failure, but as a rocky “step on the road to eventual success.”401 
Americans “made a similar evaluation,” as evidenced by a “CBS poll taken the week after 
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Reykjavik” that “showed an 11-point jump (to 72 percent)” in Americans who thought Reagan 
was handling US-Soviet relations well.
402
 
London Address 
A little over a year-and-a-half passed between the Reykjavik summit address and 
Reagan’s “Remarks to Members of the Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs” (“London Address”) 
on June 3, 1988. During that time, the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union 
generally moved in a positive direction, although there were some problems. In November 1986, 
the Iran-Contra scandal rocked the Reagan administration, and in an effort to prove he was still 
strong in foreign policy and not “soft on communism,”403 Reagan “sanctioned the deployment of 
an extra B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles.” That appeared to violate the SALT II 
treaty, and members of Gorbachev’s party demanded an increase in the Soviet nuclear arsenal as 
a retaliatory move. Gorbachev disagreed, believing that Reagan “needed to distract attention 
from the Iran-Contra scandal and restore his authority.”404 The practical decision demonstrated 
the difference between old-line Soviet leaders and Gorbachev. 
Gorbachev continued to show a willingness to break from traditional Soviet policy with 
the introduction of the perestroika and glasnost policies. Perestroika, or “restructuring,” was 
“designed to restructure both the Soviet economy and Soviet foreign policy”; it “would retain, 
but revitalize, the fundamental principles of socialism by balancing carefully new free market 
incentives and expanding democracy with central planning and protection of common societal 
needs.”405 In part, perestroika would be achieved through glasnost, or “transparency,” which 
would “encourage openness in every sphere of public life and the search for what was good and 
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true for the improvement of society.”406 Reagan recognized that Gorbachev’s reforms would 
benefit the US-Soviet relationship. However, instead of completely easing away from his anti-
Soviet rhetoric, Reagan pressed the advantage, perhaps most famously from in front of the Berlin 
Wall when he challenged Gorbachev to “Tear down this wall!”407 Still, for all of the political 
flare-ups, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty at the 
Washington summit in December 1987. From May 29-June 3, 1988 Reagan and Gorbachev 
summited in Moscow. Expectations of the meeting were low; Reagan’s position as a “lame 
duck” president guaranteed that nothing new of historic import would occur.408 However, 
Reagan managed to create some waves when said he no longer thought of the Soviet Union as an 
“evil empire.” That, said Reagan, was “‘another time, another era.’”409 Reagan’s comment was 
significant because it “carried weight” with a number of groups: For the Americans, it “signified 
a winding down of the Cold War”; for Gorbachev, it allowed him to claim that he had 
“succeeded in changing Reagan’s rhetoric; and for the Soviet people, it “served to reinforce the 
notion that political life in the Soviet Union was indeed opening up.”410  
Two years before the Moscow Summit, the Iceland summit had been a setback to both 
US-Soviet relations and the Soviet Union’s redemption narrative. The US and the Soviet Union 
seemed to have retreated into an antagonistic relationship. Two years later, Reagan’s “Remarks 
to Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London” (“London Address”), 
painted a far different picture of the US-Soviet relationship. The “London Address” is the most 
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positive and enthusiastic speech in this study. By the time Reagan gave the address, the 
relationship between the US and the Soviet Union was steadily improving, and the President’s 
Soviet narrative was rapidly changing. Reagan was optimistic about the future of the Soviet 
Union as a player on the world stage and about relations between the US and the USSR. 
Reagan’s positivity was on display in his use of historical narrative as a measure of the success 
of American policies and Soviet social and political change; in his praise of reciprocity in the 
form of deliberation and the mutual interconnected political activities of the West; and in his 
observations of Gorbachev as a synecdoche for a changing Soviet Union. 
In both the “Geneva Address” and the “Reykjavik Address,” arguments from historical 
narrative functioned as a method of comparing the Soviets’ past actions to their current actions. 
Reagan used those actions as evidence of ongoing misdeeds by the Soviets. In turn, Reagan 
adjusted his rhetoric to aid in his arguments that the Soviets should change their ways. Just as the 
Soviets were generally characterized as menaces over the past forty years, the Americans were 
characterized as guarantors of protection. Thus the present affected the past. The same is true of 
the “London Address,” although congratulatory rhetoric, not condemnation, filled the speech. 
Specifically, Reagan argued that over the last five years, the West 
embarked…on a new postwar strategy, a forward strategy of freedom, a strategy of 
public candor about the moral and fundamental differences between statism and 
democracy, but also a strategy of vigorous diplomatic engagement; a policy that rejects 
both the inevitability of war or the permanence of totalitarian rule, a policy based on 
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realism that seeks not just treaties for treaties’ sake but the recognition and resolution of 
fundamental differences with our adversaries.
411
 
Reagan was crowing, because when he came into the presidency, he had been a vocal opponent 
of détente; he believed it had weakened the United States politically and militarily. The outcome 
of his new strategy—and have no doubt that he considered the current method of engaging the 
Soviets his foreign policy strategy—was “already bearing fruit.” Moreover, he thought the world 
was probably “entering a new era in history, a time of lasting change in the Soviet Union.” 
Reagan had just finished a summit in Moscow, and he was proud and eager to talk about “the 
progress toward democratic reform” taking place in the Soviet Union. The Soviets were 
changing their role in the narrative; they showed characteristics of Reagan’s protagonist: the 
United States. It was important that Reagan specified that the new policy simply helped nurture 
the change in the Soviet narrative, not that the West had redeemed the Soviets. It was imperative 
that the Soviets chose their own path to redemption.  
In the “London Address,” redemption also took on a supernatural aspect. At its core, the 
“London Address” was about God, reciprocity, and redemption. Reagan described the West as 
on a “crusade for freedom,” and that its move “toward those things we honor and love: human 
dignity, the hope of freedom for all peoples and for all nations,” was a “pilgrimage.” Most 
important, Reagan intimated that his foreign policy was blessed by God: “I've always cherished 
the belief that all of history is such a pilgrimage and that our Maker, while never denying us free 
will, does over time guide us with a wise and provident hand, giving direction to history and 
slowly bringing good from evil—leading us ever so slowly but ever so relentlessly and lovingly 
to a moment when the will of man and God are as one again.” Reagan’s words were the pinnacle 
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of the power of reciprocity. In the context of the Soviet redemption narrative, Reagan suggested 
that because of his faith, God guided his political decisions. As evidenced by the “momentous 
events” transpiring in the Soviet Union, those decisions “slowly [brought] good from evil.” The 
implication was that the Soviets had changed through the guidance of God via Reagan. In that 
way, the “London Address” bookended the “Evil Empire Address.” In the “Evil Empire 
Address,” policy and faith were inextricably linked; the “London Address” became a kind of 
proof of the veracity of that connection. 
There was a prophetic dimension to Reagan’s connection of policy and faith that carried 
from the “Evil Empire Address” through the “London Address.” The prophetic aspect was 
unsurprising, because as Paul Kengor asserts, Reagan took on a kind of priestly role in a speech 
that was the capstone to a successful, decades-long, “crusade” against communism.412 The 
crusade was coming to an end, and positivity ruled the day. The Soviet redemption narrative 
became a story of transcendence. Note that the God did not force the Soviets to change; they 
exercised “free will,” thus preserving the spirit of a redemption tale.  
Although Reagan may have believed the Hand of Providence had guided the Soviet 
change, he understood the important and tangible contributions of Gorbachev to the process. 
After the Reykjavik summit, Reagan’s praise of Gorbachev grew in frequency and strength. By 
the time the President gave his “London Address,” it was clear that he held a personal and 
political affection for Gorbachev. The Soviet leader changed the perception of the Soviet Union 
as militarily aggressive, societally oppressive, and politically myopic by relaxing some controls 
and slowly implementing new reforms. Reagan was stunned by how much change Gorbachev 
ushered into the USSR in a short time: 
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In all aspects of Soviet life, the talk is of progress toward democratic reform—in the 
economy, in political institutions, in religious, social, and artistic life. It is called 
glasnost—openness; it is perestroika—restructuring. Mr. Gorbachev and I discussed his 
upcoming party conference, where many of these reforms will be debated and perhaps 
adopted—such things as official accountability, limitations on length of service in office, 
an independent judiciary, revisions of the criminal law, and lowering taxes on 
cooperatives. In short, giving individuals more freedom to run their own affairs, to 
control their own destinies.
413
 
The possible changes were historic in their scope. The idea of them happening was radically 
foreign in the history of the Cold War Soviet Union. So much so, that Reagan recognized them 
as “cause for shaking the head in wonder.” Reagan’s observations of the change served to 
highlight the great differences between past and present US-Soviet relationships. 
As he had in previous speeches, Reagan linked the person of Gorbachev to the politics of 
the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, as a synecdoche for the Soviet Union, embodied what Reagan saw 
in Soviet politics. Reagan’s rhetoric reflected that belief. In one instance, he told a story about 
him and Gorbachev walking around “Red Square, talking about a growing personal friendship, 
and meeting together average citizens, realizing how much our people have in common.” Reagan 
called it a “special moment in a week of special moments.” Unlike Soviet leaders of the past, 
Reagan believed Gorbachev was a “serious man seeking serious reform.” For all of the change 
Reagan observed, he recalled that what he would remember the most were Soviet citizens’ “faces 
of hope—the hope of a new era in human history and, hopefully, an era of peace and freedom for 
all.”414 Reagan and Gorbachev’s relationship was mirrored in US-Soviet relations. So went 
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Gorbachev, so went the Soviet Union. As a synecdoche, Gorbachev stood in as the general 
demeanor of the Soviet Union. When Reagan said that he and Gorbachev had a “growing 
personal friendship,” he signaled that the US could have the same kind of relationship with the 
Soviet Union. The once antagonistic villains of the world were redeeming themselves through 
Gorbachev. The President’s words could not be more different from his early vitriolic Soviet 
rhetoric; Reagan saw Soviet change as the story of a state in the process of transition and 
redemption. His rhetoric of the past, of an insidious, barbaric, militarized threat to the world was 
replaced by the vivid language of friendship and of people no longer downtrodden but filled with 
optimism. 
The “London Address” contained Reagan’s well-worn rhetorical strategies of historical 
narrative, reciprocity, and synecdoche, but he used them in to emphasize the positive aspects of 
the Soviet narrative instead of the negative aspects as he had previously. That turnabout makes 
the address important in Reagan’s catalogue of speeches. Unfortunately, the speech seems lost to 
academic circles; there are no journal articles dedicated to it. I think that is unfortunate because it 
is a fine example of Reagan’s changed Soviet rhetoric. His contemporary audience seemed to 
understand its value as well. In a diary entry from the day of the speech, Reagan briefly mentions 
the speech, calling it “very well received.”415 Just before Reagan delivered the “London 
Address,” his job approval poll numbers sat at 45%, and by the beginning of the next month, had 
climbed to 50%.
416
 
417
 The Chicago Tribune elaborated on the audience reception, noting the 
positive tone of the address, Reagan’s praise of Gorbachev, and that the President “drew a 
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standing ovation from an audience of about 400.”418 One reporter noted that the speech was 
“sentimental” in its commendation of Britain, and that it reinforced the “political love affair 
between Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.”419 Some found the speech “flamboyant” and 
overly saccharine, but admitted that Reagan’s positive assessment of the Soviet Union “may 
prove portentous for the next decade” of US-Soviet relations.420 Reagan’s effusive admiration of 
Thatcher and the Brits played alongside his overwhelmingly positive declarations of Gorbachev 
and the new Soviet attitude to create a kind of informal welcome for the Russians to the Western 
sphere of friendship. Reagan was still somewhat cautious, but as historian H.W. Brands notes, 
“His tone and demeanor indicated he had hopes.”421 
Conclusion 
By the end of Reagan’s time in the Oval Office, the Soviets enjoyed a place as 
acquaintances of the United States. To say the two countries were “friends” is an overstatement, 
but they were friendly. At the start of Reagan’s second term the Soviet Union was firmly in the 
enemy camp; their social, domestic, foreign, and military policies were antithetical to US 
interests and ideologies. By January, 1989, they had come a long way from being a dark, 
insidious, looming, “evil empire.” The historically irredeemable Soviet Union had, in great part, 
redeemed themselves. The story of that redemption was told through Reagan’s second-term 
rhetoric, followed easily enough by paying attention to his discussions of the historical misdeeds 
of the Soviet Union and how that situated the Russians on the world stage; his call for a 
reciprocal relationship that would build trust between the superpowers; and the personally and 
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politically redeeming qualities of Gorbachev, his reforms, and his role as a synecdoche for the 
Soviet Union. 
Reagan’s “Farewell Address” was the culmination of a presidency in which the 
redemption narrative became central to his legacy. The address recalled themes, aspects, and 
strategies of the previous three speeches in this chapter, and it served to remind Reagan’s 
audience of the success of the Soviet redemption tale. What follows is a brief study of the 
“Farewell Address” and its place in the context of the redemption narrative during Reagan’s 
second term. The purpose of organizing the conclusion around the “Farewell Address” is to 
demonstrate how Reagan’s final presidential speech created a cohesive finish to the Soviet 
redemption narrative. 
The end of Reagan’s Soviet redemption narrative unfolded slowly. The Soviet Union had 
decades of oppression, war, and lies to overcome, so to expect a quick turnaround in the Soviet 
narrative was unrealistic. The “Geneva Address” in 1985 was the turning point in Reagan’s 
narrative. There, Reagan first noted the possibility that the Soviets were changing. He used 
historical narrative to demonstrate the differences in Soviet word and deed. That is, he compared 
past and present actions to show how the Soviets may have altered their narrative. He was 
cautiously optimistic about the change, but history weighed heavily on his optimism. It is easy 
enough to say that that the “Geneva Address” was the start of the resolution of the Soviet 
redemption narrative, but it is important to remember that the idea of the Soviets taking steps to 
become better than they were was nearly unthinkable. That Reagan would be the author of such a 
narrative was shocking, for he had decades of vitriolic, anti-communist rhetoric under his belt. It 
was not easy to put the Soviets on the path to redemption. The Soviet Union was not the Severus 
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Snape of the world; it was rather more like Lord Voldemort. Its transgressions were great, and 
that meant it would have to fight hard for redemption. 
When Reagan delivered his “Farewell Address to the Nation” (“Farewell Address”) in 
January, 1989, the US and Soviet Union’s relationship was friendlier than it had been at any 
point in the 20
th
 century. Between Reagan’s “London Address” and the “Farewell Address,” 
conflict between the superpowers was minimal.
422
 In fact, long before the end of 1988, 
Gorbachev showed his willingness to pursue peace and reforms; two events in particular stood 
out. First, Soviet scientist and human rights activist Andrei Sakharov toured the United States in 
November. Sakharov “developed the Soviet hydrogen bomb,” won the Nobel Peace prize, and 
“endured six years of internal exile for his views on human rights” in the Soviet Union.423 His 
trip was a major indicator of Gorbachev’s commitment to perestroika. Second, in a stunning 
December announcement, Gorbachev said that he would “cut 500,000 men from the Soviet 
military, about 10%, and retire the associated equipment,” “remove 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery 
pieces and 800 combat aircraft from Soviet inventories,” eliminate “six Soviet tank 
divisions…stationed in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary,” and “restructure his 
forces in Eastern Europe to be ‘clearly defensive.’”424 
Gorbachev’s actions were proof that the Soviet Union had abandoned the bad acts that 
once defined the historical narrative, and in the “Farewell Address,” Reagan demonstrated Soviet 
redemption through historical narrative by reminding his audience from where and how far the 
Soviet Union had progressed. What the narrative used to be was important to understanding what 
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the narrative was presently. The United States had “forged a satisfying new closeness with the 
Soviet Union”425 based on a demonstrable change in Soviet actions.426 In the past, the Soviets 
merely paid lip-service to the tenets of détente and “promise[s] to treat their own people and the 
people of the world better. But the gulag was still the gulag, and the state was still expansionist, 
and they still waged proxy wars in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.” Once, the Soviets were 
untrustworthy promise-breakers with an expansionist agenda. The historical narrative was filled 
with Soviet lies and misdeeds, and nothing before Reagan’s second term indicated they might 
possess redemptive qualities. 
Over the course of four years, the narrative changed; it was “different.” In part, a farewell 
address should praise aspects of American life, and in Reagan’s narrative, American policies 
built on democratic “principles” were the impetus for Soviet change. Reagan had not faltered 
from pushing democratic ideals in his policy negotiations with Gorbachev, and the Soviet leader 
had worked within that framework while implementing his own “internal democratic reforms.” 
Subsequently, the US and the Soviet Union eventually came to agreements on a number of issues 
and formed a “new closeness.” The President’s “Farewell Address” demonstrated how far the 
Soviets had come in changing the historical narrative since Reagan first sounded a cautiously 
optimistic note in the “Geneva Address” for such an improvement. 
The “Geneva Address” opened up the public to seeing the Soviets as something greater 
than villains. Reagan emphasized some positive aspects of the Gorbachev-led USSR, but a series 
of heated disagreements between the US and the USSR had taken some of the shine off the 
apple. Those disagreements carried through into the 1986 Reykjavik summit, and subsequently, 
into the “Reykjavik Address.” That address was far more negative than the “Geneva Address,” in 
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large part because Gorbachev resisted agreeing to SDI, and Reagan felt frustrated with the 
negotiations. The “Reykjavik Address” functioned as a challenge to the Soviets to do some self-
reflection and consider the good a reciprocal US-USSR relationship could do in terms of global 
safety. Reagan’s rhetoric characterized the Soviets as something more like their pre-Geneva 
summit days; it seemed that the Soviet Union was backsliding on the road to redemption. 
In terms of the success of arguing for a relationship of reciprocity, Reagan’s “Farewell 
Address” was far different than the “Reykjavik Address.” Where Reagan expressed frustration 
with Gorbachev in the “Reykjavik Address,” particularly with the Soviet leader’s 
shortsightedness on the good a reciprocal relationship engendered, in the “Farewell Address,” the 
President praised the reciprocal nature of US-Soviet relations. Reagan’s call for deliberation and 
exchange had resulted in a relationship of reciprocity, and it had borne fruit. Reagan abandoned 
claims that his policies were transcendent. Instead, he concentrated on what reciprocity 
accomplished on an earthly level, particularly in regard to the way it shaped change in the Soviet 
Union. The President noted that on a visit to Russia he saw a joyful change in the countenance of 
the Soviet citizens.
427
 The Soviets had relaxed their social policies, allowing their citizens more 
freedom, and the Russians earned some measure of praise and trust from the West. Reagan called 
the enactment of his domestic and foreign policies a “great movement,” saying, “We meant to 
change a nation, and instead, we changed a world.” The President’s statement appears to be a 
statement about the US and the world, but it is not. Ostensibly, the US was the subject, but in 
light of Reagan’s second-term Soviet rhetoric and his fondness for Gorbachev and the General 
Secretary’s reforms, Russia became the country America tried to change, and in the process, the 
US changed the world.
428
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level of trust and surety absent in previous US-Soviet relations, and by the end of his presidency, 
it appeared he was correct. Reciprocity, once hard come by, had become a defining feature of 
US-Soviet relations. 
By the time Reagan gave his “London Address,” the US and the Soviet Union had 
enjoyed a number of mutual victories, including arms control agreements. Reagan effusively 
praised the Soviet Union, especially Gorbachev. The “London Address” was a breakthrough 
moment in the Soviet redemption story. The Soviets were characterized as moving in the right 
direction, and with the help of the US foreign policy, they were well on their way to finding 
redemption. Reagan’s “London Address” praised the Soviets for being on the road to 
redemption; his “Farewell Address” had the Soviets arrive as close as they could to redemption 
during Reagan’s presidency. Reagan saw the change in the Soviet Union as something 
momentous and worthy of acknowledgment. “Nothing is less free than pure communism,” said 
Reagan, “yet we have, the past few years, forged a satisfying new closeness with the Soviet 
Union. I’ve been asked if this isn’t a gamble, and my answer is no because we’re basing our 
actions not on words but deeds.” The Soviets gained trust through actions because their leader 
engendered such trust. Gorbachev stood as a synecdoche for the new Soviet Union. He was 
trustworthy where previous leaders were not; he was a reformer; and he “knew things were 
wrong with his society and [was] trying to fix them.” Gorbachev’s influence was seen in all 
facets of Soviet social and political life. The Soviets were keeping their promises, unlike during 
détente of the 1970s. Reagan saw the results of Soviet change in his last visit to Moscow, 
recalling the happiness of the Soviet citizens and how he “could almost feel the possibilities in 
all that joy.” How different Reagan’s characterization of Russian citizens was in his “Farewell 
 164 
Address” than in his first-term Soviet rhetoric where they were presented as downtrodden, 
oppressed people longing to flee Russian borders.
429
 
Reagan’s “Farewell Address” did not focus on the Soviets, but that he spent time praising 
the new look Soviet Union was significant. The change in the Soviet narrative was an important 
part of Reagan’s legacy, and its inclusion in the “Farewell Address” demonstrated that Reagan 
thought that as well. The address was widely praised as a “virtuoso performance” for its 
“evocative language,” imagery, and “relaxed tone.”430 Just as in his “London Address,” critics 
noted the overwhelmingly positive tone of the address, both for the future of America and US-
Soviet relations.
431
 Reagan’s final job approval poll found him at 60%,432 although I am dubious 
about the idea that his “Farewell Address” affected his numbers. Reagan’s vision of America, 
said one critic, was of “fables and mythology, of symbols and patriotic dreams,” and to Reagan, 
it was that vision that had helped the US overcome obstacles, including helping to forge a new, 
lasting friendship with the Soviet Union.
433
 
With the “Farewell Address,” Reagan narrated the final chapter of the Soviet redemption 
story. His second-term rhetoric had changed in a way few could have foreseen. Reagan’s 
previous Soviet rhetoric did not allow for the kind of relationship that developed between the US 
and the Soviet Union. It seemed the Soviets would always be irredeemable villains, just as 
Reagan had always characterized them. However, with Gorbachev’s ascension to power, 
willingness to reform, and the good relationship between the Soviet leader and Reagan, the 
Soviets changed their formerly insidious ways. Reagan’s second-term rhetoric showed the ways 
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in which the Soviet Union transformed itself, and it became—perhaps not a protagonist—a 
redeemed character in Reagan’s Soviet redemption narrative. 
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Chapter Five 
Reagan did not narrate the epilogue of his Soviet redemption narrative; Mikhail 
Gorbachev did. His reforms paved the way for the fall of Soviet communism. In November, 
1989, less than a year after Reagan left office, “thousands of jubilant Germans brought down the 
most visible symbol of division at the heart of Europe—the Berlin Wall.”434 The event was a 
watershed moment, and it seemed to signal the end of the Cold War. Indeed, later that year, 
“starting in Poland and spreading quickly throughout Central and Eastern Europe, European 
communism imploded.”435 Nearly every Soviet satellite state abandoned communism over the 
next two years, and on December 25, 1991, “the Soviet hammer and sickle flag lowered for the 
last time over the Kremlin,” signaling the end of the Soviet Union.436 Considering Reagan’s 
assertions that the Soviet Union was at odds with God, it was appropriate that the close of the 
President’s Soviet redemption story occurred on Christmas Day. In his first term, Reagan 
regarded “the reform or collapse of the communist system within the Soviet Union and its 
satellites” as “the only real long-term solution to key security problems.”437 
In this dissertation, I argue that narrative functioned as a mode of persuasion and 
historical restructuring in Reagan’s Soviet discourse. Over the course of eight speeches and two 
presidential terms, I show that through rhetorical strategies, Reagan constructed a Soviet 
redemption narrative. Reagan’s pre-presidential rhetoric was the foundation of the narrative. 
Reagan’s story began during his Hollywood days when he spoke out against communism and 
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cautioned Americans about the expansionist goals of the Soviet Union. During his time as the 
Governor of California, Reagan continued speaking about the dangers of Soviet communism. 
After his election to the presidency in 1980, Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric seemed as vitriolic as ever. 
During Reagan’s second term, however, he began talking about the Soviets in a more 
conciliatory manner. In large part, Gorbachev’s desire for Soviet reforms, and the relationship 
the Soviet leader and Reagan built, facilitated the President’s rhetorical shift. In short, this 
dissertation reveals the rhetorical strategies Reagan used to negotiate his changing Soviet 
rhetoric and the way that rhetoric created a Soviet redemption narrative. 
The Narrative 
 Reagan’s Soviet redemption story generally followed the traditional three-act narrative 
structure: setup, conflict, and resolution. The acts were not clearly delineated. Rather, each bled 
into the other. As is common in the setup, Reagan’s narrative introduced the main characters of 
the story (the United States and the Soviet Union), a problem or incident of consequence 
(ideological conflict/the Soviet menace), and the general state of the world in which the 
characters live (a radically changed, post-World War II, world). In a traditional narrative 
structure, the conflict involves great change in the characters’ world that is brought on by the 
problem, as well as the ways in which the characters navigate those changes. The conflict in 
Reagan’s narrative centered on the Cold War clash between the US and the USSR and how the 
superpowers engaged each other in a rapidly changing political climate. The resolution is the 
third act in a narrative structure. It is marked by the moment of highest tension in the story; the 
characters are forced to confront the problem introduced in the setup, which leads to the 
problem’s resolution. The Soviet redemption narrative’s resolution occurred in the President’s 
second term when Gorbachev ascended to power, Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric changed, and the 
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USSR started the process of reform. What follows is a brief review of the Soviet redemption 
narrative’s setup, conflict, and resolution. I demonstrate the ebb and flow of the narrative’s plot, 
how each act played out in Reagan’s rhetoric, and the manner in which each act influenced the 
other to create the Soviet redemption narrative. 
The Setup and the Conflict 
 It is customary to find a fairly clear delineation between the acts of a narrative. Reagan’s 
Soviet redemption narrative was different. The setup and the conflict were inextricable from one 
another. Reagan’s pre-presidential Soviet rhetoric, and his first-term presidential rhetoric, served 
much the same purpose: it defined the characteristics of the main characters, emphasized the 
differences in American and Russian ideologies, and stressed the danger of a Soviet Union left 
unchecked. That is not to say that the different eras of Reagan’s rhetoric were equal in power. 
His presidential rhetoric had a higher level of authority and consequence and thus was more 
significant to the narrative. 
Unlike a story in which the narrator creates characters and conflicts from whole cloth, 
elements of the setup were established far before Reagan began his tale. The acrimonious 
relationship between the Americans and the Soviets began in earnest after the October 
Revolution in 1917 in which the communist Bolsheviks gained control of Russia.
438
 Just as 
during the Cold War, the tenets of communism in the early 20
th
 century were antithetical to 
American democracy. Communism was “not only a threat to America’s interest in a stable global 
order, but also a menace to American domestic unity and a challenge” to American values.439 
Thus, the US and the Soviet Union maintained a discordant relationship for many years before 
World War II. After a brief alliance during the Second World War, the US and the USSR 
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returned to unfriendly terms. In 1949, there was a “first turning point,” or a moment that 
“ensures that life will never be the same for the main character[s]”440: the Soviets successfully 
tested an atomic bomb. From that moment, the US and the USSR would have to negotiate a 
rancorous relationship without one pushing the other to unleash a nuclear end-of-days. 
Although the characters and the conflict were created before Reagan began his speaking 
career, his pre-presidential Soviet rhetoric was instrumental in fashioning the setup up for his 
redemption narrative. Reagan was concerned with the political, social, and ideological conflict 
between the US and the USSR and with the idea of encroaching communist influence across the 
globe, especially in the United States. Given the USSR’s expansionist sensibilities, history of 
oppression, and disdain for democracy, Reagan readily decried the Soviets’ character and their 
threat to the world stability. He professed the immoral and aggressive aspects of Soviet 
existence, while lauding the benevolent character of the United States. 
Reagan used the rhetorical strategies of ethos, prophetic dualism, and analogy to 
convince his audiences, whether in his testimony to the HUAC, or in his gubernatorial oratory, of 
the United States’ moral superiority and goodness compared to the Soviet Union’s. The US was 
charged with vigilantly guarding against communist expansionism. Reagan’s position on the 
dangers of communist encroachment was best exemplified in his “A Time for Choosing” speech. 
As Governor of California, Reagan toned down the frequency and vitriol of his anti-communist 
rhetoric in order to “appear less radical and extremist.”441 Still, his narrative characterized the 
Soviet Union as the premier evil in the world, and the US as the greatest good. After he left the 
governor’s mansion, Reagan hosted a daily radio program that ran from 1975-1979, and his 
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“staunch opposition to Communism [was] apparent in many commentaries.”442 His pre-
presidential rhetoric told the story of a Soviet Union bent on spreading communism through 
direct intervention in unstable countries, or through covert infiltration in stable democracies. 
Reagan was unrelenting on that point, and as he entered the first term of his presidency, 
his anti-communist rhetoric raised concerns about whether he had the temperament to engage the 
Soviets without sparking some kind of military conflict. His critics were right to worry, for 
Reagan continued his brand of pointed anti-communism. Reagan concretized his narrative of the 
Soviets as harbingers of doom through historical narrative, observations about the social, 
political, and moral character of the US, the Soviets, and their allies that emerged from the 
historical narrative, and assertions about what the West must do to achieve victory over Soviet 
communism. In his pre-presidential Soviet narrative, the USSR was clearly the primary 
antagonist in the world. During the first term of his presidency, the Soviet Union became more 
than an expansionist villain. It was an evil empire slouching toward its doom but still dangerous, 
untrustworthy, and immoral. The historical narrative showed that the Soviet Union was, and had 
always been, irredeemable. 
Reagan’s pre-presidential, and first-term presidential, rhetoric created an antagonist of 
historic proportions. The Soviet Union sought world domination, and it would use deceit, 
violence, and oppression to secure its rule. Reagan’s protagonist, the US, was charged with 
defending the world from communist encroachment. Their antithetical ideologies kept the US 
and the USSR in a constant struggle for global influence. Reagan’s narrative undermined the 
Soviet Union while elevating the United States. In short, it seemed the two countries would 
forever be in conflict. 
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The Resolution 
The resolution of Reagan’s Soviet redemption narrative came during his second 
presidential term. A narrative’s resolution houses the moment when tension is at its peak, and for 
Reagan’s narrative, that moment was when Gorbachev became the Soviet leader. Clearly, there 
were other moments in the Cold War that one might point to as the moment of highest tension. 
For example, the Cuban Missile Crisis took the US and the Soviet Union to the brink of war. 
However, in Reagan’s narrative, Gorbachev’s rise to power coincided with a US-Soviet 
relationship that had recently been at its most divisive. Equally as important, Gorbachev 
signified a moment when the course of US-Soviet relations had the chance to change. The 
narrative found itself in a place of high anxiety, because the decades-long problem of US-Soviet 
conflict had reached a turning point. 
Unfortunately, Reagan could not simply change his Soviet rhetoric so that it was friendly 
and open toward the communists. Reagan’s Soviet rhetoric was consistent for decades, and his 
antecedent anti-communist rhetoric was a part of his political identity. He had made it clear that 
the superpowers’ social and political ideologies were in such conflict that the US and the USSR 
could do no more than coexist, and even that was a dubious arrangement. If Reagan radically 
changed the character of the Soviet Union in the middle of his narrative, he ran the risk of having 
his authenticity and veracity challenged. 
Indeed, Reagan’s rhetorical shift created dissention among conservatives. James Mann 
notes that during the President’s “final three years as president, frustrated conservatives 
regularly” claimed that Reagan “had become the tool of a cabal of ‘moderates’ inside his 
administration”; these moderates kept Reagan from being his true self.443 They called for the 
President’s administration to “‘Let Reagan be Reagan.’” Conservatives decried Reagan’s new 
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Soviet rhetoric. Archconservative William F. Buckley argued that “to greet [the Soviet Union] as 
if it were no longer evil is on the order of changing our entire position toward Adolf Hitler.”444 
George Will said Reagan was “wrong…about what is happening in Moscow.” Will claimed that 
the President “has accelerated the moral disarmament of the West—actual disarmament will 
follow—by elevating wishful thinking to the status of political philosophy.”445 F. Andy Messing 
Jr., executive director of the conservative National Defense Council Foundation, concluded that 
the President “abandoned the conservative agenda he brought to office” and was not “the Ronald 
Reagan of 1980.”446 Despite conservative protestations, Reagan “overcame the resistance of the 
political right, effectively marginalizing it.”447 
To take advantage of the new political climate, Reagan had to find a way to negotiate a 
change in his Soviet rhetoric. The President did so by employing three recurring strategies: 
historical narrative, arguments of reciprocity, and synecdoche. Reagan used historical narrative 
throughout his speaking career. Previously, he employed historical narrative as a way to establish 
the Soviet history of deception. In his second term, Reagan used it as a means of comparison to 
exhibit positive Soviet change and to emphasize the importance of demonstrable acts of 
reciprocity between the Americans and the Soviets. Regrettably for Reagan, the Soviets’ long 
history of dishonesty, oppression, and expansionism left little in the way of trust. Luckily, 
Gorbachev represented a new way of Soviet thinking, and the President found the Soviet leader 
an excellent synecdoche for the whole of the USSR. If Reagan could work with Gorbachev to 
form a new relationship, then the US could build a new relationship with the Soviet Union. 
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The resolution of Reagan’s Soviet redemption narrative might best be described as a 
narrative of summits. The President’s post-summit addresses revealed the progress of the Soviet 
narrative. After the Geneva summit, Reagan struck a softer, more conciliatory tone than he had 
before when talking about the Soviets. The US could work with the USSR, and although Reagan 
was cautiously optimistic, the “Geneva Address” placed the Soviets on a narrative path to some 
form of redemption unimaginable in the President’s previous rhetoric. Reagan’s optimism did 
not last long, and after the Reykjavik summit, he presented his audience with a story of Soviet 
backsliding; the Soviets had fallen back into their previous role of antagonist. It appeared that 
Reagan’s Soviet narrative would continue as before. Yet two years later, speaking after the 
Moscow summit, Reagan characterized the Soviets in relatively glowing terms. Gorbachev had 
pushed reforms in the Soviet Union, and it had experienced a sea change in terms of social and 
political actions. In his “Farewell Address,” Reagan reiterated his approval of the changes 
happening in the Soviet Union. At the end of Reagan’s presidency, the Soviets were no longer 
the antagonists of the President’s narrative, but a character earnestly endeavoring toward 
redemption. 
 In its simplest form, the arc of Reagan’s Soviet redemption narrative unfolded like this: 
During the Cold War, the Soviets were an aggressive, deceitful lot, determined to expand their 
influence across the globe. They attempted to do so through threats of violence, wars, proxy 
wars, and immoral actions. The US opposed the USSR, serving as a benevolent shield against 
communist encroachment. Nonetheless, the Soviets used treachery, dishonesty, and viciousness 
to gain footholds in countries throughout the world. They menaced the world as irredeemable 
despots whose system of government was antithetical to American democracy. There was no 
hope for peace as long as the Soviet Union existed, and as the historical record showed, the 
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Soviets could not be trusted to pursue peace, even if they espoused a desire for such. The Soviets 
seemed destined to remain the world’s antagonist, but through Mikhail Gorbachev, they began to 
change. 
Their path to redemption was not straight, and occasionally, they fell back on their old 
ways. Still, the Soviets persisted, and they eventually reformed themselves. In what I earlier 
called the epilogue, the Soviet Union voluntarily ended its existence. The USSR’s end signaled 
the Soviet redemption narrative’s close. The conclusion of Reagan’s narrative served to 
emphasize how much the Soviets had changed. In Reagan’s decades-long narrative, the world 
saw the Soviet Union as a fierce threat to its safety; the Soviets were willing to engage in all 
manner of violence and trickery to remain relevant and gain power. One expected something 
akin to a Dylan Thomas poem—the Soviets would “not go gentle into that good night,”448 but 
there was no raging in the end. The Soviet Union, which ran “against the tide of history,”449 was 
consumed by that tide like a sandcastle in the dying light of the day. 
Conclusions 
Studying a speaker’s development of one issue over the span of a public speaking career 
yields perspectives previously unknown, unexplored, or ignored. We gain new perspectives on a 
speaker’s political, social, or personal words, deeds, and beliefs through the temporal aspect of 
their orations often hidden in the study of a single speech, or of a few over a brief span of time. 
We can analyze one speech and point to the rhetorical devices, kairotic import of the moment, 
and the influence of historical events in the oration, but such analysis does not allow us an 
inclusive understanding of the speech as part of a greater body of work. 
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In Reagan’s case, two important new perspectives emerge from the study of his 
deployment of the Soviet narrative over the course of his speaking career. First, critics often note 
the consistency of Reagan’s messages throughout his career. As Robert Rowland writes, 
“Reagan speeches from the end of his presidency sound very much like Reagan speeches from 
the Goldwater campaign.”450 Such consistency was particularly true of Reagan’s anti-Soviet 
messages until his second term. Reagan’s shifting Soviet rhetoric reveals that he was not as 
dogmatic in his rhetorical approach as many would claim. His Soviet rhetoric, then, was more 
than the repetition of the same message over the course of his career. Instead, Reagan’s Soviet 
rhetoric reveals the dynamic process of rhetoric in response to new purposes, situations, and 
political actors. For Reagan scholars, contrary to the popular image of him as an “empty suit”451 
bumbling through the political process, the President’s shifting rhetoric offers evidence that he 
understood and used the nuance and power of rhetoric to achieve political goals. 
The second new perspective we gain from studying the Soviet redemption narrative is the 
clout of a unified message, especially from a President, to change the way an audience perceives 
a former political rival. Reagan’s Soviet narrative demonstrates how a speaker fashions the new 
out of the old. We see how changing the way one speaks of a political adversary can help to 
mend decades-old social and political rivalries. Changing the narrative hurt Reagan’s standing 
with some hardline conservatives, but it enhanced his standing with liberals who were “delighted 
and surprised”452 by his conciliatory language. In any case, conservatives gnashing their teeth, or 
liberals nodding their heads in approval, mattered little to the outcome of Reagan’s narrative. 
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Through his narrative, Reagan constituted the Soviet Union as redeemed, and in doing so, 
changed the way his American audience perceived the Russians. In large part, Reagan was 
successful at changing perceptions because he did not betray his political beliefs while 
navigating the transformation of US-Soviet relations. In short, Reagan was principled and 
pragmatic
453
 as he told the Soviet redemption narrative. 
Reagan’s Soviet redemption narrative deserves attention for a number of reasons. First, it 
is a powerful example of how presidential rhetoric facilitates national and international political 
change. In his first term, Reagan’s rhetoric reinforced the historical narrative that positioned the 
Soviets as the ultimate evil in the world and America as its enduring foe. Yet, despite that 
position, the Soviet Union of his second term became an example of redemptive change. 
Through both conciliatory and provocative rhetoric, in conjunction with Gorbachev’s desire for 
reform, Reagan helped facilitate a change in perceptions of the Soviet Union, and he expedited 
its abandonment of communism. 
Second, for Reagan scholars, the narrative helps us understand how the President 
negotiated his changing Soviet rhetoric in light of his antecedent rhetoric. He never abandoned 
anti-communist rhetoric; Reagan employed it strategically, using it less as the Soviets moved 
away from hardline communist policies. As I have noted, many critics of Reagan’s changing 
Soviet rhetoric found it, at best, hypocritical, and, at worst, tantamount to embracing Hitler. 
However, viewed as part of a larger narrative, the President’s rhetoric appears to move between 
that which was necessary in the past to maintain the global status quo and that which was 
necessary to advance global progress. 
Third, the Soviet redemption narrative is a unique case of political rhetorical response 
and change. Rarely does a politician, whose political persona is rooted in one unflinching, 
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enduring crusade, shift their rhetoric and message in such a relatively quick and substantial way. 
In Reagan’s case, his changing rhetoric was a response to a kairotic moment of great historical 
significance. 
Fourth, Reagan’s narrative reveals the power of rhetoric in action and shows us how 
rhetoric can mend political rifts, creating new relationships out of old. Since before World War I, 
the US and the Soviet Union maintained an acrimonious relationship that grew increasingly 
strained through Reagan’s first term. Decades of social, political, and ideological struggle 
seemed to have solidified a permanent state of conflict between the superpowers. Yet, through 
rhetorical and political moves, Reagan loosened that concretized animosity, allowing the US and 
the Soviet Union the freedom to move toward a friendly partnership.  
Last, the Soviet redemption narrative challenges us to find the cohesive message or story 
across an orator’s catalogue. In doing so, we might better understand any number of their 
overarching stances or arguments. As well, we may find that long held beliefs about an orator’s 
overall rhetoric or motivation need revision. So it was with Reagan’s Soviet narrative. There is a 
perception that Reagan’s anti-communism was without nuance, and that, while a skilled orator, 
he was somewhat politically inept. However, Reagan’s changing Soviet rhetoric and its 
accompanying redemption narrative, revealed a man who understood when, and in what 
contexts, to alter his rhetoric to suit his political goals. 
There is room to expand this study. I chose eight speeches as exemplars of how the 
Soviet redemption narrative evolved over time, but one could critique a greater number of 
speeches in order to produce a more nuanced reading of the narrative. Charting Reagan’s 
changing Soviet rhetoric, and studying the redemptive path of the Soviets, could also reveal 
what, if any, influence Reagan had in the collapse of the Soviet Union. I did not address the 
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contentious issue of whether Reagan ended the Cold War, but by studying Reagan’s Soviet 
rhetoric in conjunction with moments of Soviet action, inaction, or change, one may find 
stronger or weaker evidence of Reagan’s hand in ending the Cold War. 
When I began this dissertation, I expected to find a linear narrative. Instead, I found a 
narrative whose acts were not clearly demarcated, and whose temporal aspects helped me to 
understand the place of past actions on an orator’s current rhetoric. Reagan was a divisive 
personality; people applauded and derided his nationalistic rhetoric, his virulent anti-communist 
oratory, and his saccharine view of American democracy. I applaud Reagan, because although he 
was far from a perfect president, he held fast to his convictions because he believed he was doing 
what was best for America. For Reagan, part of doing good for the country was to push a 
narrative that said the Soviet Union was a menace to the safety and sanctity of the US and its 
allies. However, part of doing what was best for America was also recognizing when the 
narrative could change and taking advantage of the moment. What emerged from this study was 
an understanding of how Reagan’s Soviet redemption narrative not only told the story of the 
Soviet antagonist redeeming itself, but how that redemption narrative mirrored the moments 
when Reagan acted to further the good of America. 
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